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Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to describe the complex diplomatic relations between
England and Scotland that led to, and immediately followed, the armed English
aggression toward Scotland known as the “Rough Wooing”, the attempt by Henry VIII to
force the Scots to submit to English political influence in the mid 1540's. Much has been
written about specific events that moved England and Scotland from diplomacy to war
during the years 1543-1547, but no one has produced a study that utilizes both scholarly
assessments and primary source material. This synthesis of modem insight with
contemporary sources is intended to produce a more clear and detailed picture o f a
chaotic time and the individuals who shaped Anglo-Scottish relations.
The essay begins by providing a brief synthesis of Anglo-Scottish politics and
diplomacy in the years leading up to the death of King James V of Scotland in late 1542.
Background is given from both the English and Scottish perspectives, so as to give the
reader added insight into the dealings to come. The remainder of the essay describes the
intricate and often ruthless relations between the two kingdoms prior to the deaths of
Cardinal David Beaton in 1546 and Henry VIII in early 1547. Primarily the paper will
cover the “Gentle Wooing” of English diplomacy in 1543 followed by the English
invasion of Edinburgh in 1544, which constituted what contemporary sources described
as Henry’s “Rough Wooing” of Scotland. Perhaps most importantly, this essay will
explain the motives of the key individuals on both sides of the border who determined the
course o f Anglo-Scottish relations from 1543-1547.

Anglo-Scottish Relations from Gentle to Rough Wooing
1543-1547

Introduction
And so the Scots must be kept in constant readiness, poised
to attack the English in case they stir ever so little.1

The mid-sixteenth century is a fascinating time in which to study relations
between the kingdoms of England and Scotland. In particular, the period which falls
between the Scottish defeats at Solway Moss in 1542 and Pinkie in 1547 holds special
interest for the student of Anglo-Scottish politics and diplomacy. Those years witnessed
a divided Scotland under the rule of various factions, all of whom claimed to represent
the infant Mary Stuart, Queen o f Scots. King Henry VIITs plan to control Scotland
through an Anglophile political party seemed foolproof in early 1543, that is before a
Francophile party led by Cardinal David Beaton gained power. In 1544 King Henry
ordered the future Protector Somerset, Edward Seymour, to sack Edinburgh, and the
period of English aggression known as the “Rough Wooing” began. Yet Scotland refused
to be intimidated by her cousin to the south and the Scots managed politically and
diplomatically to outmaneuver Old King Hal from 1543 until his death in 1547.
My thesis will cover Anglo-Scottish relations from the death o f King James V of
Scotland in late 1542 to the death of King Henry VIII of England in early 1547. While
many historians have covered these years in their surveys of Tudor history, Scottish
history, and the life of Henry VIII, none has written specifically about the period itself,
even though there has been an ongoing debate concerning the nature of Henry VIITs

1 Sir Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Robert Adams, 2nd ed., (New York, 1992), p.21.
2

3

Scottish policy. Therefore, I wish to write a brief account of Anglo-Scottish politics,
diplomacy, and conflict, focusing primarily on the events o f 1543-44 and evaluating
relations from both the English and Scottish points of view. My thesis seeks to
understand the basis of Henry’s “Rough Wooing” and make the complex political
situation in Edinburgh more comprehensible. I shall also emphasize the importance of
religion and nationalist sentiment in each kingdom’s respective policies, as well as
showing how the events of 1543-47 affected the future course of Anglo-Scottish history.
From a historical standpoint, the relationship between the two kingdoms comprehended
issues of national sovereignty and independence, religious reform, political allegiance,
and diplomatic treachery. Events during these four years shaped the life of Mary Queen
of Scots, affected the policies of Protector Somerset, helped to bring about the Scottish
Reformation, influenced the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh in which Scotland’s “Auld
Alliance” with France finally ended, and may have produced ideas which led to AngloScottish union by 1603.
In the process of analyzing Anglo-Scottish relations, I hope to answer some of the
questions which historians have posed about this period. Did King Henry VIII have a
coherent Scottish policy at any time from 1543 until his death? I would argue that he did
not, but was England’s policy toward Scotland based entirely on her policy toward
France? What about the assistance and directions given to the Anglophile party in
Scotland, which actually had control o f the kingdom in early 1543? Was the Scottish
Governor Arran sincere in his reformist, pro-English beliefs, or was he simply stalling the
English for time? More specifically, was Arran the fool that both contemporaries and
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historians have scorned as unfit for the duties of the regency? Were the “assured” lords
the unprincipled double-dealers that historians have made them out to be? Who else
influenced Scottish policy and what were the attitudes of Scottish diplomat Sir Ralph
Sadler and the future Protector Somerset, Edward Seymour, concerning the Scots? Why
was the Anglophile party in Scotland so strong at the beginning of 1543 and so weak at
the end? Was its collapse the fault of the English Ambassador Sadler? Was Henry’s
“Rough Wooing” a poor strategy? What benefits did it have for the English? Why were
Governor Arran and Cardinal Beaton seemingly so unprepared for Seymour’s 1544
invasion? If religious reform did play such a large role in Scotland’s relations with
England, why were the Scots still firmly allied with Catholic France in 1546? How did
Cardinal Beaton rise to such prominence in Scottish affairs overshadowing the queen
Dowager and members of the Hamilton, Douglas, and Stuart families? And finally, was
Henry VIII responsible for Beaton’s murder in 1546?
My source material consists of contemporary documents which relate to AngloScottish diplomacy, as well as modem English and Scottish political surveys. To achieve
a broader perspective, I will also use documents written by the principal figures o f each
kingdom, while including letters written by foreign ambassadors in London. The most
important primary sources for this period are Letters and Papers. Foreign and Domestic,
of the Reign of Henry VIII. documenting nearly every source associated with Henry's
government; The Hamilton Papers, which focus primarily on Anglo-Scottish relations;
Sadler State Papers, including the dispatches of the English ambassador in Scotland; The
Scottish Correspondence of Marv of Lorraine, which comprises the letters received by the
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Scottish queen Dowager; Register of the Privv Council of Scotland, documenting
Scottish government proceedings from 1545; the Letters of James V, which includes the
correspondence to and from the Scottish King until 1542; and The Works of John Knox.
focusing on the Protestant leader's opinions and recollections of the period.2
I shall begin this essay by laying out a broad history of events and synthesizing
the secondary source material, focusing on England in the first chapter and Scotland in
the second. Thus, the first part of the essay examines the background of the period from
the perspective of both the English and the Scots. The second part consists of a more
detailed study of the period itself. For the remaining six chapters I look more closely at
the complexities of Anglo-Scottish relations, using primary sources and my own
interpretations o f the persons involved and the policies those parties espoused. As much
as possible, I want the principal figures of the period to tell their own story. My goal is to
present a clear perspective on an often misunderstood period of deceit, chaos, fear, and
confusion.

2 Full bibliographic citations are included at end of essay.

Chapter 1
HenryVIIFs Scottish Policy leading up to the "Rough Wooing"

There exists no standard explanation of Henry VIITs foreign policy that most
modem scholars would agreeably accept. Anglo-Scottish relations in the early 1540's the period before the “Rough Wooing” - have particularly been open to interpretation.
Yet, two distinct theories for England’s policy toward Scotland have been advanced. The
first theory, argued by historians such as A.F. Pollard, R.B. Wemham, G. Donaldson,
R.G. Eaves, and P.S. Crowson, insists that King Henry had a “unified Kingdom of greater
Britain”1in mind before 1540 and molded his Scottish policy to achieve that end. A
second group of historians including D. Potter, W. Ferguson, S. Gunn, J. Guy, J.J.
Scarisbrick, G.R. Elton, L.B. Smith, and D.M. Head, believe that there was no policy
aimed at dynastic union with Scotland before 1542-43 and, in any case, Henry VIII had
no coherent Scottish policy, since his focus was never on his northern neighbor during the
1540's. In either case, by 1542, in the context o f the political crisis in Scotland caused by
the death o f James V, Henry had an excellent opportunity to exert English control over
Edinburgh. The fact is, Henry tried to do so, but only half-heartedly because his true
interests by this time lay in one last honorable military coalition against France. Thus, all
Henry required was the assurance that the Scots would not open up a second front along
England’s northern borders. A combination of poor English diplomatic strategy,

1Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy (London, 1973), p. 125.
6
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exceptional Scottish stubbornness, and Henry’s bad temper ruined this chance for AngloScottish peace that Henry needed if he were to devote all his resources to the continental
theater. Thus, the English military coercion o f Scotland in 1544-45, known as the
“Rough Wooing", proceeded not from a long-term imperial strategy but directly from
Henry’s decision, as early as the Spring of 1541, to once again make war against the
French.
Throughout Henry’s reign, the kingdom of Scotland loomed on the periphery of
English foreign policy. Henry, and also Wolsey before 1529, was much more interested
in continental affairs than with a kingdom perceived as backwards and powerless in the
European sphere of influence. England viewed Scotland as simply a hindrance along the
northern border that occasionally needed to be contained. However, this policy
drastically changed during the periods of Henry’s three wars against the French: 1513-14,
1522-23, and after 1542. The Franco-Scottish “Auld Alliance” dating back to the 12th
century and renewed in 1492 and 1512 forced England to take Scottish relations more
seriously for fear o f a northern invasion backed by France. The first two periods of war
resulted in England seeking peace with the Scots against a backdrop of armed conflict.
Following each reconciliation between Henry and Francis I, Scotland would again
become an insignificant object of English foreign policy. R.G. Eaves states that after the
Scottish disaster at Flodden in 1513, “because Henry’s sister was queen of Scotland and
his young nephew the new King, the English monarch believed he might annex
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Scotland.”2 While this may have been true throughout the course of Henry’s reign, the
fact is that Henry never actually formulated or attempted a policy which would bring
Scotland under England’s control until after 1542. D.M. Head argues that the only
coherent Scottish policy was that “Henry consistently sought a tractable Scotland that
would follow the English lead.”3 Usually this meant trying to keep the peace with
Scotland while attempting to wean them away from the “Auld Alliance” by maintaining
ties with influential pro-English supporters such as Henry’s sister queen Margaret.
During those periods of French conflict, however, attempts to keep the peace most often
failed and English policy required a forceful containment or submission of the Scots.
Therefore, English foreign policy towards Scotland was far from long-term and mostly
situational, depending on English policy towards France and vice-versa. But while this
description fits nicely the period before 1540, there was much more to Anglo-Scottish
relations after this point.
The decade o f the 1530’s was a period of relative peace for both Scotland and
England. Henry was forced to forego an aggressive continental foreign policy in order to
focus on his marital negotiations with Rome and the domestic aspects of the Reformation.
In 1526 Henry made peace with France and the 1528 truce at Berwick established an
official peace with Scotland in 1534, although border violence was on the increase
throughout the 1530's. By 1535, Henry even sought to improve Anglo-Scottish relations

2 Eaves, Henrv VIITs Scottish diplomacy: 1513-1524 (New York, 1971), p.l 1.
3 Head, “Henry VIII’s Scottish Policy: A Reassessment”, Scottish Historical Review
61.1982, p.2.

9

and until 1541 he periodically sent Sir Ralph Sadler to tempt James into undertaking his
own financially expedient reformation. However, English envoys were met “frostily” by
James who had no intentions of moving closer to a schismatic England when he could
strengthen the popular “Auld Alliance” with a French bride. James would marry Francis
Fs daughter Madeleine in 1537 and that same year receive a sword from Pope Paul III
with advice to set an example for Christian kings against heresy. By 1539 and the truce
at Toledo between the Emperor Charles V and Francis I, Scotland was still firmly behind
both the Pope and the French King. Fearing a papal-supported crusade from the 1539
truce, England readied herself for an invasion not only along the southern coastline but
also along the northern borders. It was rumored that Francis had indeed asked James to
be prepared to invade by May 15th of that year, but the threatened invasion of England
never occurred. As the threat of war passed, Henry kept relations with Scotland on good
terms and intermittently sent Sadler north to try to dissuade the Scottish king of amity
with France. Nonetheless, as of 1540 Scotland remained very much aligned with France
and very much opposed to an English-directed attack on the church.
In June 1540, Thomas Cromwell, who had always pleaded for a pacific policy
towards Scotland, was arrested and executed. Following his former minister’s
suggestions, Henry tried to persuade James that he should renounce France and keep the
peace with England. During one of Sadler’s intermittent trips to Edinburgh, the English
envoy proposed a meeting between Henry and James and returned to London under the
impression that James would support such a meeting. Thus, early in 1541, Henry
scheduled a royal progress to the north for the following summer and planned to meet
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with James at York. When the Scottish ambassador Thomas Bellenden visited London in
June 1541, he carried a vague message from James, one that neither accepted nor
outrightly refused Henry’s invitation. While James was not unwilling to attend the
meeting, his council, led by the pro-French Cardinal Beaton, strongly advised James not
to make the journey for fear of an English scheme to kidnap their king. For his part,
Henry had convinced himself that James would meet him at York, although few of his
councillors believed that the king of Scots would actually appear. Historians still
speculate on Henry's reasons for wanting to meet with James in 1541.
R.B. Wemham states that Henry VIII turned to his “British Problem” in the
closing years of his reign, after the incorporation of Wales in 1536 and the assumption of
the title "king of Ireland" in 1541. But Wemham adds, “The key to that mastery,
however, lay with Scotland.”4

John Guy and J.J. Scarisbrick each attribute this

apparently imperialist stance to the practical efficiency of Henry’s chief minister Thomas
Cromwell, not a specific strategy by Henry. Steven Gunn argues that “the king’s
flexibility over his claim to the overlordship of Scotland was even greater than that over
France.”5 Putting aside English imperial aims, D.M. Head suggests that the worsening
relations between the emperor and France by early 1541 was the real reason for Henry’s
amicable attitude with James. Head states that the emperor’s plan to bestow Milan upon
his son in October 1540 “was almost certain to bring renewed war with France, and as it

4 Wemham, Before the Armada: the emergence of the English Nation 1485-1588 (New
York, 1972), p. 149.
5 Gunn, "The French Wars of Henry VIII," in Black, ed., The Origins of War in Earlv
Modem Europe ("Edinburgh. 1987), p.38.
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became clear that Henry would enter on the emperor’s side, Scotland resumed a central
role in English diplomacy.”6 J.J. Scarisbrick states a similar view when he writes “It was
probably in the Spring o f 1541 that Henry decided to resume his military career.”7 It is a
fact that Henry sent the duke of Norfolk to inspect the northern border defenses early in
1541. If a return to war on the continent was Henry’s objective by the spring of 1541,
then securing peace with Scotland would have been ample reason for Henry to meet with
James that summer.
Henry waited two weeks for James to arrive before leaving York in a rage on
September 29, 1541. Contrary to a popular belief, this fit of anger did not lead directly to
war with Scotland, for Anglo-French relations would most always dictate military policy
toward the Scots. But the failed meeting at York did resolve that were there to be a
continental war, England would have to contain Scotland by force before landing an army
at Calais. By late 1541, Henry had allied himself with Charles V and by early 1542 plans
were being made for an English invasion o f France the following summer. In August
1542, Henry sent Norfolk north to negotiate a peace or forcefully contain the Scots.
However, before Norfolk arrived his deputy, Sir Robert Bowes, led a raiding party into
the lowlands and was soundly defeated by the Scots at Hadden Rig. Still angry over
being made to look foolish the previous summer, Henry took the battle at Hadden Rig as
a provocation of war and declared war on Scotland in October. When Norfolk arrived on
the borders to negotiate a settlement, Henry purposefully made the demands too high and

6 Head, "Henry VIII's Scottish Policy", p. 15.
7 Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII (Berkeley, 1968), p.426.
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from that point conflict was inevitable. Henry ordered Norfolk to invade but the year was
growing late and the English could only manage to bum the town of Kelso and some rich
border land, hardly the blow that Henry had needed to knock the Scots out o f the next
year’s campaign scenario. Therefore, England sought peace once more and Henry’s
council issued a pamphlet which laid out the history o f Anglo-Scottish relations and the
reasons the Scots should accept peace. Despite rumors of a Scottish counter-offensive,
Henry marshaled his resources to prepare for the 1543 invasion of France. James’
decision to follow through with a late November invasion produced the rout that occurred
at Solway Moss and led to his own death in December 1542.
Gordon Donaldson states that “the foreign policy to which Scotland was
committed by James V ’s French marriages was to lead directly to the disaster with which
his reign closed. But it was not the only cause of that disaster, for the King’s domestic
policy also played its part.”8 Scotland chose to strengthen the “Auld Alliance” with
France over seeking better relations with England when James married first Madeleine
and then Mary of Guise. Thus, as of late 1541 and the Anglo-Imperial alliance, the Scots
would either have to work out a truce with England or support their French allies and
fight England. Any hope for peace was ruined by the failed meeting at York, for which
James himself deserves some of the blame because o f his indecisive behavior. Donaldson
insists that James officially agreed to attend the meeting then backed out on the advice of
his council and the pro-French clergy led by Cardinal Beaton.9 But after Norfolk’s

8 Donaldson, Scotland: James V - James VII (New York, 1965), p.49.
9 Ibid.. p.59.
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invasion o f late 1542, James felt the need to retaliate against his English uncle.
Both Donaldson and William Ferguson agree that the defeat at Solway Moss was
directly related to the political dissent in Scotland caused by James himself. The Scottish
king neglected his nobles by raising up subjects of low degree and also enriching his own
finances at his lords’ expense. James disregarded the well-being of the Church as well,
exacting substantial levies while persecuting many wealthy subjects who were clearly
innocent of heresy in order to finance his lavish lifestyle. Thus, when James proposed a
counter-offensive to Norfolk’s raid, many of his nobles refused to risk invading England.
Furious, James excluded all but Beaton from his council and with little support did his
best to mobilize an army. Under the unpopular and relatively inexperienced royal
favorite, Oliver Sinclair, some 14,000 Scots encountered a much smaller English force
near the River Esk led by the deputy warden, Lord Thomas Wharton. The Scots, who
were reluctant to fight in the first place, retreated in a state of confusion and were routed
at Solway Moss on November 24, 1542. Although few Scots were actually killed,
approximately 1,200 men, including a few dozen nobles, were captured. Those who lived
along the border, dissatisfied with James and his domestic policies, captured most of
these Scottish nobles themselves and gladly handed them over to the English. James,
who had been suffering from melancholy ever since his two sons had died in 1541, could
not bear the defeat and died of a crushed spirit on December 14, 1542. He left behind
both a six-day old daughter and a country in political turmoil.
D.M. Head writes that “the English policy after Solway Moss must be seen as
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proof of Henry’s limited interest in Scotland,”.10 The Imperial ambassador in London,
Eustace Chapuys, noted that after Solway Moss, Henry was as jubilant as he had been
before the execution of Catharine Howard. Indeed, his chances to neutralize Scotland
before he undertook the French war had greatly improved once James was dead. No less
than six factions of noblemen were attempting to become young Queen Mary’s regents
and thus gain control of Scottish politics. But even with the internal division in
Edinburgh, Henry and his counselors failed to grasp the opportunity of controlling
Scotland and closing England’s vulnerable "back door". The English were simply too
preocupied with their continental strategy to annex Scotland. As Steven Gunn argues,
glory, tradition, and chivalric machismo together explain Henry's somewhat obsessive
need to make war with France. David Potter also observes that Henry’s court was
comprised of many young courtiers who dreamed of achieving honor and prestige in
France. John Guy suggests that after the revelations about Catharine Howard and with
his “ego in this fragile state, Henry resolved to restore his ‘honour’ in war against
France.”11 But a full treasury also explains Henry's fixation with a French war, as
Richard Hoyle has shown. Hoyle states that "the confiscation of the monastic lands and
the extension o f taxation over the church promised royal affluence and fiscal
independence.”12 In other words, Henry's coffers were filled with monastic spoils and for
the first time since 1513-1514, he had the money to go to war with France without having

10 Head, "Henry VIII's Scottish Policy", p. 19.
11 Guv. Tudor England fNew York, 1988), p. 190.
12 Hoyle, "War and Public Finance," in MacCulloch, ed., The Reign o f Henrv VIII (New
York, 1995), p.96.
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to make his subjects pay a costly special subsidy. That he used this money to fight the
French and not to subjugate Scotland reveals the intentions of the English court at the
time. Henry was content to release the prisoners taken at Sloway Moss in the hopes that
they would form a pro-English faction in Edinburgh that would bring Scottish politics
under English control.
James Hamilton, the earl of Arran, was proclaimed regent of Scotland on January
3, 1543. Arran was mildly Anglophile and favored reform of the church, but he was also
under heavy pressure from Beaton and other factions. The English had hoped to take
advantage o f this factionalism, but the “assured" lords who were to form Henry’s proEnglish faction were not good collaborators and were eventually undermined by Henry’s
own flawed diplomacy. As M.H. Merriman states, the most devoted assured lords were
those who had a “desire for the reformed faith”13 and supported Henry’s efforts to marry
the young Queen of Scots to the heir o f Protestant England, five-year-old Prince Edward.
In addition to the marriage scheme, Henry demanded that the Scots renounce the French
alliance and send Queen Mary to England. The Scots felt these terms to be unacceptable
and, according to R.B. Wemham, in February 1543 the assured lords were the first to ask
the English for easier terms. The most influential assured lords, the earl of Angus and his
brother Sir George Douglas, were in fact able to influence Arran for a time, and the
Anglo-Scottish treaties o f Greenwich were signed in July 1543. However, Cardinal
Beaton, who had fallen from favor at the Scottish court, had been building a pro-

13 Merriman, “The Assured Scots”, Scottish Historical Review 47.1968, p.21.
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French/pro-Church party and successfully garnering French support with the help of
Mary of Guise. By the end of July, Beaton and his followers had moved young queen
Mary from Edinburgh to Stirling and by September, Arran had allied himself with them.
The pro-English party was dwindling fast and the Douglas brothers could not prevent the
Scottish Parliament from annulling the Greenwich treaties in December. Henry’s plan for
containing Scotland lay in ruins and the Scots were once again firmly behind France.
The year 1543 was to have been a time of glorious victory for Henry but instead it
became a period of diplomatic collapse. Because of Scottish affairs and coordination
problems with Charles V, the planned attack on France was postponed until the summer
of 1544. In Scotland, Henry’s pro-English party had surrendered their castles to Arran
and Beaton, who together had stabilized Scottish politics. J.J. Scarisbrick insists that
Arran and his ambassadors had purposefully complied with Henry and Angus throughout
1543 in order to buy time. Henry, in demanding a dynastic union and Scottish
subjugation so abruptly, asked for entirely too much from the stubborn Scots and vastly
underestimated their deceitful political skills. Thus, in 1544 “Henry lost all patience with
the Scots and resorted to violence and blustering rather than diplomacy.”34 In order to
force the Scots into submission during the June invasion of France, Henry ordered Jane
Seymour’s brother, the earl of Hertford, to sack Edinburgh, Leith, and St. Andrews.
Hertford and various other councillors urged Henry to be more lenient for fear of further
alienating the Scots but the old king refused. Hertford carried out his orders and with

14 Head, "Henry VIII's Scottish Policy", p.22.

16

about 12,000 men surprised the Scots and devastated Edinburgh and the surrounding area
in May 1544. Although St. Andrews was spared, the destruction drove many of those
who were still pro-English to France’s side. Even Angus turned his back on the English
and in 1545 led a Scottish army to a resounding victory at Ancrum Moor. After
Hertford’s raid, there would be no peaceful English alliance with - or control of Scotland in Henry’s lifetime. But, as R.B. Wemham states, “At whatever cost to the
long-term prospects, Henry thus achieved his short-term aim. The Scots were paralysed
for the 1544 campaigning season.”15
Henry afterwards had little success in France; the English captured Boulogne but
failed to occupy Montreuil or march anywhere near Paris, which was the original plan.
Charles V added the insult of making peace with Francis without consulting Henry, and if
that was not enough for the English monarch, Hertford was forced to return to Scotland in
1545 to ward off a possible French-led invasion. Henry was also out of money, having
spent most of the revenues from the sale of monastic lands to finance the French war.
But as Steven Gunn contends, few o f Henry’s subjects complained because although the
war was for the most part a failure, the honor of its undertaking remained. The fact that
continental warfare also held a much greater importance politically and economically
than victory over the Scots explains the focus Henry placed on the French war and the
indifference with which he tried to control Scotland. As D.M. Head argues,
As long as the king had his eyes to the continent, Scotland
occupied a secondary position in his calculations. Scottish

15 Wemham, Before the Armada, p. 157.
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matters often had to be dealt with before European adventures
could be undertaken, yet Henry generally viewed relations
with Scotland as a distraction from the larger context of
European diplomacy.16
Henry never practiced a coherent policy with Scotland other than attempting at
times to create factions of Anglophiles who would try to influence Scottish policy. By
1542-43 and the political upheaval in Edinburgh, Henry decided to bring about a
practical, cost-efficient settlement by uniting England and Scotland through marriage and
thus controlling his northern neighbor. Even though he had the opportunity to conquer
Scotland, Henry did not consider it “because he had never intended to do more than
contain the Scots and because his major interest lay elsewhere.” 17 Henry’s ineffective
strategy of relying on the assured lords and his decisions to demand unreasonable terms
and then devastate the lowlands had the combined effect of pushing Scotland into a closer
alliance with France. The “Rough Wooing” made the Scots even more stubborn
supporters of the “Auld Alliance” and the Catholic Church, and united them, despite the
problems of 1542-43, against the English. There was no long-term strategy of AngloScottish relations even after 1542. The violent events of 1544-45 were the direct result of
Henry’s plans to make war on France. As D.M. Head concludes, “It seems clear that at
least from 1542 and the abortive meeting at York, Henry had aimed at settling relations
with Scotland in order to turn to France. Amidst the twists of English policy this was
Henry’s only consistent goal.”18

16 Head, "Henry VIII’s Scottish Policy", p.23.
17 Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. p.436.
18 Head, "Henry VIII's Scottish Policy", p.21.

Chapter 2
Scotland in the 1540's: James V and his astute cardinal
“Adieu, farewell, it cam’ w i’ a lass, it will pass w i’ a lass,”.1 King James V of
Scotland muttered these famous words only hours before he died on December 14, 1542.
The king was referring to the Stuart (Stewart) line of kingship that had begun when
Marjorie, daughter of Robert the Bruce, married Walter Fitzalen, sixth hereditary steward
of Scotland. The Stuart house had held the throne since 1371, passing the crown from
father to son successively for over 150 years.2 Alas, James V had no surviving sons, as
both had died tragically in 1541. However, a daughter was bom to Queen Mary of Guise
just six days before James died. When he learned of the news, only hours before his
death, he uttered the prophecy above, expecting the Stuart line to end with the prospect of
a week-old girl’s long minority. The Scottish king could not have been more wrong, for
the house of Stuart would hold not only the Scottish throne, but by 1603, the English one
as well.
Scotland had faced a long minority for James himself only a generation earlier,
and found that “the practice was for men of the same surname, whether or not they were
demonstrably related by blood, to act together.”3 Thus, various factions of noble families
fought to control the regency while the Duke o f Albany was periodically in France, and

1R.L. Mackie, A Short History of Scotland (New York, 1963), p.24.
2 J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors 1485-1558 (Oxford, 1978), p.406.
3 Donaldson, James V - James VII.p.12.
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after he had left Scotland for good in 1524.4 In 1528 James had to rely on a faction loyal
to him to battle his stepfather, the Douglas earl of Angus, and claim his crown. Hence,
the Scottish nobles, during James’ minority, had gotten a taste of the bitter factionalism
that would divide Scotland in 1543.
The death of James V created a power vacuum in Scottish politics that two
powerful rivals, who were also cousins, rushed to fill for their own respective factions.
The first was James Hamilton, the earl of Arran, heir presumptive to the throne and a man
“who had leanings toward Protestantism and who favoured a new alliance with England
and with an English king who had broken away from Rome.”5 The second was Cardinal
David Beaton, Archbishop of St. Andrews, the late king’s chief advisor and “advocate of
the old faith and the old alliance,”.6 In January 1543 Arran was proclaimed regent and
Beaton was arrested. Yet only months later, Beaton was reinstated as chancellor, and
practically controlled Scotland until his murder in 1546. In order to achieve this
remarkable turnaround, Beaton skillfully and ruthlessly appealed to the supporters of
Roman Catholicism, those who were anti-English, and particularly his old friends, the
French. He also used a very clever and astute political sense to harness both the regent
and all opposing factions. Thus, together with Scottish stubbornness and Henry’s
“Rough Wooing” of 1544-45, quite possibly the most influential force that kept Scotland
from allying with England until 1560 was Cardinal Beaton and his conservative faction.

4 John Stuart, the Duke of Albany, was the Francophile governor of Scotland for a time
after the Anglo-French wars of the early 1520's.
5 Dickinson, Scotland from the Earliest Times to 1603 (London, 1961), p.316.
6 Ibid., p.316.
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However, before considering the confusing politics of 1543, one needs to be
aware of the circumstances which led to Solway Moss and the internal dissention that
followed. The political situation after Albany had left Scotland in 1524 almost mirrors
the factionalism that was to come in 1543. James Beaton, Archbishop of St. Andrews,
“was regarded by the English as the principal obstacle to their cause,”7just as his nephew,
David, was two decades later. The archbishop, with the support of the earls of Argyle,
Lennox, and Murray, urged the Scots to remain loyal to Albany and France. But the earl
of Arran, father of the future regent, joined with Queen Margaret Tudor, mother of James,
to argue for an end to the boy’s minority and a treaty with England.8 A compromise was
arranged in 1525 that declared Albany heir presumptive and determined that James would
remain in the care of each of the leading nobles in turn. But Archibald Douglas, the earl
o f Angus, refused to give up the young king, and supported by Arran and Queen
Margaret, deprived James Beaton of the great seal. Thus, a pro-English party, led by
Angus and his brother, Sir George Douglas, took power in 1526 and kept control of
Scotland until 1528. During these years Anglo-Scottish relations remained good and
Henry VIII believed that he might gain his nephew’s confidence through Angus, but this
was not to be. The Douglas brothers quickly alienated their supporters within the proEnglish party, including their old enemy Arran and Angus’ estranged wife, Queen
Margaret. By 1527, the Scots began to suspect that Angus and Sir George were simply
keeping the young king prisoner and Lennox attempted to rescue James but was killed in

7 Donaldson, James V - James VII. p.39.
8 Ibid., pp.38-40.
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the process. The Scottish nobles were hesitant to unite against the Douglases with the
king in their possession, but in the Spring of 1528 James escaped and the brothers were
forced to take refuge in England. They would remain in exile until 1543.9
William Ferguson argues that “James V grew up hating the Douglases and
everything that they stood for, including friendship with England.”10 Ferguson believes
that this is why James’ foreign policy favored Scotland’s “Auld Ally”, France. The king
had also been quite attached to the earl of Lennox, who had been a Francophile victim of
Angus.11 In any case, James’ two French marriages in 1537 and 1538 brought France and
Scotland closer together than they had been since Albany was governor. In fact, until his
death in 1536, Albany was James’ Scottish agent to the French and to the Pope. The
policy that Albany and James would arrange with the papacy was to have a significant
impact on Scotland during the 1540's.
James began exploiting the wealth of the Church in 1531 when he asked Pope
Clement VII to force Scottish prelates to contribute ten thousand Scottish pounds
annually in establishing a College of Justice. Clement agreed and the College was
established in 1532, but most of the money went to the king himself. Most likely,
Clement was only providing that James would remain loyal to the papacy since he was
aware that a crisis was brewing in England. Thus, “James had bargained to remain true to
Rome provided he was allowed to use part o f the Church’s revenues for state purposes.” 12

9 Ibid.. pp.40-41.
10 Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England (Edinburgh, 1977), p.55.
11 Donaldson, James V - James VII. p.45.
12 Dickinson, Scotland from the Earliest Times to 1603. p.308.
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Throughout the 1530's, the Scottish prelates grudgingly handed over the money to their
king. However, the Scots were not oblivious to continental ideas of religious reform, and
Tyndale’s translation of the New Testament into the vernacular quickly became available
in Scotland. As in England, the Church in Scotland was widely felt to be too wealthy and
“most of the bishops and abbots, with few and notable exceptions, now led secular and
often disreputable lives to the neglect of their spiritual office.”13 Many Scottish reformers
actually found refuge in Henrician England, which provided the reformers in Scotland
with an example of ecclesiastical and doctrinal reform. For example, Sir John Borthwick
was indicted in 1540 for approving of the “English heresies” and urging them on his
fellow countrymen.14 Meanwhile, the bishops, although unhappy with the king’s
financial requirements, were more content to be abused by their monarch if it meant that
he was less likely to perform an English-style attack on the Church. Thus, with the
wealth of the Church being shared by the king and the Pope, official Scottish policy
throughout James’ reign remained firmly attached to Rome.
Scottish nobles, on the other hand, were clearly divided on matters of religion and
loyalty to the papacy. James had exploited them almost as m uch, if not more, than he
had the Church. In his desire of increased revenues, James initiated many questionable
proceedings against certain lords and earls which resulted in forfeitures of land and
money to the monarchy.15 But the issue which would most effect Scottish politics in the

13 Ibid., p.314.
14 Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men (London, 1983), p. 13.
15 Donaldson, James V - James VII. p. 44.
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coming years concerned the role of the Scots nobles in James5 government. For the most
part, the king ran Scotland without the consent of his nobility, appointing churchmen to
government posts that in England were held by the peerage. The king also neglected his
nobles by delegating authority not to local magnates but to personal favorites. James’
ineffective judicial policy along the borders led to increased instability and dissatisfaction
there as well as in the western highlands. By 1540, James’ faulty policies were causing
growing political dissention. Since the king was enriching his own finances at his lords’
expense, the prospects of an attack on the Church seemed propitious to some of the
reform-minded nobles. A dissolution of monastic lands would provide greater revenues
for both the king and the nobles while also introducing much-needed ecclesiastical
reform. Not surprisingly, many nobles who fostered these beliefs supported a proEnglish foreign policy as well. Gordon Donaldson suggests that before the king’s death
in 1542 there were two opposing factions in Scotland: one pro-French and conservative ,
the other pro-English and reformist.16
“Ecclesiastical disaffection apart, the events which closed James’ reign in 1542
reflect a clear lack of enthusiasm, to say no more, for papal policy.”17 Nowhere is this
evaluation more evident than the Scottish defeat on November 24, 1542 at Solway Moss.
Many of James’ disaffected nobles refused to risk a counter-offensive into England after
Norfolk’s invasion. Donaldson surmises that the nobles’ reluctance to support James
stemmed from the fact that Scotland would be fighting on behalf of the papacy against a

16 Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men, p. 14.
17 Ibid.. p .14.
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schismatic England.18 James’ chief advisor, Cardinal Beaton, was in fact the most
influential supporter of the invasion and pressured the king into viewing the act as a
crusade. Thus, when James mustered his army, many of the nobles with Protestant
beliefs did not attend and those who did only did so out of obedience for their king.
When the Scots ultimately engaged the English at Solway Moss, many of the disaffected
nobles chose surrender to the English over dying for a king in whom they had lost all
confidence. Henry VIII would later use these Scottish prisoners to aid the pro-English
group already in Scotland.
By early 1543 the Anglophile reformers were ready to seize power from the
bishops and conservative nobles. Donaldson states “in later years, reformers were often
divided in their personal allegiance, but at this stage the issue was so clear-cut that
Protestantism and advocacy o f amity with England were inseperable.”19 However,
Dickinson argues that even though they were pro-English, Henry VIIFs “assured lords”
constituted a third faction that worked with Arran’s reformers but had an agenda of their
own.20 Ferguson admits that the assured lords did little once they returned to Scotland
because what Henry asked of them “went against national opinion which was strong for
independence and thus still inclined to the Auld Alliance.”21 At any rate, the long-exiled
Douglas brothers returned to Scotland in early 1543 to lead Henry’s collaborators in
putting pressure on the earl o f Arran. In fact, Beaton was seized and jailed by the

18 Ibid., pp.14-15.
19 Ibid.. p .15.
20 Dickinson, Scotland from the earliest times to 1603. pp. 316-317.
21 Ferguson, Scotland’s relations with England, p.60.
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Douglases after Arran was chosen as regent, but it was only a matter of time before the
cardinal resumed his leadership role.
David Beaton had worked as a Franco-Scottish diplomat for years before
becoming bishop of Mirepoix on 1537 and that same year returning to Scotland to
become coadjutor to his uncle, James Beaton. He was made a cardinal in 1538 and when
his uncle died in 1539, he became the new archbishop of St. Andrews. In 1543 he would
be made a papal legate and, like his uncle before him, became the champion of Roman
Catholicism and French interests in Scotland.”22 Yet Beaton was unable to take control
o f Scottish politics immediately after the death of James V. Since the cardinal had been
humiliated and disgraced by the Solway Moss disaster, the strong reformist faction
suspended James’ testamentary depositions which would have established Beaton as the
head of government. Instead, the Protestant-leaning heir presumptive Arran was named
regent. On January 25, Angus, Sir George, and the other assured lords were welcomed
home by Arran and the next day Beaton was warded at Dalkeith. Soon after, the Scottish
parliament, on an act introduced by assured lord Maxwell, officially encouraged
possession of the English bible and preaching of “the true word of God.”23 Parliament
also appointed a commission to negotiate a treaty with England which was to include a
marriage between young Queen Mary and five-year-old Prince Edward. On March 18 Sir
Ralph Sadler arrived in Edinburgh to further King Henry’s plans and it appeared that
Scotland would soon be aligned with the English.

22 J.D. Mackie, Earlier Tudors, p.405.
23 Donaldson, James V - James VII. p.64.
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Nevertheless, the conservative Francophile faction had the benefit of skillful
diplomacy on its side in the persons o f both Beaton and the queen dowager, Mary of
Guise. While Beaton was still a prisoner of the Douglases, Mary was busy organizing the
conservative bishops, sowing mistrust between Arran and Sadler, and encouraging Henry
VIII to make excessive demands which would antagonize the Scots.24 The queen
dowager also appealed to France for aid and the French were happy to oblige by sending
two Scottish exiles home to help the conservative cause. These two men, who were to
play important roles over the next few years, were Matthew Stuart, earl of Lennox, and
John Hamilton, former abbot of Paisley and Arran’s half-brother. By sometime around
May, Beaton had regained his freedom and negotiated with the French to receive sixteen
ships loaded with money and munitions.
The conservatives were now prepared to utilize political, religious, financial, and
coercive methods to regain control of the Scottish government. Arran himself was known
to be quite irresolute and it was said “What the English lords decide him to do one day,
the abbot changes the next.”25 Nor did the Scottish nobles remain firm in their
convictions, for the earls of Fleming, Bothwell, Eglinton, and Semphill had all switched
to Beaton’s side by July. Politically, the earls of Argyle, Murray, and Huntley led the
conservative nobles against the Douglases and Arran’s dwindling number of reformist
supporters. Thus, even though the Anglo-Scottish Treaties of Greenwich were agreed to
on July 1, Arran’s government was facing major difficulties both internally and

24 Ferguson, Scotland’s relations with England, p.60.
25 Donaldson, James V - James VII. pp. 65-66.
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externally.
By late summer 1543, the Scots were becoming increasingly annoyed with
Henry’s overbearing attitude, and his refusal to compromise his demands molded the
events which closed out the year. In August, Arran was able to get the Treaties of
Greenwich ratified by parliament, yet only a week later he “suddenly re-embraced the
Roman faith, did penance for his apostasy, and made Beaton and Mary of Guise, the
Queen Mother, members with him in a new council o f government.”26 Henry VIII then
made the terrible mistake o f breaking the treaty by seizing several Scottish merchant
ships. This final action shattered the pro-English faction and Angus and Sir George were
left to pick up the pieces. The Scottish parliament convened in December under much
different circumstances than had been the case eleven months before. The conservative
Francophiles now controlled Scotland and on December 11 parliament annulled the
Treaties of Greenwich. The assured lords were made to forfeit their castles and the
Douglas brothers, who attempted to disrupt parliament by force, fled Edinburgh along
with English ambassador Sadler. As Ferguson correctly states, “Henry VIII was
completely outmanoeuvred by the subtle Frenchwoman and the crafty prelate.”27
Resentful and needing to protect his northern borders as he prepared for war
against France, Henry ordered the earl of Hertford to sack Edinburgh and lay waste to the
surrounding area. On May 4, 1544 the English policy of coercion known as the “Rough
Wooing” began as Hertford landed outside Newhaven and proceeded to march on the

26 Dickinson, Scotland from the earliest times to 1603. p. 318.
27 Ferguson, Scotland’s relations with England, p.60.
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Scottish capital with some twelve thousand troops. The invasion seemed to take Beaton
and Arran completely by surprise: “the Scots thought that they had no cause for fear, and
when in the early summer of 1544 at great fleet appeared in the Firth of Forth the
Governor and the Cardinal persuaded themselves that it was only a fleet of fishing-boats
returning from Iceland,”.28 At first, the devastation of Hertford’s invasion turned the
Scottish nobility against the ruling faction prompting Mary of Guise to attempt to
supersede Arran as regent. Rival parliaments were summoned by the governor and queen
dowager but in the end Beaton effected a reconciliation by making an appeal for unity
against “our auld inymeis of Ingland.”.29 Beaton’s skillful manipulation of both Arran
and Mary of Guise placed him in exclusive control of Scottish policy from late 1544 until
his murder in 1546. One could argue that Henry’s “Rough Wooing” in 1544 resulted in
the firm establishment of the French-supported Beaton as leader of Scotland. While the
strategy of fear did lead many Scots to question their alliance with France initially, by
late 1544 when Beaton successfully appealed for unity against the English, the Scots were
more angry than afraid. As J.D. Mackie states, “The effect of his [Henry’s] severity was
to unite all Scotland against him.”30

28 R.L. Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, pp.70-71.
29 Donaldson, James V - James VII. pp. 70-71.
30 J.D. Mackie, Earlier Tudors, p.407.

Chapter 3
The English Ambassador and the Assured Lords
youe and my lord your brother, with the rest of your friends do
sitt so still; and much the rather mervaileth bicause there hath been
so gret a bande and promise made by othe from one of youe to
another, that youe shuld cleve togidres and never to fayle one another,
but all to take one parte...And wheras youe saye that youe suffre much
hurt and dammage for his majestes sake, we canne litle perceave as yet
that youe have sufffed any thing for his sake, but by his meanes and
grat charge youe have not onely brought yourself to the restitucion of
your landes and possessions, with a gret encreace of the same; but also
gat such authoritye, as, whenne youe wer in it, and wisely woold have
used it, youe might have kept both him and yourself from the charges
which he susteyneth no we, and have ordered the realme at his majestes
and your will and pleasure.1
-The Privy Council to Sir George Douglas
December 1, 1543.
In the early Spring of 1543, King Henry VIII waited impatiently for some sign
from his "assured" lords that they had indeed taken control o f Scottish politics and would
initiate a pro-English policy. Matters had become quite complicated north of the border
since the unexpected death of James V in December, and Henry hoped to benefit from the
Scots’ misfortune. James had left a week-old daughter as the new sovereign and the
ensuing political battle for the regency pushed Scotland into a dangerous state of
confused factionalism. The Scottish nobles taken prisoner at Solway Moss in November
- the assured lords - had taken formal oaths to promote English aims in Edinburgh and
write progress reports to Henry about the northern situation. Yet, Henry had not received

1 The Hamilton Papers, ed. Joseph Bain, (Edinburgh, 1890-1892), Vol.l, #127, pp.203204. (Hereafter designated as HP)
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any correspondence of value from the earls of Glencaim, Casillis, Bothwell, Fleming,
Maxwell, or Somerville, or even the earl of Angus and his brother, Sir George Douglas,
who had both formerly been in exile in England and returned to lead the pro-English
party.2 Henry was all the more frustrated because he had recently agreed to ally himself
with the Emperor for the purpose of invading France, an invasion tenatively scheduled for
later that year. Since diplomacy was much cheaper than war, the English king had
planned to use his assured lords to dispose of Scotland’s “Auld Alliance” with the French
and thus lock England’s “back door” against invasion before having to cross the Channel.
The pro-English party was also supposed to secure a marriage treaty between the young
Queen of Scots and five-year-old Prince Edward, thereby making Scottish policy more
favorable to English wishes and less likely to lead to a border war while England was
preoccupied with France. That he had not heard any favorable news from his
collaborators since they returned to Scotland in January was a cause of great concern for
the English monarch. Therefore, on March 13, 1543, Henry ordered Sir Ralph Sadler to
be his emissary in Edinburgh and work with Angus, Douglas, and the assured lords to
further Anglo-Scottish amity in the earl of Arran’s new government. Henry wrote, “As
Sadler has been ‘sundry times’ in Scotland and also is privy to the things promised here
and to all proceedings since, no man can so well serve this purpose...to go in post to
Edinburgh to reside there until revoked, and shall there proceed, according to certain

2 Entire list of Assured Lords in Letters and Papers. Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign
of Henry VIIL eds. J. Gairdner and R.H. Brodie, (London, 1862-1910) Vol. 18,
Part 1, #2, p. 1. (Hereafter designated as LP)
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instructions sent herewith and as he thinks best.”3 Yet, as Sadler would soon learn,
Scottish politics in 1543 was a complex game of alliances and intrigues in which
sometimes those who could least be trusted were those who were supposed to be assured
to England. However, it was neither incompetence on Sadler’s part, nor the
untrustworthiness of the assured lords which ultimately doomed Anglo-Scottish relations
and led to the violent “Rough Wooing” of 1544.
Sir Ralph Sadler had been sent to Scotland before, and was considered Henry’s
Scottish expert, but never had the diplomatic stakes been so high as they were in 1543.
Either the Scots would agree to what many considered a humiliating marriage alliance
and end their Auld Alliance with the French, or Henry would have to subdue Scotland
forcibly before he and Charles V made war against Francis I. Yet, it seemed that each
mission Sadler undertook in Edinburgh for Henry was doomed to failure from the start.
Whether or not these setbacks were the fault of the ambassador himself is a question this
essay will attempt to resolve, but it does appear that Sir Ralph was hindered in his
embassies by a combination o f poor instructions and inconceivable objectives. For
instance, his foremost biographer, A.J. Slavin, admits that in 1540, “It is hard to escape
the conclusion that Sadler had been sent on a fool’s errand, and that not for the last
time...”4 Indeed, again in 1541 Sadler’s final embassy to James V would result in the
incident at York that summer in which James failed to meet with Henry and thus

3 LP, Vol. 17, #270, p. 153.
4 A.J. Slavin, Politics and Profit: A study of Sir Ralph Sadler 1507-1547 (Cambridge,
1966), p.90.
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provoked the old king’s wrath. Much like these previous missions, that of 1543 required
Sadler to push for a policy which was fundamentally against Scottish national and
religious interests. Sir Ralph was a respected and quite competent diplomat, but even
Paget or Gardiner would have found it very difficult to persuade the Scots to acquiesce to
Henry’s consistently inflated demands.
Throughout the later 1520's and early 1530's, Ralph Sadler was employed as a
clerk in the household of Thomas Cromwell, the second most powerful man in England
after the fall of Wolsey. Sadler’s fortunes thus rose with Cromwell’s and in 1537 Henry
himself noticed the clerk’s abilities and took him into the government. That same year
Henry chose Sadler to make an embassy to Scotland in order both to survey the northern
counties (in the wake of the Pilgrimage o f Grace), and attempt to sway James V away
from French and papal influence. It seems impressive that Henry would choose Sadler
for a mission such as this, but the fact that he sent a fairly inexperienced commoner
without so much as a knighthood to speak with the Scottish king also shows the relative
unimportance of Scotland in Henry's mind. Henry wrote that he chose Sadler for this
mission because he could “sett furthe and with siche dexteritie conduit negotyacyons that
he coulde gentilie perswade the sayde king...”5 Sir Ralph subsequently showed that he
could conduct himself well in Edinburgh and in the presence of the Scottish king.
Unfortunately, he was unable to “gently persuade” James away from the French Alliance,
but Henry was still pleased with the results of Sadler’s first Scottish mission. His next

5 LP, V ol. 12, Part 1,#540, p.254.
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embassy in 1540 would prove to be a much more delicate matter, and one in which he
was much less successful.
By 1540, James was quite content with both the four-century old Auld Alliance
with France and also the state of religious affairs in Scotland. In fact, he repeatedly wrote
to Pope Paul III asking that the Archbishop of St. Andrews, Cardinal David Beaton, be
given a legateship which “he promises without hesitation that the Cardinal will use for
the honour and profit of the realm and the church,” and that “this favour will forge the
closest link hitherto between him [James] and the holy see, and none will be found
readier to do all that becomes a Christian prince„on behalf of his holiness and the faith.”6
Thus, breaking with his father-in-law Francis I and Pope Paul III to embrace his
untrustworthy and schismatic uncle, Henry VIII, and the largely detested kingdom of
England could have hardly been further from James’ mind when Sadler arrived in
February 1540 to promote just that.
In the course of several meetings at Holyrood, the Scottish king was completely
unresponsive to Sadler’s anti-clerical railings and repeatedly stood up for both his
cardinal and the church. It is clear that James had no intention of attacking either the
church, from which he already gained substantial revenues, or Beaton, whom he relied
upon as a vital member of his government. James relied upon Beaton’s counsel to the
extent that he wrote to Paul III in 1540 stating “The Cardinal of St. Andrews is frequently
distracted by the royal service from his pastoral office, desirous as he is to fulfil it. He

6 The Letters of James V. ed. R.K. Hannay and D.Hay, (Edinburgh, 1954), p.377.
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has chosen master William Gibson...to deal promptly with pastoral affairs. James
thoroughly approves...”7 During the late 1530's the king had been Beaton’s strongest
supporter for a Cardinalship when the prelate was still Bishop of Mirepoix but also
James’ most respected diplomat to France. Thus, noting the frequent correspondence of
James to Paul III concerning the Scottish king’s obvious dependence on Cardinal Beaton
both as a supportive religious leader and as an important link to France, Sadler’s mission
in 1540 was a true "no-win" scenario.
Even after his failure to turn James against Beaton and the Auld Alliance, upon
his return to London Sadler was made principal Secretary of State. At this point, Sadler’s
fortunes diverged from those of his mentor, Thomas Cromwell, who was executed three
months after Sadler’s failed mission to Scotland. A successful embassy might have saved
Henry’s chief minister from execution, and A.J. Slavin theorizes that “the mission of
1540 was perhaps conceived in desperation by Thomas Cromwell as part o f his doomed
effort to retain control o f the council and the machinery of state.”8 If the 1540 mission
was taken “in desperation” with the knowledge that there would be little chance of
success, this would explain why Henry would appoint Sadler to such a high office in the
wake of an apparent diplomatic setback. Also, if the 1540 mission was believed to be
nearly impossible, Sadler’s 1541 embassy must have been considered almost as difficult.
That year England moved closer to an Imperial alliance against France and Henry aspired
once again to make war on French soil. But if Anglo-French war was to be the case, it

7 Ibid., p.397.
8 Slavin, Politics and Profit:, pp.92-93.
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was necessary now more than ever to try to bring Scotland over to the English side.
In July of 1541, Sadler returned to Edinburgh with instructions to persuade James
to meet Henry at York sometime later that summer as a show of peace and friendship
between the two kingdoms. Doubtless Sadler purposely waited until Beaton was away in
France before proceeding to convince James to agree to the meeting.9 Yet, James’
consent was probably due less to Sadler’s persuasiveness than a sincere wish to keep the
peace along an increasingly violent border. Although Pope Paul III had sent James a
sword with the advice to cut away schism in the Church, James himself seemed to have
felt less inclined to make war against his uncle. Sir William Eure wrote to Henry late that
summer that “my espials say, the Scots are in great fear because of your Majesty’s
coming to York. The Spiritualty, great Lords, Borderers, and the Out Isles desire war;
but the King and his Privy Council... peace.”10 James even sent his envoy Thomas
Bellenden to England to secure safe conduct passes for late September. However, it
appears that Beaton and the Scottish bishops must have dissuaded James from going into
England without so much as a note to Henry. Sir Thomas Wharton, the Warden of the
Marches, wrote to the Council in early September that
there was no likelihood of his [James] coming to England,
for he promised the Cardinal, at his passage into France, not
to go into England until he had answer from France to the
Cardinal’s message...the laird o f Crage, usher of the Chamber,
think, with the Cardinal and bishops, that the king should not
come into England.11

9 The Letters of James V. p.427.
10 LP, Vol. 16, #990, p.478.
11 LP, Vol.16, #1143, p.539.
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Later correspondence from Francis I to his English ambassador Marillac stated that “He
[Beaton] assured me that the king of Scotland would never be there [York].” 12 The
message that James waited for from France was hinted at in a letter from Beaton to James
stating that “Francis is as affectionate to James as to any of his own sons, and thanks him
that he has not condescended to any meeting with the king of England. If the king of
England were to invade James’ realm, Francis would defend him.”13 Thus, if James was
assured that France would aid Scotland in case of an English attack, it might help to
explain the reason why James failed even to offer Henry an excuse as to why he never
came to York. In any case, Beaton’s influence caused Sadler’s mission to fail again and
prompted an angry Henry scathingly to write to James that “The Scots have made spoils
and raised fire in England...These attemptates declare rather open hostility than any such
friendship as James lately expressed...speedy redress to be made, the lack or delay of
which should force him to provide other means to protect his subjects.”14
The failed meeting at York led a humiliated and vengeful Henry to a new policy
toward Scotland: if James would not peacefully ally with England, he must be forced to
do so. The next year, 1542, witnessed England preparing for war and an “amicable loan”
taken which was collected with the knowledge that the money was to be used against the
Turk and their adherants (namely France, and therefore also Scotland).15 Yet the border
defenses were in poor shape and it took the better part of the year before the English

12 LE, Vol. 16, #1181, p.550.
13 LP, Vol.16, #1178, p.548.
14 LE, V ol.16, #1207, p.561.
15 LP, Vol. 17, #261, p .140.
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commanders could supply enough men, munitions, and victuals to support a northern
army. On August 24, the privy council wrote that “the King has determined to send the
duke of Norfolk with a main force against the Scots...and not only defend the realm
against the Scots but invade Scotland.”16 Henry’s official reasoning was that the Scots
had broken the peace along the borders, refused to return English heretics (Catholics
seeking asylum in Scotland), and had humiliated the honor of England by not keeping the
meeting at York. In actuality, the English had broken the peace twice before the Scots
finally retaliated, and there were also Scottish Protestants who had taken refuge in
England to escape punishment from Beaton. When James would write Henry asking for
a continuance of peace, the English king reckoned that his nephew’s requests were
attempts to stall for time, which in actuality they probably were. Then came the defeat of
an English raiding party at Haddon Rig, which was used by Henry as an excuse to declare
war on Scotland that October. Norfolk immediately invaded, but owing to the time of
year, could only manage to bum Kelso and some farmland before returning to England.
In the meantime, James pleaded with Pope Paul III to aid Scotland, saying:
Henry will pour out his vast new and ill-gotten resources to force
James into his impious courses, or to wreak heavy vengeance upon
Scotland. The pope is urged to do all he can...If...the danger to
Scotland is neglected, the evil may spread to the destruction of the
Christian common weal.17
Yet, neither the Pope nor Francis I, who was busy warring against the Emperor, came to
Scotland’s defense in 1542, forcing James to take matters into his own hands. The result

16 LP, V ol.17, #661, p.371.
17 The Letters of James V. p.444.
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was the ill-fated and poorly organized Scottish retaliation in November 1542 which ended
in the Scots being routed at Solway Moss by a numerically inferior English force. The
capture o f some twelve hundred Scots, including a few dozen nobles, followed by the
unexpected illness and death o f James V three weeks later, set the stage for the complex
Anglo-Scottish relations of 1543.
The plan to subdue Scotland by using captured Scots nobles to promote proEnglish policies seemed to be the brainchild of Henry himself. He wrote to Wharton on
November 30 that he wanted “20 or 24 of the very best of the Scots now taken conveyed
to London before Christmas...only such as are noblemen or of the king o f Scots’
Chamber, or, o f such substance to be worth sending.”18 Henry wined and dined the
surprised Scottish Lords and allowed them to carry their swords like free men. He
presented them with gifts and bid them stay in some of London’s best manors with his
own councillors’ households. After “splendidly entertaining” them, Henry offered them a
way to be back in Scotland before the month of January was out. In return for their
freedom, they would be bound to Henry by solemn promises to advance certain English
aims in Scotland, known as the four articles. The most important of these articles was the
securing o f a marriage treaty between young Mary Stuart and Prince Edward, followed by
the delivery of the Scottish heiress into Henry’s keeping in England. Furthermore, ten of
the prisoners thought to be the most trustworthy (or most treasonous depending on the
way one views it) subscribed to an additional article, called the secret article. The earls of

18 LP, V o l.17, # 1 1 4 8 , p .628.
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Casillis and Glencaim, lords Maxwell, Somerville, and Gray, Robert Erskine, and Oliver
Sinclair, among others, all agreed to assist Henry in taking the crown of Scotland should
young Mary die. In addition, these men pledged to place the chief strongholds in
Scotland into the king o f England’s hands.19 In addition to the prisoners of Solway
Moss, three influential Scottish exiles also swore oaths to Henry and sought to regain
their lands following the death of James V. The first was the earl o f Bothwell, who
subscribed to the four articles, but was felt to be too inconstant to know about the secret
article. By contrast, the other two exiles had been in Henry’s service for a number of
years and were expected to coordinate the pro-English party upon their return to Scotland.
Both Archibald Douglas, the earl of Angus, and his brother, Sir George Douglas,
subscribed to the secret article and quickly became very much involved in influencing
Scottish policy.
As the new Scottish regent - James Hamilton, the earl of Arran - well knew, the
Douglas brothers had had a long history of cooperating with England before the events of
1543. Archibald, the earl of Angus, had married Henry’s sister, the queen Dowager
Margaret Tudor, after her first husband James IV had died on the field at Flodden. In
1526, after a series of disputes over which family would act as regent for James V, and
following Governor Albany’s departure to France, Angus kidnapped the young prince
and took control of Scottish politics. From 1526-1528, a Douglas-led pro-English party
ruled Scotland and kept very friendly relations with Henry until James escaped and the

19 LP, V ol. 18, Part 1, # 2 2 , pp. 10-12.
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Douglas brothers were forced the flee to England. In fact, the Douglases themselves
participated in the 1542 battle at Haddon Rig, where they fought on the English side.
They wrote to Henry of the defeat saying “The scttys ar warray wantoun, and becaus of
thys gryt mysfortoun that we have had, it makis thaime the prouder...Trewly it wos nocht
tha that wan the feyld, it was we that losd it with our mysordour.”20 James referred to the
brothers as “the Douglasses, James’s rebels,”21 and in 1538 he had a number of the
Douglas family still residing in Scotland put to death. It was obvious to the Scottish king
that the Douglases were treasonous and working against him, and it appears that he was
correct. Angus was clearly in Henry’s pay by 1543, receiving a pension o f approximately
three hundred pounds, while Sir George Douglas frequently kept the English informed of
happenings in Scotland through contacts he met with in northern England from time to
time.22 Thus, the Douglas brothers became the natural leaders of the assured lords, for all
of those in Scotland who considered either Arran or Beaton their enemies flocked to
Angus and Sir George. They were also the two Scots whom the English implicitly
trusted from the beginning, since they had been so long in England working for Henry.
Nevertheless, Sadler would later have trouble deciding if Angus and Sir George were in
fact the most, or the least, “assured” of the pro-English group.
As January 1543 wound to a close and the assured lords journeyed north to return
to Scotland, their good faith towards Henry was already beginning to come into question.

20 HE, V ol.l, #128, p.159.
21 LP, Vol.17, #674, p.378.
22 Slavin, Politics and Profit, pp.98-99.
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The English Lord Lisle wrote to Henry on the 14th saying that “he spoke with Angus
secretly, who said their conclusion was... not to issue the proclamations, but to bring the
king’s purpose to pass by the aid of their friends (and perhaps of some money).”23 Thus,
the assured lords had decided to change their agreement with Henry even before they left
England! The proclamations were supposed to be made on the borders in an attempt to
“assure” more Scots and Lisle added that “upon ‘reknowlege’ of the king’s determination
the proclamations shall go forth.”24 The Scots also opposed sudden action against the
new government and preferred reasoning with Arran instead of overpowering him. These
modifications appeared logical at first, but could soon be viewed as the start o f a series of
deceits and outright lies the assured lords employed to remain in favor with both Henry
and Arran.
The editor o f Letters and Papers. James Gairdner, perhaps put it best when he
remarked that “Henry was strangely sanguine if he thought that the pledges given him
by a number of Scottish prisoners in his hands - eminent, as these were, in rank and
station - constituted anything like a safe guarantee to secure him complete control o f the
government of Scotland.”25 Yet, the answer was quite simple: complete control of
Scotland was not foremost on Henry’s mind in late 1542 or throughout 1543. He only
wanted to make sure that the Scots would not attack England while he was preoccupied
with his main objective, the invasion o f France. It took Henry only six days from Solway

23 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #43, p.25.
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Moss to write Wharton requesting the best of the prisoners be sent to London, so not a
great deal of planning went into his "assured lords" strategy. In any case, the king needed
to save money. Hertford’s invasion in 1544 was a measure of last resort and cost Henry
plenty, but political treachery obviously cost Henry very little and meant that he could
invest more energy and money in southern England, closer to France. Finally, Henry’s
thinking concerning Scotland stressed short-term objectives. It would be well enough if
he could gain control of Scotland but in 1543 all he wanted was the infant Mary in his
safe keeping, which assured him a measure of security against the Scots. Henry should
have realized that the Scots would soon resent his demands to deliver Mary, but he did
not care as long as he had Mary in his hands by the time Charles V was ready to begin the
projected invasion of France. The king’s short-term aims are revealed by the fact that he
became anxious over events in Scotland less than two months after his assured Lords
returned. Henry wanted quick results, and ordered Sir Ralph Sadler to travel to
Edinburgh to make something happen. But Sadler was thrown into a situation that the
English had failed to understand, and thus faced overwhelming demands on one side
while receiving contradictory information from an irresolute governor on the other.
Nevertheless, it appeared that the pro-English party had a chance of meeting its objectives
early in 1543, before completely falling apart by December and forcing Henry to switch
from “Gentle” to “Rough” Wooing.

Chapter 4
The Diplomacy of Sir George Douglas

Sir Ralph Sadler arrived in Edinburgh on March 18, 1543 with orders from Henry
VIII to advance English aims in the new government and also discover what, if any,
progress the assured lords had made in Scottish politics.1 The English ambassador
quickly found that the Scottish Parliament he had hoped to influence had already
adjourned, without his knowledge, just days before. Sadler immediately sought out
Governor Arran, who assured him that all was well and that favorable relations with
England would continue. Yet, “there was a great company o f noblemen and gentlemen
about him, which pressed so near him, as it seemed to me, that either he would fain have
had me in some other place, where he might have secretly communed with me, or else
intended to take counsel afore he entred farther with me.”2 Perhaps Arran’s hesitation to
speak in detail with Sadler had something to do with the Parliament that had just met,
where instructions for peace with England were drawn up for Scottish ambassadors en
route to London. These instructions, in some cases, strongly contradicted the demands
Henry VIII had been making from Westminster, and leads one to the conclusion that the
bishops and the conservative nobles Argyle, Murray, Huntley, and Methven had

1List of Henry’s instructions to Sadler in LP, Vol.18, Part 1, #271, p .153.
2 Sadler State Papers, ed. Arthur Clifford, (Edinburgh, 1809) V ol.l, p.66 (hereafter
designated as SSP).
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persuaded Arran to adjourn Parliament before the arrival of the English diplomat.3
However, Sir George Douglas assured Sadler that the Scottish Parliamentarians “had
agreed all well together”4 for peace with England and proceeded to inform Sadler of the
hard work the assured lords had undertaken since their return to Scotland in late January.
Nonetheless, Sir George was also forced to account for the failures the pro-English party
had faced, including Parliament’s refusal to deliver young Mary to England and the
assured lords inability to block a petition calling for the freedom of Cardinal Beaton.
But, before considering Sadler’s initial conversation with Douglas, it would be best to go
back and clarify the important events in Scotland prior to Sadler’s arrival.
Upon James V ’s death on December 14, 1542, a power struggle began in
Edinburgh between the heir presumptive, James Hamilton, earl of Arran, and the late
king’s chief advisor, the conservative, pro-French Cardinal Beaton. A new government
was proclaimed from James' will on December 19 committing Arran, Murray, Argyle,
and Huntley to the regency with Beaton acting as lord chancellor. Yet, almost
immediately Arran had a falling out with the cardinal, reportedly calling him a “false
churl” and drawing his sword on him.5 This incident probably was related to a “black
list” o f heretics that Beaton had drawn up for James and that was said to include Arran’s
name. Arran was indeed a “great favourer of the scripture”6 and was said also to favor
better relations with England over France. In contrast, Beaton was allegedly involved in

3 List of instructions to Scottish diplomats in SSP. pp.59-63.
4 SSP, p.67.
5 LP, Vol.17, #1249, p.686.
6 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1,#27, p. 17.
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giving his consent for the murder o f an English agent, Somerset herald, and stating that
he “had authority from the Holy Father the Pope to interdict the realm of England...”.7
Thus, recognizing Beaton’s contradictory outlook, while also being politically ambitious
himself, Arran accused the cardinal o f forging James’ will.
Arran was clearly hesitant to share power with Beaton, and in the aftermath of
Solway Moss, for which Beaton was partially blamed, he reckoned that the time was ripe
to take control of Scotland in the name of the nobility. Arran capitalized on the memory
o f James’ unpopular policies toward his nobles to show that the will would have
bypassed the realm’s natural leaders and given Scotland over to the cardinal and his
churchmen. Therefore, Arran sought the support of the lay earls against Beaton, and also
sought the position of governor to give him control of the Council of Regency. The many
references to the twenty-six year old Arran as irresolute and weak, in addition to rumors
concerning his expendability, make it seem that those who agreed to support him hardly
feared him as much as the more formidable cardinal.8 Sir George Douglas had written
Lisle as early as December 17 saying that “Arran was but a simple man, and th ’ other
were but fools, so that the strongest of the field were like to obtain the crown.”9 But
those earls who supported Arran as one of their own did not expect him to sway toward
Henry and Protestantism as much as he would once the assured lords returned. In any
case, Arran took advantage of a reformist backlash against the old government and was

7 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1,#26, p.15.
8 HP, Vol. 1, #276, pp.371-373
9 LP, V ol.17, #1213, p.669.
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named governor and regent on January 3, while Beaton was relegated to a minor position
on the council. Meanwhile, Mary of Guise, the queen dowager and mother o f the heir to
the throne, waited in Linlithgow to determine what her role should be during the regency.
By early 1543, Sir Richard Southwell and Sir John Dudley,Viscount Lisle, were
Henry’s main contacts with Scotland. At first, Henry took Arran’s appointment as
governor as an affront to his own suzerain rights in Scotland, which he had untactfully
announced to the Scots as soon as he had learned of James’ death in December.10 Then,
Henry changed his mind and issued a second set of instructions to Southwell, ordering
that Arran be informed that he was expected to co-operate with England, while also
adding that “the sayd Sir Richard must also remembre that the nature o f the Scottes is full
of gelousy and envye, and therfor albeit he is ordred to take the advise of therle of
Anguishe, Erie of Glenkeme, and Lord Maxwell who will be the chief men o f trust in this
consultacion.”11 Thus, Henry, although not as concerned with the Scots as with the
French at this time, was nonetheless taking nothing for granted north o f the border and
tried to intimidate Arran from the start. This action underscores Henry’s short-term way
of thinking about Scotland, for intimidation might not have been the most productive
policy to use on a man already said to favor English ties. In a mixture o f friendliness and
vieled threat, Lisle even had a Scottish pursuviant inform Arran that “if he knew the
King, he would rather be his subject than to be king of all Scotland.”12 To build up even

10 LP, Vol. 17, #275, pp.361-363.
11 LP, Vol. 17, #276, p.372.
12 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #27, pp. 16-17.
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more pressure on the governor, the assured lords had agreed at Darlington to “reason with
Arran and, if he will not be persuaded, to oppose him”.13
True to their word, Angus and his brother journeyed straight to Holyrood to meet
with Arran in late January. The two had been in exile for fifteen years and Beaton
opposed letting them reenter Scotland, as did Argyle and Murray, on the grounds that the
two had been “long nourished” in England. But Arran nevertheless welcomed the
Douglases back with open arms, restoring their lands and immediately placing them on
the Council of Regency.14 That Arran would be so amiable toward Angus and Sir George
was surprising since the Hamilton and Douglas families had been rivals for decades,
especially after the 1520 incident known as “Cleanse the Causeway” when the Douglases
forcibly ran the Hamiltons out o f Edinburgh. But it seemed that Arran was quite
forgiving toward James’ old enemies, just as he was rather spiteful toward the late king’s
main adherants.
At the suggestion of the assured lords, the day after the Douglases arrived in
Edinburgh, Arran allowed Angus to arrest Beaton and detain him at Dalkeith, a Douglas
stronghold. It was reported that “therle of Anguishe and his broder ruleth the rost aboute
the governor, and that all the lordes which were prysoners here dependithe moche uppon
therle o f Anguishe.”15 Whatever the extent of their influence, the Douglas brothers did at
least persuade Arran to consent to Beaton’s arrest, and face the inevitable opposition from

13 LP, V ol.18, Part l,#37,p.22.
14 HP, V ol.l, #285, p.387-391.
15 HP, V ol.l, #289, p.397.

the bishops and conservative nobles. Was the cardinal’s imprisionment merely a show
put on for the English? The answer will have to wait until the motives of Arran and the
Douglases are more fully understood.
Arran himself remains somewhat o f a mystery. Most historians classify him as
having been irresolute and unfit to govern. A.J. Slavin describes Arran as “a weak man
and a trimmer”.16 Henry VIII once wrote that “he is a man that seeth not deepliest in
these matters, all must be laid before him,” 17 while Mary of Guise called him “a simple
and inconstant man who changed purpose every day.”18 Yet, as J. Gairdner writes, “It
was not that the governor was weak, though perhaps he did not mind being so
considered.”19 It must be remembered that Arran was successful in both gaining the
protectorship o f Scotland for himself, and also overriding the opposition o f Beaton and
the conservative lords to the reentry o f the Douglases to Scotland. The arrest of Beaton, a
cardinal and papal legate, whether or not it was meant as a facade, was a bold act in itself.
Arran had indeed written to Lisle to inform Henry that “if sure of quietness with the King
[Henry], he would put hands on the Cardinal and reform the whole church as the King
has reformed England.”20 As for Arran’s inconstancy, any man placed in his position was
predictably going to be viewed as somewhat irresolute, given that Henry was on one side,
the conservative Francophiles on the other, and the assured lords somewhere in between.

16 Slavin, Politics and Profit, p. 102.
17 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #364, p.214.
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Neutral Scots, o f course, were playing off all sides. The year 1543 would certainly find
Arran to be quite changeable with regard to religion, policy, and loyalty, but, as with
most other Scots involved in this game, he was only looking out for himself and the
continued independance of Scotland. These two objectives characterized Arran’s
decisions and actions throughout the rest of his governorship, for without the one, he
could not have had the other.
Following the arrest of Cardinal Beaton, public opinion in Scotland toward
Governor Arran abruptly changed for the worse. When the Douglas brothers had first
returned to Scotland, they encountered a great number o f supporters who were either proEnglish and reform-minded, or simply unsympathetic toward the old government. But
after Angus' arrest of Beaton, these supporters seemed to dwindle drastically. Priests in
Edinburgh refused to sing mass, christen children, or bury the dead in the wake of
Beaton’s imprisonment, which angered the Scottish people considerably.21 People began
saying that “the Governor was a good man till he rounded with th’erle of Anguishe and
his brother.”22 Because Arran had appointed a Protestant named Thomas Guilliame to
preach daily at Holyrood and openly supported reform of the church as opposed to
traditional religion, people began to acknowledge the influence of Angus and the others,
now referred to as “English lords”.23 Yet, regardless of whether or not Arran truly wanted
to effect an English-style reformation, he suceeded in keeping all his rivals at least

21 LP, Vol.18, Part 1, #102, pp.69-70.
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somewhat contained.
As Arran attempted to please the English, Mary of Guise ended her silence at
Linlithgow and had secretly written to her uncle, the duke of Guise, asking for French
aid. Almost immediately, rumors quickly spread throughout Scotland and England that a
major French force was on its way to Edinburgh. In order to keep the duke from
assuming power over young Mary and possibly Scotland itself, Arran continued to show
that he was ready to compromise with the assured lords and thus gain Henry’s favor.
This would in turn make the French, who were already hesitant to provoke England into
open alliance with the Emperor, less likely to take over matters in Scotland. It would
additionally, and perhaps more importantly, cause Henry to suspend his raids into
Scotland if he believed that the Scottish governor was agreeable to English demands and
working in England’s favor. Lisle was indeed ordered to end all military incursions into
the lowlands after repeated letters from Arran asking “to grant an abstinence of four or
five months” while peace negotiations proceeded “with goodly haste”.24 A truce was
finally granted on February 11 by the English privy council, and Arran was no doubt
content with his successful bid to stall for time. Arran seemed to know that Scottish
politics were still too disjointed to ally with either France or England and risk losing
Scottish control of Scotland. The governor also realized that he could both consolidate
his own power and please the English if Beaton was detained. That the cardinal was not
held more tightly by the Scots, and easily escaped to St. Andrews only months later,

24 LE, V ol. 18, Part 1, #96, p.64.

49

reveals not only the prelate’s individual influence, but also Arran’s policy of remaining
friendly toward all sides. No doubt the Scottish bishops, the conservative lords, and the
French were less incensed by Beaton’s relative freedom than they would have been if he
were held in a dungeon, locked in chains. That Beaton did in fact free himself from the
governor’s quite lax authorities shows the changing situation that Arran himself faced
throughout the year.
On March 12, 1543 the Scottish Parliament convened in Edinburgh for the first
time since the death of James in December. Both the pro-English party, led by the
assured lords, and the pro-French party, led by the bishops and conservative nobles,
arrived in force to make their beliefs and complaints known to the new governor. The
opposition to Arran’s pro-English stance had already met near Perth only days before,
harshly condemning the governor for his impious actions, calling for the release of
Beaton, and making threats to boycott the Edinburgh Parliament. The Douglas brothers
wrote to Lisle that “the Governor replied that he would grant no such unreasonable
desires, and sent a herald charging them on pain of treason to come and serve for the
commonwealth.”25 On account of Arran’s bold command, the oppositionist lords and
bishops decided to sit at Parliament, and the policy agreed upon was indeed meant to
preserve the Scottish commonwealth.
The most important business the Parliamentarians faced was the drawing up of
conditions for peace that their ambassadors would convey to the English privy council in

25 LP, V ol. 18, Part 1, # 2 8 6 , p. 161.
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London. Contrary to Henry’s demands, the Scots refused to deliver young Queen Mary
to England and agreed that she should be kept by her mother - the queen Dowager, Mary
of Guise - and chosen Scottish Lords. They did agree to the proposed marriage of young
Mary to Prince Edward of England, but under the following heavy stipulations:
it is to be desired that Scotland stand at liberty and be governed by
the present Governor until our Sovereign’s “perfect age,” without
any impediment from England...The Queen being of perfect age
and married in England, this realm shall always have the name of
Scotland and its old liberties, and shall be governed by a governor
bom of the realm, and have its own laws... the present governor shall
remain governor for life...After the marriage all the strengths of
Scotland shall remain in the hands of noblemen of the realm, at the
Governor’s pleasure...26
These instructions were quite unlike those that the assured lords had pledged to promote,
and gave Arran a considerable amount of power in determining the future of Scotland.
Arran was in fact officially made second person of the realm at this time, a move that was
for the most part supported by the oppositionist lords and bishops in attendance.
However, the assured lords did gain a victory against the Scottish bishops when Lord
Maxwell introduced an act that officially encouraged preaching of “the true word of
God” and the reading of the English bible.27 Yet, the “clergie and the commynaltie”
battled back with three petitions to Arran:
The firste is, that the Cardinall may be restored to his libertie and
former estate... the second, that the state of the clergie may stand
and contynue in suche condicion as yt ys at this present, and not
followe the cast of England; the thirde, that the yonge Quene...

26 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #273, p. 156.
27 Maxwell's Act found in A Source Book of Scottish History II. eds. Dickinson,
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51

may be put into the keeping of iiij noble men of realme till suche
tyme as she shalbe of yeres of consent to marye...28
Thus, the Scottish Parliamentarians of March 1543 - pro-English and conservatives alike
- sought primarily to safe-guard the continued independence of Scotland during Mary’s
minority. Over those few days, the Scots showed an unlikely display o f unity, at least on
the most important point of remaining loyal to their young queen. It was under these
circumstances that Sadler arrived in Edinburgh on March 18, knowing that a brief
Parliament had just taken place, and wanting to consult the assured lords on exactly what
had occurred at Holyrood.
After his aforementioned meeting with Governor Arran, Sadler was escorted back
to his lodgings by Sir George Douglas, whom he began to question concerning the
political situation in Scotland. Sadler discovered that Douglas was quite eager to speak
about all that had transpired since the assured lords had returned to Edinburgh. He began
by saying:
I have laboured with all my power to do the King’s majesty service,
and will do while I live, wherein I have always pretended outwardly
the commonwealth of Scotland, and spake not much of England,
because I would not be suspected...And now...all is well, and we
have kept our parliament honourably agreeing well together, and
have concluded...that the King’s majesty shall have the marriage of
our young mistress, and that we shall be assured friends to England
for ever...29
From the start, Douglas hinted at the double-dealing he was later accused of,
conveniently informing Sadler that he had to actively work for Scotland’s behalf lest he
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be thought an English agent, which in reality he was supposed to be. Douglas was quick
to exaggerate the friendliness o f the Parliament toward England, but failed to mention
that the marriage arrangement came with a series of conditions that he knew Henry would
find completely unacceptable. However, Sadler was no fool, and proceeded to accuse
Douglas and the other assured lords of not fulfilling their promises, asking “‘Wherefore I
pray you...how be the noblemen affected to his majesty? Which be assured of his
majesty’s party? And why have ye not written more frankly from time to time?” ’30
Douglas responded that he and his brother had indeed written periodically, but the real
problem was that the assured lords “were never, nor yet be able to perform” the oaths
they swore to Henry. He added, “...though the most of them be well affected...the
rest...are mean men, and the others that be of any power are slipt and gone.”31 Yet,
Douglas wished to assure Sadler that he and his brother still had many friends, and that
the pro-English party was the strongest faction “so long as we keep the govemour that he
start not from us; for by him we must work all things for the King’s purpose, unless we
should do it by force, whereunto the time serveth not.”32 As can be seen, Sir George at
the time was very much opposed to taking over Scottish politics by force. Later in the
discussion, he again reiterated this point by stating, “if there be any motion now to take
the govemour from his state, and to bring the government of this realm to the King of
England, I assure you...there is not so little a boy but he will hurl stones against it...”33

30 Ibid., p.68.
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Thus, Douglas counseled caution, time, and patience; options utterly contrary to Sadler’s
instructions from Henry and the privy council.
The rest of the conversation between Sadler and Douglas exposed not only Sir
Ralph’s instinctive abilities, but also Sir George’s hesitantcy to proceed in treachery as
strongly as Henry would have liked. Sadler informed Sir George that:
Mr. Douglas, the King's majesty hath had large offers...to have the
child brought into his hands, with also the strong holds, according to
your promises; and if your ambassadors should come with mean things,
not agreeable to his highness, you are a wise man, ye know what may
ensue thereof.34
Sir George seemed to take Sadler’s vieled threat quite seriously, and quickly sought to
both console English doubts and establish himself as having been true to Henry. Stating
a position often repeated by the assured lords over the next few months, Douglas replied
that “his majesty shall have the marriage offered to be contracted...and having that first,
the rest of his desires may follow in time.”35 The consensus of the pro-English party was
that, once the marriage contract was concluded, English expectations would soon be
placated by a favorable Scottish policy. It was a hopeful stance, taken by those who were
powerless to take the impractical English demands any further. Before leaving, Douglas
spoke frankly to Sadler, saying, “all things cannot be done at once”36; for he was
obviously frustrated by the lofty goals set by the English king. He argued that even if
promises had been made, circumstances would not allow the assured lords to perform

34 Ibid., p.69.
35 Ibid.,p.69.
36 Ibid.,p.69.
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them. Thus, Douglas believed the English demands to be impossible to fulfill either
politically or by force, but still felt obligated to promote English aims to Arran in order to
keep his standing with Henry. Perhaps to regain Sadler’s confidence, Sir George boasted
that, "I have so insinuate myself with the govemour, that I am in chief credit with him; I
have caused him pull down the cardinal, who was, and would have been, chief enemy to
the King’s purposes...”37 But no matter whether or not Sir George Douglas actually
deserved the credit for influencing Arran toward a pro-English stance, it was obvious
from the discussion that he was either unwilling or unable to follow Henry’s instructions.
Which of these was tmly the case would explain, at least from one angle, the failure of
Sadler’s mission in 1543.
Sir George Douglas was said to be a man of spirit and talents, and most likely
himself led the loose coalition of assured lords. But, Sadler soon discovered that the
assured lords were less a coherent party than a group of self-interested peers who
distrusted one another as much as they did their conservative, pro-French counterparts.
Sir George took the credit for bringing Arran over to the pro-English group, but was
Arran tmly an Anglophile? His stance on religion and the arrest of Beaton made it seem
as if he were on England’s side, but one can see where these decisions were in his and
Scotland’s best interests, and hardly prove that he was either Henry’s or Douglas’s
political puppet. The governor no doubt favored better relations with England, but not to
the point where he would risk his governorship to bring it about. Douglas did seem to

37 Ibid.. pp. 69-70.
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have some amount of influence over Arran, but most of his power was used over his own
brother. A.J. Slavin stated that “His influence over his brother Angus was complete...”.38
More importantly, Lord Somerville himself insisted to Sadler that Angus, "be too much
led and directed by his brother George,”.39 The editor of Sadler State Papers. Arthur
Clifford, adds that Godscroft, the Douglas family historian, recorded that Angus’
common answer to any suit was “we shall advise with our brother...”.40 Thus, since the
Douglas brothers were considered by the English to be the natural leaders of the proEnglish party, and knowing that Sir George Douglas had direct influence over his brother
Angus, it would seem that the weight of the assured lords' success or failure rested firmly
on the shoulders of the younger brother.
From his personal standpoint, George Douglas had much to gain, but also much to
lose if he decided to appear overly pro-English upon his return to Scotland. He would
receive a substantial English pension and probably an important post in an English-run
Scottish government should Henry gain control of Scotland, yet he could just as easily
lose all the power and land he and his brother had regained in January if Henry should
fail. While aligning with the conservative nobles could offer prestige and security to the
Douglas brothers, Henry could only offer the promise of future rewards if they followed
an impractical set of guidelines which would undoubtedly alienate their friends and
followers, as it already had when Beaton had been arrested. By playing both sides, Sir

38 Slavin, Politics and Profit, p. 103.
39 SSP, p.72.
40 Ibid.. p.72, footnote.
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George had the luxury of reaping the benefits from both England and Scotland, without
having to choose between the two. He could work on England’s behalf to an extent,
counseling Arran to keep Henry’s favor, while also securing his prestige in Scotland by
appearing to support young Mary as well. It was a politically safe manoeuvre for
Douglas, as it was for Arran, to attempt to please all sides and thus stay independent of
constraining alliances. By remaining free to choose the most beneficial options which
presented themselves in this complex web of diplomacy, Douglas could take advantage of
both English money and Scottish power, while being able to fall back on his reinstated
Scottish lands should Henry lose Scotland to the French. In addition, Scottish
nationalism had begun to swell up in the people following the arrest of Beaton and socalled “corrupting” of Arran by the “English” lords. Henry’s demand for the delivery of
both the cardinal and the young queen to England was too much to ask o f the traditionally
stubborn Scots. Thus, by March of 1543, it could be argued that Douglas was both
unwilling and unable to promote English aims to the fullest. He was definitely proEnglish in his beliefs, but only to the extent that his political treachery was realistically
within reason. He seemed to have had no moral qualms whatsoever in selling out his
fellow Scots to the English, but Henry’s demands were far beyond even what Douglas
felt comfortable supporting before his peers. Whether he in some way felt a deeply
hidden loyalty to Scotland is impossible to know, but on a practical level, Douglas was as
equally trapped by Henry’s diplomacy as was Sadler, and to a lesser extent, Governor
Arran. All three were in one way or another competent supporters of better relations with
England, and all were faced with the impossible objectives of the English king.

Chapter 5
The inconstant Governor and deceitful queen Dowager
By the end of March, 1543, Cardinal David Beaton was back in the safety of his
own castle at St. Andrews, having supposedly bought off his former jailkeeper, Lord
Seton, with French gold. Yet, for the lack of measures to prevent it, apparently Governor
Arran and the pro-English party had not the strength nor the desire to keep the cardinal
captive, even though Sir Ralph Sadler had made Henry’s wish for the continued
imprisonment of the prelate perfectly clear to both the governor and the Douglases.
Sadler himself admitted that the governor “lacketh here good ministers for that
purpose...”,1after Arran had assured the ambassador “that he [Beaton] was in as sure
prison in his own house, and as straitly looked unto as he was before...”.2 Arran must
have known that his own words were untrue, but was under significant pressure from the
conservative lords and the clergy to free Beaton while still wanting the situation to appear
as favorable as possible to the English. Circumstances were slowly starting to change in
the Francophile party’s favor, and the governor was more content to act amicably towards
Beaton and his supporters than to risk his position by firmly following advice from the
English and their assured lords either to transfer the cardinal to a more pro-English
stronghold or deliver him to England. Sir George Douglas hesitated to follow English
instructions in this situation as well, failing to take custody of Beaton and personally

1 SSP, p.94.
2 Ibid., p.93.
57

58

move him to Tentallon Castle as Sadler had wished. As Henry had complained to Sadler
on March 30, "how George Duglus hath handled that matter, himself best knoweth."3 In
fact, Sir George's position as the governor’s most influential advisor had already been
undercut by Huntley and the conservative earls.
A series o f effective diplomatic moves by the queen dowager, Mary of Guise, had
placed the Catholic, pro-French conservatives in a much better bargaining position by
April, 1543, than they had been only two months before. First, the queen dowager, with
the help of conservative earls such as Huntley and Murray, sought aid from France in the
person of Matthew Stuart, earl o f Lennox and next in line after Arran to the Scottish
throne. As a part o f their secret correspondence, Lord Methven wrote Mary concerning
the invitation offered Lennox to act as a counterbalance to the assured lords. He stated,
“Remeber that contenuall lawbouris be maid that Lennox be had gif it ma be but
inconvenyent, and gif he can be had hastilie depesche in France...and remember that ther
departing be sacret kepit...and I sail thar efter cum and speik wyth you an quhat sarvice I
can salbe don wyth deligens.”4 Thus, the queen dowager was very much involved in the
covert diplomacy o f the pro-French faction, acting as its virtual leader until Beaton was
again at liberty, and welcoming Lennox and three shiploads of French money to
Linlithgow on April 5. But Mary was perhaps most effective in her diplomatic

3 LP, Vol.18, Part I, #334, p.187.
4 The Scottish Correspondence o f Marv o f Lorraine, ed. Annie I. Cameron, SHS
(Edinburgh, 1927) 3rd Series, Vol. 10, #VIII, p. 10. (Mary of Guise was also
referred to as Mary of Lorraine on account o f her birthplace) (Hereafter
designated as The Scottish Correspondence")
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deceitfulness; attempting to present Sadler and the English with a skewed view of
Scottish affairs by stating her support for the marriage alliance with England while urging
Henry to be even more demanding of the Scots.
Sadler met with the queen dowager on March 22 in an attempt to better
understand the Scottish situation and also inform her of the benefits of the marriage
alliance. In this last respect, his instructions must have seemed as futile as the ones he
had received in 1541, for if he could not turn James against France, how was he expected
to turn James’ French widow against her homeland and into the arms o f her husband’s
worst enemy? Yet, Sadler was hopeful that Mary would understand Henry’s offer to be
in the best interests of her daughter and Scotland as a whole. For her part, Mary hoped to
lull the English into a false sense of security, thereby stalling for time as Lennox sailed to
Linlithgow and Beaton worked to obtain his freedom. Thus, Sadler “found her most
willing and conformable in appearance to your Majesty’s purpose, for the marriage of her
daughter to my lord prince’s grace; and also, that your Majesty should have her delivered
forthwith into your hands and custody...”5 As the term “in appearance” implies, Sadler
was somewhat hesitant to trust that a French princess would be so gracious as to hand
over her only child to the English. Arthur Clifford surmised that Mary wished to draw
Sadler into some plot for abducting the young queen, then would have let the plot be
known, raising the already high popular indignation toward the pro-English party.6 But
this was not her only goal, for Mary also sought to win the trust of the English over Arran

5 SSP, p.84.
6 Ibid.. p.84, footnote.
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and the assured lords by informing Sadler that “the govemour and council have
determined in their parliament, that your Majesty shall not have the child delivered into
your hands, for sundry considerations alledged amongst them.”7 Thus, Mary forced
Sadler and the English Privy Council to question the motives of both Arran and the
assured lords who had allowed the measure to pass. Even Douglas had not been so frank
as to go into detail on the reasons the Scots would not deliver the young queen, but Mary
was quick to point them out to Sadler, making it seem as if she was the more honest
source o f Scottish information.
The queen dowager directly condemned Arran for working against the interests of
England, thereby attempting to sow dissension between the ambassador and the governor,
and also provoke Henry into making increasingly threatening demands. Nevertheless, the
queen dowager’s facade fell for a moment and her true loyalties were revealed when she
added that “The cardinal, if he were at liberty, might do much good in the same...”.8
After their conversation had ended, and Mary had shown Sadler the healthy future Queen
of Scots, Sir George Douglas was summoned to speak with the queen Dowager alone.
Douglas afterwards correctly told Sadler that “She was nothing willing, nor comformable,
to your majesty’s purpose...”.9 Douglas saw through Mary of Guise's charade, and tried
to convince Sadler of this fact, but the ambassador, hopeful to have finally found a way in
which to convey young Mary to England, submitted to London only a mild rejection of

7 Ibid-, p.85.
8 Ibid., p.86.
9 Ibid-, p.88.
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her sincerity when he wrote:
Thus your majesty may perceive, that some juggling there is;
which, by the grace of God, a little time shall reveal unto your
majesty. And, for my part, if my wit and experience would
serve me as well as my good will, I should sooner decipher the
same;10
One of Sadler’s main faults throughout his mission to Scotland was his optimism
that the Scots would realize the benefits o f a marriage alliance with England and an
English-style religious reformation. Perhaps his view of the Scots was a bit too
condescending, for he should have understood the uncomfortable position in which
Henry’s demands placed the pro-English party and all who wished an Anglo-Scottish
alliance to come about. Nevertheless, the queen dowager’s comments drew an equally
hopeful response from the English privy council:
In the queen...the king’s majesty judgeth to be a frank and
plain manner of proceeding, such as motherly love to the
surety of her child should o f reason easily perswade her.
In the rest, the king’s majesty is in a marvellous perplexity
what to say of them, being their deeds so repugnant to that
the queen saith, with the strange fashion o f removing of the
cardinal, so denied at one time, doubted o f afterward, and
then granted by sir George Douglas...11
Thus, Henry and the council felt that Mary of Guise spoke more truthfully than their own
assured lords. Mary had successfully deceived not only the privy council and King
Henry, but also Sadler, who was sceptical at first, but later remarked that “wherein also I
was fully perswaded upon my last conference with her,”12 This stands as yet another

10Ibid., p.88.
11 Ibid.. p. 100.
12 Ibid., p. 112.
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example of the “quick-fix” nature o f Henry’s Scottish policy. To avoid the trouble of
sending an expensive army to Scotland on the eve of the French invasion, the English
happily accepted that a French princess would side with them. Sadler was instructed to
meet with the queen Dowager again to discover what lords she believed would be willing
to deliver young Mary, and then secure their commitment by “alluring them with
promises and rewards...”.13 It seemed that those in London already had begun to distrust
their pro-English party, and felt that an equal number of empty promises that had been
given them would eventually lure someone to bring the infant queen across the border.
Henry and his councillors especially felt betrayed by Sir George Douglas, who they
blamed for allowing Arran to allow Beaton to go free.
After having been in Scotland for less than a week, Sadler too was becoming
suspicious o f the motives of Arran and Douglas. The ambassador had urged the governor
and Sir George to move Beaton to the Douglas castle of Tentallon, an impregnable
stronghold where he would be more closely confined. Yet, the cardinal was put under the
less-than-watchful eye of the Catholic Lord Seton and a small garrison at Blackness.
Douglas explained to Sadler that Arran had suggested moving Beaton to St. Andrews so
as to be able to confiscate the castle and the gold within it for the governor himself. To
Sadler’s objections against the plan, Sir George responded “That he is in as sure prison
there, as in any place in Scotland,” and later, Arran promised “That, whilst he lived, the
cardinal should never have liberty, nor come out of prison”.14 The governor added that

13 Ibid., p .101.
14 Ibid., pp.89-90.
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the move was also meant to persuade the Scottish clergy to resume their religious duties
for the upcoming Easter holiday, duties which they had abruptly ceased performing upon
Beaton’s initial arrest. At that point, Sadler wrote “But if the cardinal shall have his
liberty, I shall never trust him [Douglas] nor the govemour,”.15 However, Beaton did
gain his liberty because, for one reason or another, his jailor Seton never occupied St.
Andrews castle and the cardinal was left a free man inside a fortress protected by his own
men. Beaton proceeded “to lead the clergy in making an offer of money and plate for the
defence o f the realm against England.”16 The cardinal’s personal authority further
strengthened the resurgent conservative party, while Sadler was left with worthless
assurances from the very men who were supposed to be his allies.
On April 1, Sadler dined with Governor Arran at Holyrood and proceeded to
question him about the queen dowager’s comments made only a few days before. Arran
made it a point to entertain the English ambassador with “great cheer and good
countenance”, and requested Sadler to write to England to procure “some books of the
New Testament and Bible in English, and also the statutes and injunctions made by the
king’s majesty for the reformation of the clergy, and extirpation of the bishop of
Rome...”.17 When informed o f Mary of Guise’s ill words towards him, Arran
prophetically replied to Sadler “That I should find her in the end (whatsoever she
pretendeth) a right French woman,” admitting that:

15 Ibid.. p.89.
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She studied nothing more than to set the king’s majesty and him
[Arran] at pick; and so to keep both realms from unity and agree
ment...as she is both subtle and wily...And still she laboureth...by
all means she can, to have the cardinal at liberty;18
Thus, Arran had correctly ascertained Mary o f Guise’s ruse as well as Douglas, but the
governor’s opinion of the situation was not taken seriously by the English for they were
still questioning his loyalties. Arran had pledged that Beaton would never go free and
that Seton was well-bound to him, yet the cardinal’s imprisonment had become but a
nominal reality. Since the queen dowager and the governor both professed to be on
England’s side and accused the other of working against the marriage alliance, the
ambassador knew that one of them must be in league with Beaton and the conservative
earls.
After his dinner with the governor, Sadler wrote that “I cannot tell which o f them
to trust, but refer the same to your wisdoms...”.19 One could blame Sadler for not
realizing that both of them might have been lying for different reasons - Mary for France
and the Auld Alliance, Arran for the continued independence of Scotland and the safety
of his own position as governor - but even if he had understood this, he was already
defeated by his own king’s outrageous demands. The assured lords were not powerful
enough to take control of Scotland without a figurehead such as Arran, the queen
dowager, or Beaton, so Sadler’s only other diplomatic option if he could not place his
trust in someone substantial would have been to admit defeat and request that an army be

18 Ibid.. pp.111-112.
19 Ibid., p. 112.
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sent to place the pro-English party in control. Remaining optimistic that a peaceful
alternative could be found, Sadler continued his mission to work out the marriage
alliance, and hoped, like the assured lords, that all the rest would follow. Unfortunately
for him, the English privy council's instructions to Edinburgh only revealed its ignorance
o f the situation, and moved an already faltering Arran even closer to Beaton’s side.
Around the middle of April, Arran first began to show signs of leaning toward the
pro-French party. The governor was only a man of twenty-six and was perhaps
beginning to realize the risks involved in maintaining a pro-English agenda. The delivery
of the young Queen to England would have been nearly impossible for Arran to
undertake and remain as governor, especially since the few followers he now had - the
assured lords - refused to risk it themselves. The arrest of Beaton had cost Arran a great
deal of popular support, as had his open embrace of Protestantism. The conservative,
Francophile party had always had a larger base of supporters, and was now strengthened
by the leadership o f Beaton, the arrival of Lennox, and the bargaining power of both
French gold and the church’s own supply of wealth, which was safely locked away at St.
Andrews. While Arran remained on good terms with Sadler and Henry, it was also clear
that he was increasingly telling the English what they wanted to hear. Arran would
commonly refer to Henry’s obviously impractical aims as “reasonable demands” while
saying to Sadler that he felt the Pope to be “a very evil bishop.”20 It cannot be proven that
Arran directly gave Beaton his freedom, which indeed would have been unlikely given

20 Ibid., pp.92& 94.
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their prior associations, but the governor certainly could have provided a better guard
than Lord Seton, or allowed the assured lords to move Beaton to a stronger fortress.
However, public opinion would not have stood for the latter option, as the assured lords
were already considered “English lords” and corruptors of Arran. The most practical
move for the governor was to allow Beaton to be moved, then attempt to console English
fears that he would gain his liberty, which was inevitable once he was back at St.
Andrews with his gold and means of open correspondence. Arran was not, as Douglas
finally called him in frustration, “the most wavering and unstable person in the world,”21
but he was also not blind to the fact that the nobles who supported Scottish nationalism
far outnumbered those who backed England, Protestantism, and a marriage alliance
which might make Scotland into an English satellite much like Wales or Ireland. Thus,
from mid-April through the month of May, Arran more openly sided with the
conservative party, while still keeping England docile by feeding her claims she wanted
to hear. It was clear that Arran was no longer forming his own policy, but reacting to the
situation put in motion by the conservative leaders.
Regarding the remainder o f the assured lords, apart from Sir George Douglas, one
has to wonder if their role in Anglo-Scottish affairs included as much double-dealing as
their more prolific comrade. It has been shown that Angus had no real individual motives
apart from those of his more intelligent brother, and mirrored Sir George’s comments
when he told Sadler that “there was no doubt but your majesty once having the interest in

21 I b id .,p .l0 5 .
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the young queen, all the rest of your grace’s desires should follow.”22 The old exile
perhaps put the Douglas family’s situation best when he admitted that “but yet...I am not
fully established here; I am but newly restored to my possessions, trusting to be every day
more and more able to serve his majesty,”.23 But, as shall be seen, Angus did perform all
the duties that he was realistically capable of executing on behalf o f England, and by late
1543 and early 1544, was one o f the few assured lords still trusted by Henry and still
fighting the conservatives.
In contrast, William, fourth earl of Glencaim, and Gilbert Kennedy, third earl of
Casillis, were both “Lutheran in sympathies and anglophile in antecedents,”24 yet
Glencaim died in 1548 in receipt of a French pension and Casillis died at Dieppe in 1554
while arranging the match between young Mary and the Dauphin. Lord Maxwell also
held Protestant leanings and proved his worth by introducing the very liberal religious
legislation at the March parliament, but he too held questionable loyalties to England as
time passed. Bothwell and Fleming had almost immediately rounded with the
conservatives upon their return, and Lords Somerville and Gray were the only other
assured lords of note left in the pro-English party by April 1543. But, if his collaborators
had begun to abandon Henry, the English king was certainly not making any pretense of
supporting their cause. While most of the assured lords favored Protestant religious
reform, Henry had openly allied with the Catholic Emperor Charles V and in the process,

22 Ibid., p.74.
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placed a hold on Protestant preaching in England. Furthermore, the blustering attitude
evident in Henry’s correspondence must have made them think twice about handing over
their homeland and young queen to such a vengeful man. As Arthur Clifford states in
Sadler State Papers. “The violent expostulations here enjoined must have had the natural
effect of disgusting those of the noble captives who remained attached to Henry’s cause,
and alienating such as were wavering. Sadler, accordingly, hesitates at delivering these
reproaches.”25 Like the Douglases, the remainder of assured lords hardly wanted to risk
both their positions and possibly their lives in support of an England which seemed to
care little for them, as her religious policy, foreign affairs, and bullying demands
increasingly suggested. Yet, perhaps the main obstacle to the continued obedience of the
assured lords was the attitude of the Scottish people, and their growing resentment
towards the English marriage alliance. The possibility that the influential and quite
zealous cardinal, backed by the majority of the Scottish nobility, might lead the masses
against the impious “English lords", at best driving them from Scotland, at worst
executing them as traitors, could not have been far from their minds.
In the wake of Lennox’ April landing in Scotland with a party of French soldiers,
Sadler counseled caution to Henry and the privy council, feeling the time was not right to
resort to effecting changes by force.26 Yet, Beaton was meanwhile producing an even
greater threat to the English cause in the person of John Hamilton, the abbot of Paisley
and Arran’s half-brother. Beaton had convinced the ambitious churchman to travel to
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Edinburgh and persuade Arran to capitulate to the conservative party. It seems that the
cardinal hoped Hamilton would have an effect on Arran much like the one Sir George had
on Angus. Yet, it was not that Arran did not wish his half-brother to come to Scotland,
for Sadler admitted to the privy council that the governor “much wanted” him there, even
though he must have realized that Hamilton was a strict churchman who would certainly
not support an alliance with England.27 If Arran had suspected that his individual power
would be stifled by the abbot’s arrival, he would probably have informed Sadler of this
and asked that a safe-conduct for the prelate not be given. This and the fact that rumors
were spreading concerning an influential position for Hamilton make it seem that Arran
actually wanted his clever half-brother’s counsel, and in turn was not a pawn in Beaton’s
plans but a willing participant. Sadler was in fact the real pawn here, but without reliable
sources of information, he was correct in admitting to Henry that “the state of affairs is
very perplexed...”28
The remainder of the month of April witnessed the true victory o f the
conservative Francophile party over the disaffected and disunited pro-English party even
though the marriage alliance with England was still to be ratified by the Scots in July. On
April 19, Sadler wrote to Henry that “the Governor was now ruled by his brother the
Abbot of Paisley, and seemed no way disposed to accede to the King’s propositions...”.29
John Hamilton was made chief advisor upon his arrival in Edinburgh and soon after,
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Arran dismissed the Protestant preachers at court whom he had supported since late
January. Sensing that Sir George Douglas would no longer be effective in counseling the
governor toward English aims, the privy council instructed Sadler to undergo a strategy
which resulted in Arran moving even closer to Beaton and the conservative earls. Sadler
was instructed to inform Arran that should Beaton declare him an illegitimate child, the
French agent Lennox could become the new regent. It was widely known that Arran’s
father had undergone a complicated divorce, and Sadler was to show the governor that the
Scottish nobility thought “he was neither wise, constant, nor politick, and had no title to
the crown of this realm; for he was a bastard undoubtedly.”30 The ambassador explained
that Lennox had come to Scotland on Beaton’s behalf to challenge the governor for the
regency. Being the leading church official in Scotland, the cardinal could conceivably
call Arran’s legitimacy into question and thus hand the regency over to the man next in
line to the throne. While the queen dowager, and not Beaton, had invited Lennox to
Scotland, the conservative party no doubt had this strategy in the back of their mind, but
had not openly pursued it prior to Sadler’s conference with Arran. In any case, this
attempt to frighten Arran over to the English side seemed to have had the exact opposite
effect. Instead o f moving against Beaton, which would have been dangerous to his
governorship, Arran chose to move closer to the conservative party, thus ensuring his
continued position as director of the regency.
As the month ended, Sadler received word from Henry “that your majesty hath
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determined to alleviate and disburden me o f the office of secretary...”31 Although the
official reasoning for Sadler’s removal as co-Secretary of State (with Thomas
Wriothesley) was that Henry could not afford an absentee secretary, it would be naive not
to believe that his demotion had something to do with his failed efforts in Scotland which
by then had only resulted in Beaton’s freedom and Arran’s growing separation from the
pro-English party. A.J. Slavin insists that “At a crucial time in the intrigues in Scotland,
Sadler’s labours were hampered by his dismissal...”32 However, this merely exemplifies
yet again how the king and privy council hindered the success of their ambassador to
Scotland.
In order to reveal the constantly changing circumstances surrounding Sadler's
mission in 1543, one has only to consult his personal account of the political episode. As
previously stated, Sadler wrote on April 19 that Governor Arran was in no way disposed
to accept Henry's demands. Yet, less than two weeks later, on May 1, Sadler wrote to
Henry that "the Governor is now wholly on Henry's side," and optimistically believed
Arran's claims that the marriage alliance with England would be swiftly concluded.33
However, the English ambassador was well aware that the Scots could prove deceitful,
and shared his true feelings of the situation with the Lieutenant of the North, the Duke of
Suffolk, when he surmised:
Nevertheless, the state of this realm is so perplexed, that it is
hard to judge what will follow; for all this while the feares of

31 Ibid.. p. 168.
32 Slavin, Politics and Profit, p. 119.
33 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #482, p.290.

72

our warres hath made them sit still and agree togethir. But
whan the pece shalbe concludid, it is not unlike that the warre
which nowe goes on will begin here among themselfes in
earnest, the realm being divided as it is into sundrie partes.34
Since England and Scotland were still officially at war with only a fragile truce keeping
the peace, both the conservative Francophile party and the assured lords urged that Sadler
request the English privy council to extend the truce until July 15. The Scottish nobles
from both political groups stated that the extension would provide them with more time
to debate Henry's demands; of course it would also give each side additional time to
consolidate its power. As Sadler pointed out in his letter to Suffolk, it was far from clear
which party could take control of the kingdom after the threat of war with England
abated. Yet it became more obvious day by day that the conservative bishops and earls
had more popular support than the pro-English nobles, with the possible exception of the
merchant community, which saw in a treaty with England new markets and safer waters.
The conservatives appealed to the traditional views of most Scots, both in religious terms
and also national sentiment, as they fanned the age-old hatred of the English by accusing
Henry of wanting to make Scotland his own. Throughout the early summer of 1543, that
skillful politician and persuasive diplomat, Cardinal Beaton, was clearly the central
player in the Fancophile party. The Scots were becoming violently anti-English and in
one instance, Sadler and his English servants were fired upon in the garden of his
Edinburgh residence. The ambassador informed the privy council of another unfavorable
sign when he wrote "I am privily advertised, that the cardinal hath made such earnest

34 SSP, p.216.
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labour by friends unto the said govemour for his favour, that he [Arran] hath been thereby
induced to forget and mitigate a great piece of his displeasure towards him [Beaton]...”.35
Yet, as the month of July 1543 approached, Sadler had good reason to feel more
confident about the eventual success o f his mission. Arran, slowly turning toward the
conservatives but still solely in control of the government, had agreed to offer modified
conditions of the English demands to Henry, and assured Sadler that the king would not
refuse them. Glencaim and Sir George Douglas were sent to London in May with this
latest Scottish response to Henry’s demands, and returned with a set o f similarly harsh,
but somewhat more flexible conditions.36 Primary among these involved the delivery of
the young queen to England, which would still occur, but would be postponed until the
child was approximately ten years of age. Apparently, Sadler had been effective in
urging Henry to be more conciliatory, for on May 6 he had pleaded that “All had been
done that could be in furtherance of the king’s wishes, whom he strongly urges to accept
the terms to be laid before him by Glencaim and Douglas,".37
Throughout the days o f May and early June, the Scottish nobles met to debate the
modified English demands. Conservative earls such as Murray and Argyle told Sadler
that they were not altogether against the marriage as a tool for peacefully allying Scotland
with England, but added, “until the same shall be so united, by the consummation of the
marriage, they will spend their lives to preserve the liberty o f this realm, which would be

35 Ibid., p.222.
36 Complete list of re-negotiated demands in LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #577, pp.334-335.
37 HP, V ol.l, #371, p.533.
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lost if the child were delivered.”38 If these words were true, some o f the most
conservative nobles were quite open-minded concerning an alliance with England, so
long as Scotland remained free. Thus, it appears to have been Beaton and the Scottish
bishops who actually represented the anti-English ideology o f the conservative party.
However, Sadler was instructed to use increased threats of force to better urge the Scots
to accede, and surely by this time both nobles and prelates had realized that Henry’s
patience would not last much longer. Finally, on June 8, a Scottish Parliament consisting
of both Francophiles and Anglophiles agreed that,
Our sovereign lady shall be delivered to the King or the Prince,
his son, at her age of 10 years...The perpetual peace to be like
the last...that whomsoever either party shall comprehend shall
not enjoy the benefit of that comprehension if the same detain
any land, possession, or pension from the King or from Scotland...39
Yet the negotiations were far from over. Henry still had to agree officially to the terms,
ratify them in the English Parliament, and send the draft treaty back to Edinburgh for
formal ratification from the Scottish Parliament before the marriage alliance and peace
treaty became a reality. Thus, the political wrangling continued into the summer of 1543
and if anything became more confrontational.
Sadler knew that Beaton could present the greatest threat to the ratification of the
treaty, and with peace being so seemingly close at hand, he urged Arran to make good on
the threats he often uttered:
That if the peace were concluded, he would not fail to pursue

38 LP, Vol. 18, Part 1, #482, p.290.
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both the cardinal and the said earl of Lennox...But of force he must
suspend and stay his proceedings in that behalf, till he see how
all things shall stand between these two realms; till which time
he may not conveniently make any great stir within this realm.40
Yet, after all this talk of how Beaton would be captured and punished, Sadler was of the
opinion that “the Governor seems to wax cold in the prosecution of him and Lennox.”41
Sir Ralph’s intuition was correct, for Arran had no intention of arresting the cardinal, and
most likely lacked the support needed even to attempt it at this stage. Arran was once
again practicing his policy o f safe diplomacy; putting off an important action till the
English made the first move and granted a peace treaty.
In order to place their goals in Scotland on more firm footing, Henry and the
English privy council instructed Sadler to offer bribes and rewards to Arran and the
assured lords in return for their continued allegiance. Sir Ralph thus provided Casillis,
Glencaim, Maxwell, and Somerville with three hundred marks apiece, and granted the
earl of Marshall one hundred pounds sterling. Casillis even informed Sadler that the
conservative earl of Murray would perhaps be swayed by English gold. Yet, these added
incentives were no match for the resources of Beaton and the Francophile party, or even
the government itself under Arran. Sadler had remarked that none were rich in Scotland
save for the clergy, and Gordon Donaldson admits that:
Henry’s policy of tampering with the allegiance of the Scottish
magnates had failed to maintain a party, if only because others
could counter his financial bids...the Scottish government could
offer inducements in the shape o f tacks of crown property, while

40 SSP, p.203.
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the cardinal could grant feu charters and offer eccleiastical patron
age, and in the background there was France, whence pensions
could come to the well-affected.42
That Henry was being as “cost-efficient” as possible with his Scottish policy has been
made clear, thus his hesitation to give large amounts of money to men who were by this
time very suspect in their true loyalties. Henry had once described the Scottish nobility
as a group o f “wild beasts, sometimes hunting in a pack, sometimes tearing each other to
pieces; but governed...whether separate or united, only by a greedy ferocity.”43 Still, the
English king was becoming increasingly impatient to quickly - and cheaply, which meant
peacefully - conclude the marriage treaty with Scotland. To this end, Henry went so far
as to offer Princess Elizabeth’s hand in marriage to Governor Arran’s son. Of course, this
plan would have served the double-purpose of assuring that Arran would not match his
son with the young queen of Scots, and also that he would more importantly remain
steadfastly allied to England as the Anglo-French war drew nearer. Yet, Arran must have
realized that the Scottish people would certainly not have approved of their governor
being in such league with the English, and for that matter, neither would the conservative
bishops and earls whom Arran was being careful not to upset. He answered Henry by
humbly saying that as long as Scotland remained free when the treaties were settled, he
would desire the marriage.44 As with his threats toward Beaton, the governor made it
seem as if everything the English desired would be taken care of once the peace treaty

42 Donaldson, James V - VII. pp. 72-73.
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was concluded. Thus, Arran succeeded in placating both sides while still keeping his
personal options open. As J. Gairdner wrote of him, “the way he received the King’s
great offer hardly indicates such weakness as was so generally imputed to him.”45
Stalling for time in order to put off restricting decisions, while making sure to
keep England content enough not to invade and wreak havoc on the land - these were the
ultimate goals o f Arran’s government throughout the summer of 1543. No matter that
Arran supported Protestantism and English-style reformation, self-interest was his
primary consideration. Even as the marriage alliance and peace treaty proceeded, the
governor took steps to fortify both his and Scotland’s position against English incursion.
First, soon after his half-brother, the abbot of Paisley, arrived in Edinburgh to be his chief
advisor, Arran entered into a clandestine agreement with the abbot and Cardinal Beaton
that would secure financial stability for his oft-brokered son. Supposedly, this bargain
included a simoniacal transaction in which Arran’s son would gain a sizeable church
pension for life, contingent on his entry into the holy orders.46 Thus, by late April the
governor was already building favor with the conservatives, while still working with
Sadler to bring about the marriage alliance with England. Yet, one must assume that as
of late April, Arran was no longer acting in good faith towards the English. It seemed
Arran had no strict preferences as to which side he entertained, and this observation is
further proven by his actions on May 14, when he sent a secret correspondence to Pope
Paul III committing “the kingdom to the protection of his Holiness, whom he begs to

45 LP. Vol. 18, Part 1, preface, p.xxxii.
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undertake the defence of its liberty and privileges...”.47 But why would Arran commit
Scotland to papal interference while moving to finalize a treaty with England? Even
more puzzling, why did the conservative earls and bishops - including Beaton - so
abruptly agree to Henry’s modified demands?
It appears that the governor, along with the Scottish bishops and most of the
nobility, agreed to continue the marriage negotiations throughout May and June for no
other reason than to avoid a potentially devastating war with England. It had been less
than six months since Solway Moss, and a strong English force led by Wharton had been
stationed on the Scottish border ever since that time. Henry had been threatening for
months to invade if his demands were not met, and only the optimistic counsel of Sadler
and the assured lords that the situation was under control had prevented him from driving
Arran out of Edinburgh and placing Angus in control of the government. Yet, there was
also the English king’s troublesome financial constraints which led him to favor
diplomacy over invasion. In any case, most Scots were still afraid o f the English king’s
power, and the nobility certainly did not want another war. However, the Scottish
bishops were already preparing for conflict. Beaton had called a convention of the clergy
at St. Andrews near the end of April, one that placed among its goals the obtaining of
French military aid and the bribery of the neutral Scottish nobles to ensure their
allegiance to the conservative cause.48
Still, the Scots were not ready to fight a war with England, and had to solve their
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own political problems before preparing to do so. This was the mission of both the
conservative party and the government in May and June; not wary acceptance as Henry
believed but a new unified level o f deceit, meant to keep the English off-guard and on
their own side of the border. As A. J. Slavin surmises, the peace would signify “the end
of foreign intervention in their affairs, leaving Scot free to fight Scot in diehard
combat...”.49 In other words, without intricate plans to do so, conflicting parties of Scots
were nevertheless unified in the one purpose of appeasing the English long enough so that
they could settle their own affairs. Arran and Beaton remained enemies, but they both
realized it would be foolish to provoke Henry into a needless war when consenting to a
marriage ten years hence would probably keep the English king satisfied for a bit longer.
The ever practical Sir George Douglas perhaps stated it best when he remarked that “we
being unprovided for war, gain by this treaty ten years of peace; during which, king
Henry or his son, or the queen, may die, or the parties coming o f age may refuse each
other, or matters may so stand that the match may be concluded on more equal terms.”50
This explains the lack of protests from the most anti-English conservatives - the bishops at the June parliament. Rome was already sending a papal legate to aid Beaton and focus
European attention on Scotland’s plight. The cardinal himself even added to the amicable
facade toward England by claiming to support the marriage alliance and further confusing
an English privy council that was desperate to find someone in the whole of Scotland

49 Slavin, Politics and Profit, p. 124.
50 Given by Clifford as a footnote and related by the Douglas family historian Godscroft
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whom they could trust.
Yet, nearly three months after pledging that he would no longer trust Arran if
Beaton were set free, Sadler continued to support the governor and the assured lords,
believing, as J.A. Froude surmised, that “it was possible that they were still partially
honest, and had broken their promises as much from inability to keep them as from
unwillingness.”51 But the ambassador had already spent too much time waiting on the
governor to act, and both his and Arran’s inaction had made it possible for the
Francophiles after the disaster of Solway to mend themselves into a much stronger
political force than the pro-English party. While Beaton had been busy building an
impressive coalition o f bishops, nobles, and foreign allies, Arran had been busy stalling
the English, but losing many of his original supporters. He did still have a number of
loyal retainers, including the assured lords, together with the governmental resources to
call on many more. However, the governor had already misread Seton’s trustworthiness,
if he had ever believed Seton to be loyal in the first place. By late June months of endless
negotiating had resulted in the conservative bishops and earls substantially outnumbering
the Anglophiles. Nevertheless, the draft of the marriage treaty was approved by the
Scottish Parliament.
In this atmosphere of betrayal, the Treaties of Greenwich were signed by Henry,
Douglas, and Glencaim on July 1 and perceived by Sadler as a diplomatic victory.52 In
the final version agreed to by Henry, young Queen Mary would not be delivered to

51 Froude, Reign of Henrv the Eighth, p.561.
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Scotland for another ten years, and Scotland itself was not forced officially to relinquish
the Auld Alliance with France. Yet, peace was granted and formally the two kingdoms
were to be allied to one another, provided the treaties were ratified within the two months
stipulated. Yet both Henry and his ambassador had sorely misjudged the strength of their
pro-English party in Scotland. Sadler was too blinded by relief and optimism to realize
that Beaton and the conservative Francophiles would never really support the treaty, and
could now take steps to further consolidate their power since English interference was no
longer a threat. That Henry cared little about Scotland once he gained their neutrality was
evident over the next few months, as the English never bothered to ratify the treaties,
concentrating instead on preparations for the military campaign across the Channel. The
fact that the marriage alliance with Scotland was less about English sovereignty than
short-term political objectives is obvious when one considers that on June 22, nine days
before the imminent Scottish treaties were signed, an anxious Henry finally felt it safe
publicly to declare war on France.53

53 LE, V ol. 18, Part 1, #754, p.423.

Chapter 6
The defection of the Governor and the failure of English diplomacy
To Sadler's dismay, both English and Scottish jubilation over the signing in July
of the Treaties of Greenwich was short-lived and the superficiality of the alliance became
increasingly apparent as the summer wore on. Only two months after the signing o f the
treaties, what was left of the eroding Scottish amity toward England disintigrated and Sir
Ralph was forced to flee Edinburgh. The English Lord Warden, William Parr, had
seemed to grasp the volatile situation in Scotland better than Sadler or Henry, and soon
after the treaties were signed began to write o f alarming signals concerning the rapidly
changing circumstances across the border. In a early July dispatch to Suffolk, the
Lieutenant o f the North, Parr wrote,
the hoole multitude of Scotlande...be all bente and determyned
rather thene they woll condissende and aggree at any tyme to
delyver theire yong quene into England, or to confourme
theymselfes to other covenauntes touching that purpos, to
stande in ennemytie and to die upon the same.1
Through his position as Warden of the Marches, Parr received intelligence from English
and Scottish spies in the pay of England. Far from the political intrigues of Edinburgh,
Parr could effectively gain information on which side the Scottish nobles and commoners
were supporting: reformist pro-English or conservative, nationalistic pro-French. In
another of his frequent reports to Suffolk, Parr estimated that "the commonalitie in every
place through Scotlande is clerelie geven and leanethe unto hym [Beaton] and his
1 HP, V o l.l, # 3 97. p .557.
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adherantes" and other than the assured Scots, "the rest of Scotlande, both spirituell and
temporall, is against the govemour,..".2 Yet, it appears that the king and his chief Scottish
diplomat chose to ignore this information, instead placing all their hopes in the fact that
Arran and the assured lords could, as they themselves had been saying all along, bring
Scotland under control now that the treaties for peace had finally been signed.
While different religious attitudes still separated the supporters of each political
faction, it seems that as the year progressed, the split became more nationalistic in nature.
In a July dispatch to the privy council, Suffolk, Parr, and Cuthbert Tunstall, the bishop of
Durham, related the opinions of a trusted Scottish informant who believed that "the Scots
will never have their Queen 'come in England' and will rather die than 'be under any other
King than one of their own'".3 To better understand the nationalistic fury o f the Scots,
Scottish historian Robert Mason suggests that they interpreted Henry's blustering claims
to their homeland as meaning that the English king wished to create a "colonial empire"
of Greater Britain. Henry had already claimed suzerainty over Ireland and Wales, and the
Scots believed that an alliance with England would only force their kingdom into this
English empire where they would have to acknowledge the English king as their superior.
This response to English saber-rattling was far from new, and had persisted from on one
hand the reign of Edward I, and on another less concrete level, the fictional legend of
Brutus created by Geoffrey of Monmouth in 1136 to justify English superiority over the
island's peoples. Mason states that "there was much in the Brut tradition to irritate the

2 Ibid.. p. 556-557.
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Scots. In particular, there was the claim that the Kingdom of Scotland was nothing more
than a dependency of the English crown."4 Of course, Henry did not do much to allay
Scottish fears in late 1542 when he released the pamphlet entitled A Declaration.
Contevnvng the Just Causes and Considerations, of this Present Warre with the Scottis.
which argued for "the trewe & right title that the Kinges most royall maiesty hath to the
soverayntie of Scotlande."5 Thus, Mason contends that the Scots resisted English
demands to bow to their feudal superior both militarily and ideologically throughout the
years before, during, and after the 1540's.6 This innate fear and hatred of the hostile
intentions o f the heretical English king who wished to subjugate both their religion and
their homeland was no doubt exacerbated by an influential Scottish clergy determined to
break the unnatural English alliance signed on July 1, 1543.
In another o f his many worrisome letters to Suffolk, Parr stated that "all whiche
the Govemour of Scotlande promyseth to the Kingis majeste is but craft, frawde and
falsitie, for the govemoure never entendethe, nez is able, to perfourme his promyses...".7
Parr had reason to make these accusative remarks, for he was using intelligence gained
from his Scottish spies which would seem to prove that Arran was purposefully deceiving
Sadler and Henry concerning the marriage treaty:

4 Mason, "Scotching the Brut: Politics, History and National Myth in Sixteenth-Century
Britain", in Mason, ed., Scotland and England 1286-1815 (Edinburgh, 1987),
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6 Mason, "The Scottish Reformation and the Origins of Anglo-British Imperialism", in
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And he [Arran] aunswered his counsaill againe, 'Ye knowe the
King o f Englande is a mighty prince, and we not able nez of powre
to resist his puissance, and for that cause I thinke and take it best
by fare wordes and promyses, with the concluding of this peas to
deferre and put over the danger that might otherwise fall upon us;
and in the meane tyme the yong quene maye chance to die or other
change maye happene, wherebie Scotlande may be relieved and
more able to resist Englande.'8
If the information was true, Arran was in fact deceiving the English and did not plan ever
to deliver the young queen into English hands and risk losing the kingdom. But he also
could have been trying simply to justify the English alliance. Perhaps not surprisingly,
Arran's statement concerning the treaties was very similar to the one spoken by Sir
George Douglas. This explanation was probably common among the pro-English party,
for they could not very well admit that they supported the English king and the marriage
for it's own sake. Yet, the sheer incompatibility of the English demands on Scotland were
proven by the fact that Henry's most influential collaborator and the heretofore proEnglish governor o f Scotland had both expressed cynical and unsupportive views
concerning the alliance. Nevertheless, in early July 1543 Henry and the privy council
were confident that a strong and lasting agreement had been made by men who wanted it
to work. Even Sadler, who should have known better the situation, dismissed Parr's
comments as falsities and prepared to get the treaty ratified by Scotland's Parliament as
soon as possible. On July 7 Parr wrote that a servant of Sir George Douglas informed
him that "the Governor will turn to the party of the Cardinal and Lennox, and only awaits
the coming of George Duglasse ('because of a promise made to him') to forsake Angus

8 Ibid.. p .555.
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and him and revolt to the Cardinal,".9 Later that autumn, the English would begin to take
the Lord Warden's analysis seriously, but by then it was too late to influence events north
o f the border.
Soon after the draft treaties were signed and returned to Scotland for ratification
by Parliament, Beaton's conservative pro-French faction, which had been relatively
compliant until then, finally began to display its true motives. For two months, Beaton
had persuaded the English that he supported the goal of peace and friendliness between
the two kingdoms promised in the treaties.. Yet, now that the main threat of English
violence had abated in the jubilation surrounding the signings, Beaton and the clergy
could step up their pressure on Arran and begin to move Scottish politics in their own
direction. Arran, still playing both sides, appointed a Convention at Edinburgh for the
ratification of the treaties. However, this time it was rumored that the conservative
bishops and earls would not appear as they had in June. Next came the news that Beaton,
Huntley, Argyle, Bothwell, and Lennox were preparing a force which would meet at
Stirling, proceed to Linlithgow to take possession of the young queen, then head toward
Edinburgh to remove the governor from power. While it seemed that Scotland was
possibly on the verge of civil war, Parr, and a number of historians, believed that the
whole conflict was being "staged for English eyes". If this was the case, the deceitfulness
of the Scots was far beyond what Sadler could have been trusted to determine. It is more
likely that this was the point from which Arran and Beaton would begin to eventually

9 LP, V ol. 18, Part I, # 8 3 8 , p.473.
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unite against the English. However, if Arran and Beaton did come close to starting their
own little war, it must have been that growing feeling o f nationalism for their homeland,
combined with political practicality, which kept the two most powerful men in Scotland
from destroying each other.
The conservative faction based their rebellion on the "defence of the Faith and
Holy Church, and preservation of the liberty of the Realm."10 Considering the gold they
spent to secure allegiances, these reasons undoubtedly persuaded many in Scotland to
unite against the reformist governor and his "English Lords". In response, Arran
"summoned his friends and warned the country in the Queen's name to resist this
rebellion,"11 while he and Angus prepared their own force to assemble outside
Linlithgow. The governor then wrote Glencaim and Douglas, who were still in England,
that insurrections had arisen against the cardinal and wishing them to inform Henry that
his aid was required. However, Arran made it clear that it was not military aid he desired,
but monetary aid, and "he said he had men enough, and would not bring Englishmen into
the realm unless his adversaries brought in Frenchmen...".12 The cardinal's party arrived
at Linlithgow with about six to seven thousand armed men, yet they were unable to take
possession of the castle which held the two queens. It seems that Linlithgow was
brilliantly guarded by those most loyal to the governor, which suggests that Arran
remained a respected and powerful figure even as the conservative faction grew in
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opposition. Soon after, Arran and his band arrived with an equal number of men and
assured lords Angus, Casillis, Maxwell, and Somerville. Even if the two bands that faced
one another at Linlithgow were numerically comparable, it was said that throughout the
whole of Scotland the armed supporters of the Francophile faction outnumbered Arran’s
followers by a count of three to one.
However, no battle was to take place for the regency of Scotland. The two sides
agreed to forgo a confrontation and meet to discuss terms. Beaton and Arran, each with a
dozen of their loyal nobles, talked for a long while and finally agreed to lay down their
arms and appoint a group of barons, from both parties, to look after and protect the young
queen while the treaties with England would remain unchanged. Sadler praised
Glencaim for hastily returning to Scotland and bringing about the conciliation by
convincingly arguing for the marriage treaty and alliance with England. Glencaim even
informed Sadler that Beaton was still content with the draft treaties, as long asthe queen
was no longer solely under the governor's protection. Yet, Douglas correctly warned the
ambassador "that this rebellion is only to frustrate and annul the peace."13 Nevertheless,
Sadler failed to grasp the gravity of Beaton's beliefs, and masked the importance of the
"rebellion" by writing to Henry that "had Glencaim and Douglas come home sooner, this
inconvenience might have been prevented."14
It seems as though the English never realized the significance o f Arran and
Beaton's agreement to avoid what could have become a costly civil war. In their
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meetings together at Linlithgow, the ambitious twenty-six year old governor was faced
with an experienced and persuasive diplomat twice his age who surely must have laid the
political realities before the regent: the conservative faction had the support of the entire
clergy, most o f the nobility, and most of the population. At this point, Arran must have
finally realized that the cardinal now had the upper hand and that the English alliance was
doomed to failure. The governor knew he must make concessions if he was to keep his
governorship, and as a result, gave up his greatest advantage over the conservative
faction: the possession of young Queen Mary. Arran quickly informed Sadler that the
earl of Huntley had declared that the conservative lords and bishops would not come to
Edinburgh to ratify the treaties, and additionally, had pressed him "to leve the cast of
England", and in return the cardinal had pledged to serve and obey him as regent.15 The
assured lords - all except George Douglas - declined to believe this story, thinking that
the conservatives were now resolved to support the treaties. But it appears that Arran was
speaking the truth to Sadler, perhaps in desperation, for he knew that unless something
substantial occurred, he would be forced by necessity to join with the cardinal.
At any rate, Scotland's shift from a pro-English stand to a nationalist one was
significantly yet subtlely revealed soon after the conflict at Linlithgow was averted.
While the citizens of Edinburgh cheered Arran on High Street as he proclaimed the peace,
Mary of Guise and her daughter were taken from his protection and moved to Stirling
under the auspices that Linlithgow was too small for the retenues of the four lords
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keepers. Of much greater significance, Stirling was further away from both the English
border and the coastline, more defensible than Linlithgow, and was in an area of great
support for the cardinal. In response to the removal of the two queens to Stirling, Sadler
despondently wrote Henry on July 28 that "thinges here go so frowardlie, and so moche
untrewthe, jalousie, feare, and suspicion is amonges these men here, oon of another, that I
cannot tell what to write to your majeste...".16
Arran was not so foolish as to make a break with Henry immediately, for both he
and Scotland had much to gain by remaining compliant a bit longer. A.J. Slavin suggests
that the governor and the cardinal each wished to remain outwardly friendly towards
England at least until the autumn when the campaigning season would be nearly over and
a destructive English invasion avoided.17 But Arran was still in charge of the
government, and wanted to gain as much from Henry as he could without forsaking his
country or the young queen. It could be argued that he thus played his game of appeasing
both sides a few more weeks, perhaps hoping that Beaton would make a mistake and
England could help him regain the amount of political control that he had earlier in the
year. Throughout the month of August, Arran was much more available to Sadler than he
had been for months, was honest to the ambassador that the cardinal had invited him into
the conservative faction, and made a series of amicable assurances with Henry while all
the while being careful not the compromise Scotland to English incursion. It was over
the course of these few weeks that an English strategy that was entirely too ill-conceived,
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grossly misinterpreted, and poorly managed, in essence defeated itself. Beaton or Arran
or even the ineffectiveness of the assured lords did not so much deceive the English as
much as the English deceived themselves by overlooking Scottish national feeling, and as
a consequence, lost their hold on Scotland. By contrast, Huntley's message to Arran to
join the Francophiles and remain regent was a stroke of political genius, for it allowed
Arran to keep his governorship while it undermined his need to remain loyal to England.
Nevertheless, Sadler continued as best he could to support Governor Arran and
keep him on England's side, although it was said that Arran “begynneth a lytell to
droupe.”18 Perhaps the only politically adept assured lord, Sir George Douglas, informed
Sadler that Arran "is at this present, if he will so remain, as dedicate to the King as any of
them," but could use the added persuasion of English monetary aid.59 Soon after, as a
result of Sadler's letters describing the offers made to Arran by Huntley, Henry sent
instructions to offer Arran further allurements in order to keep control of Scotland out of
Beaton's hands. Thus, on August 6, the ambassador presented the governor with one
thousand pounds Stirling and the gratitude of the English king in putting down Beaton's
insurrection. Sadler was again instructed to inform the governor that he could mobilize
five thousand English border troops against the cardinal, but was also commissioned to
tell Arran that, by virtue of the ancient English claim of superiority, Henry would make
him King of Scotland beyond the Firth if his son married Princess Elizabeth.
Once again, even the inducements offered by the English sorely misjudged the
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attitudes and circumstances north of the border. The bait of a kingship for Arran went far
beyond the boundaries of clandestine agreements and approached the unchivilrous level
of blatant treason. Henry failed to realize that accepting English military aid against
fellow Scots would ruin Arran politically and open the door even wider for Beaton's
party. As Arran replied to Sadler, "to bring in 5,000 Englishmen would make 20,000
Scots forsake them," and so he asked that Henry loan him five thousand pounds Stirling
instead.20 The opportunistic governor must have felt that at least he could gain some
rewards from the English and perhaps buy back some neutral nobles, for he was not
foolish enough to accept a kingship in the less productive lands above the Firth when his
own ancestral lands lay on the opposite side.
Angered by Arran’s request for five thousand pounds, Henry refused additional
requests from the governor that the time allowed for ratification of the treaties be
extended. In keeping with his “cost-efficient” method of formulating Scottish policy, the
king wrote to Sadler on August 16 that he “cannot perceive to what good purpose the
5,0001. demanded can be employed” and added that Sadler should “grope the Governor
whether he will, in gage for it, deliver the strongholds on this side the Firth or the young
Queen.”21 In addition, Henry commented that Scottish ships traveling to France were in
violation of the treaties and he had “stayed five or six of them, and the rather because
they show themselves to be o f the Cardinal’s faction...”.22 On the same day, Arran wrote

20 LE, Vol. 18, Part II, #22, p. 12.
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to Henry concerning the taking of a Scottish merchant vessel called the Boneaventure and
stating that “so recent an attemptate requires hasty redress,”.23 The detaining of ships
such as the Boneaventure incensed the merchants of Edinburgh and the heretofore
reformist, pro-English burghers began to loudly protest the siezures along with the entire
set of English trade restrictions on shipping to the continent. With the last bastion of
unified public support for England slipping away, the conservative lords began to show
their true feelings toward the English and their adherants in Scotland. Huntley wrote to
Mary o f Guise that
gif the govemour makis scharp perswyt on our soverane Lady and
your grace that ye wryt to my lordis of Argyle, Lennox and Bothwell
to caus thame to persew all thame quilk ar in company with the
govemour, thair landis, friendis, and placis and gudis, be fyre and
sword in maist extreme maner...24
Sadler had reported as early as July 31 that the cardinal’s faction had grown aggressive,
yet the queen dowager and Beaton himself were both still, in her words, “of the same
good mind to accomplish all the King’s pleasure, especially the marriage of the Prince
with her daughter.”25 In this air of open hostility and suspect promises, Henry demanded
that the Treaties of Greenwich be immediately ratified by Arran, whether Beaton and the
conservative lords participated or not.
Thus, on August 25, Governor Arran officially ratified the Anglo-Scottish treaties
at Holyrood with Sadler and the assured lords looking on and with the supposed consent

23 UP, Vol. 18, Part II, #47, p.23.
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of the absent cardinal and conservative lords and bishops. Afterwards, Arran asked
Sadler if he had heard from Henry concerning the loan of five-thousand pounds sterling.
Sadler responded that since the “cardinal and his complices had already consented to the
treaties,” Henry “would be loath to defray such a sum, unless you might be assured what
commodity should ensue thereby to your grace’s affairs.”26 The ambassador added that
now, with the treaties ratified, if Arran would “go roundly to work, he and his friends
might easily repress” Beaton and his party.27 Thus, Sadler had turned the tables on Arran,
exempting England from further monetary aid until the governor himself made a move in
Henry’s favor. However, the neutral Scottish lords had pledged to resist any ratification
not achieved through Parliament, so the English clearly knew the risks involved of
pushing for immediate ratification and not giving Arran the money which he desperately
needed. For his part, Arran now knew that he could not count on Henry to aid him
against Beaton, save possibly for an English invasion which he had no intention of
instigating. Sadler wrote that when Arran had heard Henry’s answer on the point of the
loan, the governor cooly replied that:
if he [Arran] shall be put at, or pursued by the cardinal and his complices,
(which, no doubt, with the aid of money, which the whole Church
will advance unto him, besides the aid they look for out of France,
shall be able to be a great party unto him) he must needs make his
refuge to your majesty, without whose help and aid in that case,
he shall not be able to withstand their malice.28
Thus, Sadler chose not to press Arran concerning the strongholds or the delivery o f the

26 SSP, p.272.
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young queen, and stated that the governor prepared to visit St. Andrews and the cardinal
himself in order to better set things at peace.
Yet Sadler was no fool, he knew that Beaton would never actually support the
treaties with England and that Arran could never arrange to deliver either the young
queen or the strongholds to Henry at that time. He wrote to Henry that
I told him [Arran], I hardly believed that the cardinal would declare
himself so honest a man as he said... And besides that, I know the
one part thereof he cannot perform, though he would, which is the
delivery of the queen...And the strongholds, I am sure, he will not
deliver.29
But Sadler also knew that Henry would not pay Arran five thousand pounds, even with
the governor’s thinly vieled hint that without equal monetary resources to Beaton, the
pro-English party could not survive. Yet, Sadler could only perform the instructions
given him by Henry, even though it would appear that Arran meant to discuss strategy
with Beaton at St. Andrews, insofar as he had never bothered to seek the cardinal out
before. It must have been plainly obvious to everyone that, as the conservative leaders
had not journeyed to Edinburgh, they did not want the treaties ratified. Beaton stated it
was because he feared arrest, but it would have been difficult for Arran to attempt that
manouever a second time, after what had happened months earlier. The assured lords, the
privy council, and Henry VIII were all under the false impression that Beaton would
consent to the treaties now that they were ratified, and if not, Arran could handle the
situation with English troops. Only Douglas, Sadler, and Arran himself believed the

29 Ibid., pp.272-273.
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opposite, and after a meeting on August 17 with the cardinal in St. Andrews, Douglas
changed his mind as well, no doubt believing it to be in his best interests to do so. Sadler
had been too long in Edinburgh, surrounded by the assured lords, to effectively guage the
feeling of the entire kingdom. Moreover, he trusted Arran to keep his word. The
governor, however, saw clearly his predicament and acted on it with no concern to whom
he had or had not pledged allegiances.
After ratifying the treaties o f Greenwich on August 25, Governor Arran traveled
to St. Andrews with the probable intentions o f either working out a compromise with
Cardinal Beaton or forsaking the English altogether and submitting to the conservative
pro-French faction. Yet, upon arriving at St. Andrews castle, “the Cardinal neither met
him nor would speak with him,” and in a fury the governor “caused the Cardinal’s treason
to be proclaimed in St. Andrews,” and hastily returned to Edinburgh “to gather his force
and make like proclamations elsewhere against the Cardinal and his complices.”30 Thus,
if Beaton and Arran were indeed putting on a show for the English, as Parr insisted, they
were certainly doing a fine job of it. More likely, Beaton knew he now had the upper
hand and wished to repay the governor for his actions earlier in the year. The two
factions prepared to face each other once again at Stirling, and in effect decide by force
who would control Scottish politics. Upon meeting with Arran following the events in
St. Andrews, Sadler found him to be “incensed” against the cardinal, and when asked
about the forfeiture of his castles, which Henry had been pushing for over the previous

30LL V ol. 18, Part II, #94, p.45.
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few weeks, Arran answered plainly that he “is not able to perform the treaties within the
time limited in the same. And also, if he should deliver the strong-holds to your majesty,
it shall behove him to fly the realm; for in that case his own friends will detest and
forsake him;”.31
Meanwhile, the citizens of Edinburgh, still enraged over the capture of the
Scottish merchant ships on the probably correct premise that some of them conveyed
messages to France, “swear they will set Sadler’s house on fire and bum both him and
his, and say that the Governor has ‘coloured a peace’ only to undo them.”32 If that was
not enough for the unfortunate ambassador, the assured lords had been pressing him for
weeks to convince Henry either to send them money or “else send a main army to
conquest the realm,” but he had only received negative answers from the king.33 Douglas,
stalling for time as he attempted to find a middle ground between the English and the
conservatives, and probably figuring that Arran was going to defect to Beaton, informed
Sadler that the governor “will rather put himself in the hands o f his enemies” than fight,
but Henry “should bear with the Governor for a time, and meanwhile the war and division
here will make them easier to deal with next year.”34 The assured lords wished to solve
their own internal problems without English intervention, but were also seemingly
committed enough to their pledges to join an invading army. Yet, Angus and the others
always followed their violent suggestions with advice to keep the peace, and most likely
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reckoned that Henry would not spend the money and resources required to sustain an
invading force in Scotland. Douglas specifically stated to Sadler that "the season is very
late" to embark on a Scottish invasion.35 Thus, with the political situation in pieces
around him Sadler desperately tried to contact Governor Arran, but the regent had already
left Edinburgh. With no recourse but to bolt to Beaton’s party, Arran rode to Stirling on
September 4, ceremoniously recanted his reformist acts, and with the cardinal and queen
dowager, officially crowned young Mary as the Queen o f Scots on September 9.
Sadler began to hear rumors of Arran’s defection to Beaton almost immediately
and in desperation proceeded to write various dispatches to the king, Suffolk, and Parr
documenting the latest news. The governor had told Sadler that he was riding to
Blackness to look after his pregnant wife, yet Sadler feared the worst since Arran was not
accompanied by Douglas, Angus, or any o f the other assured lords. The frightened
ambassador wrote to Suffolk that he had heard accounts o f conservative supporters taking
vengeance upon Protestants, and painted a bleak picture o f the situation when he stated,
“Never saw people in such fury as they be now, and all the realm is in commotion, and
great slaughter said to be in the Highland,”.36 On September 5, Sadler informed Henry of
Arran’s actions, and added that “some think that they will now concur to observe the
treaties,”.37 Yet, most likely he only added the statement to somewhat placate Henry’s
anger, for he had been overly optimistic concerning Scottish politics for months when

35 Ibid.. p.62.
36 LP, Vol. 18, Part II, #128, p.69.
37 L£, Vol. 18, Part II, #132, p.72.

99

writing to Henry while being a bit more blunt and practical when corresponding with
Suffolk or Parr. For his part, Henry quickly wrote Angus and the assured lords, praising
them for acting like true gentlemen while Arran betrayed them all by running to the
cardinal.38 But when Sir George Douglas asked for relief in money, Henry only
responded with words of encouragement and a questionable promise to send funds and
troops into Scotland to aid them.39
Henry’s apparent anger and eagerness to punish the Scots for Arran’s defection
mirror his temper in 1542, when he bid Norfolk to invade Scotland because of James’
failure to meet him at York. The ego-bruised king was even asking his Lords Lieutenant
in the north to prepare figures for the sacking of Edinburgh.40 But Suffolk, Parr, and
Tunstall were well aware that it was getting too late in the season to victual that many
troops, and besides, at this point war had already broken out on the continent. Henry’s
urgings this time were probably meant to move the assured lords to fight the
conservatives themselves, although no aid would be forthcoming. There exists other
evidence of English attempts to prod the Scots into action with promises of aid. - Suffolk
wrote to the privy council on September 13 that the assured lords were,
too poor to retain the men they need, Suffolk means to put a little
more to that which is to be employed about Sir George Douglas,
so as to let them have some money amongst them at this beginning,
for money has hitherto allured them to the King’s purpose, but he
will not be lavish till he knows the King’s pleasure.41
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But perhaps the most extraordinary dispatch that was delivered in this period of confusion
was one addressed to the town of Edinburgh from Henry VIII himself. The English King
condescendingly informed the citizens that if they “misintreat the ambassador or infringe
the treaties, he will use as enemies to both realms [France & Scotland],” adding that “It
shall be wise o f them to foresee their danger...”.42 Henry later learned from his northern
lieutenants that it would be too expensive and risky to attempt the burning of Edinburgh
in 1543.
On September 13, Parr sent Suffolk a dispatch containing the eye-witness account
of the events at Stirling as related by Sandy Pringle, a Douglas agent under the pay of
England. Pringle stated that Arran and Beaton had "aggreed verey well" to the young
queen's coronation and "the Govemour alsoo aggreed to deliver up the castles, holdes,
and fortresses o f Scotlande to the Cardinall...".43 Arran additionally yielded enough to
place Beaton, the queen dowager, and the earls of Huntley, Argyle, Bothwell, and Lennox
on his council and "doo nothing but by theire consentes advice and counsailles."44 In a
disturbing scene of betrayal toward those religious reformers who had supported him and
believed him to be like-minded - including Sir Ralph Sadler - Arran recanted his heresies,
was absolved by the cardinal and bishops, and received the sacrament. The conservative
faction still sought peace with England and planned to meet with Sadler in Endinburgh,
but would refuse to honor the Treaties of Greenwich and expected that the pro-English
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nobles would forsake the King of England and "consider theire duties, and have respect to
theire naturall countreye".45 Beaton remained hopeful that aid from France would soon
arrive and therefore bolster his position should Henry attempt a late-year invasion. Parr
wrote that Pringle,
saithe he herde the Cardinall saye, that or the King of Englande shulde
have any interrest in Scotlande, or medle within the same, he and manye
of the clargie shulde first die, and sawe him ride in hamesse furnished
with weapon, as if he thene shulde have gone to battale.46
Yet Pringle also brought news of great significance concerning Sir George
Douglas’ role in the freeing of Beaton in March. He had heard the cardinal say that five
days after he was arrested in January,
he gave to George Duglasse foure hundred crownes, and aftre that,
with the consent of the said George, he was removed to Lord Setons
place...and there was meanes devised bitwene the said Lord Seton
and George Duglasse for the loosing hym from thens...47
When the cardinal asked Douglas why he was aiding him, Douglas supposedly replied
that “he did it bicause he knewe others laboured for his loosing, and if he had bene losed
by other, it had bene contrarie to his myende, and therefore he did it to lette hym prefilie
knowe, that it was none but he that losed hym.”48 Nevertheless, Douglas repeatedly
assured the English that he was on their side, and while Henry was hesitant to trust him,
he really had no other choice.
Thus, the two most influential men whom Henry and Sadler had trusted as
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working in the best interests of England in reality felt very little allegiance to the English
cause. In a letter to Sadler in late September, Henry desperately called upon Angus,
Glencaim, Casillis, and the remaining assured lords to apprehend Arran and Beaton,
which was clearly a misconceived and impossible order at the time. The enraged and
frustrated English king additionally admitted that England was once again in a state of
war against Scotland, breaking the peace signed in August.49 Sadler met with the new
Scottish administration on September 20, with Cardinal Beaton now acting as Lord
Chancellor and arguing that the Scots nobles felt the Treaties of Greenwich were
advanced by private council and were thus unofficial.50 Yet, the political and diplomatic
deception that the conservative faction had used so well in 1543 finally turned one of
their most useful members against them upon Arran’s defection.
A number of Scottish lords chose to change sides as a result of Arran’s move, but
none were so influential and ambitious as Matthew Stuart, the earl of Lennox and French
envoy to Scotland. On September 17, Lennox responded to a letter sent him by the queen
dowager which expressed her surprise at seeing him depart Stirling so soon after young
Mary’s coronation. Lennox answered that he could offer reasonable excuses, for he had
business to take care of in Glasgow.51 Unknown to Mary of Guise, Lennox had been
negotiating with the pro-English party and was planning a defection of his own. Sadler
wrote to Henry on September 20 that,
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thErle of Glencam sent me woorde that undoubtedlie the saide
Lenoux woolde leave his affection to Fraunce, and adhere to your
majeste...to have ayde and help at your majestes hande,
for the recoverie of his right and title to this realme, which (he
saith) the Govemour no we usurpeth.52
It is surprising that Beaton did not anticipate a move from Lennox once Arran had
entered the conservative ranks. With Arran no longer the enemy, and young Mary
crowned Queen, Lennox had lost his place as the main contender for the regency as well
as the throne. There was also the blood feud between Lennox and the House of
Hamilton stemming from the death o f Lennox’ father at the hands of Sir James Hamilton
of Fynnart. Thus, it would have been nearly impossible for him to remain on the same
side as Arran, and he looked to England to support his dynastic interests in Scotland.
Still playing his game and keeping himself involved with the English cause, Sir George
Douglas informed Sadler he believed that Lennox would be more loyal than Arran had
been if he was assured a marriage to the king’s niece,53 and a substantial stipend to
replace what he would lose from France. After all that had already taken place, Sadler
was weary to trust Douglas’ information and wrote to Henry that “the world was so full
o f falsehood he knew not whom he might trust!”54 Yet Lennox was to prove his change
of allegiance, as well as his skills in duplicity, when in October he dealt the conservative
faction a major setback.
For weeks, the cardinal and queen dowager had been awaiting a small French fleet
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sponsored by the Duke of Guise bringing not only military and monetary aid to the Scots,
but also a French ambassador, Jacques de la Brosse, and papal legate, Marcus Grimani.
Lennox met the ships not far from Glasgow and proceeded to deceive the French into
believing that he was still on their side and was sent to commandeer the gold and
munitions on behalf of the cardinal. But as Lord Methven hastily pointed out to Mary of
Guise,
sen apperandlie it sail nocht failze gif Levynnox cummis nocht to
you and usis nocht your counsall bot he has ane hey purpose as to
be princepall and to ws all mone artalyery and utheris thingis that
com out o f France to his awn particular efecttis;55
Lennox' actions were all the more ironic because he believed the Guises to have more
control over French actions in Scotland than he, the ambassador, and had felt abandoned
by Francis I.

In any case, Sadler was no doubt relieved when he wrote to the privy

council on October 18 that Lennox had a great deal of French money and artillery
stockpiled in his castle at Dumbarton and he, Angus Glencaim, Cassilis, and other
assured lords had essentially taken Glasgow.56 The only consolation for the conservative
faction lay in the fact that Grimani and de la Brosse had escaped capture and were with
Beaton, Arran, and the queen dowager at Stirling. Upon learning of this rare victory from
his pro-English party, Henry wrote that “lynoux, who if his deeds correspond to his
promises, shall find great kindness at Henry’s hands;”.57 Thus, Sadler and Henry were
not the only ones fooled by Scottish duplicity in 1543, for neither Beaton nor Mary of
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Guise were prepared for Lennox’ defection. In late September, even the most devoted of
conservatives, Huntley, was thought to have defected to Angus for a short time before he
returned to the cardinal’s side. Loyalty and sincerity during these months of chaos and
confusion were truly rare characteristics, as Anglo-Scottish relations repeatedly
demonstrated.
By the middle of October, Sir Ralph Sadler was confined to his residence in
Edinburgh, with angry residents attacking his servants and the burghers meaning to detain
him as long as possible in the hopes of recovering their captured ships. The situation
throughout Scotland remained tense, as conflicts broke out along the borders, the proEnglish lords skirmished with the conservative faction, and Beaton and Arran demanded
that Lennox turn over the French gold and munitions. The papal legate Grimani
reportedly found Scotland to be so wild he wished himself at home again.58 Henry still
wanted the assured lords to apprehend the young Queen and deliver her to England, yet
Sadler informed him that it would be impossible to get her out of Stirling Castle. Fearing
for his own life, the English ambassador prepared to be escorted out of Edinburgh by
Angus and Douglas and conveyed to Tantallon Castle. On October 30, as Sadler left
Edinburgh, he wrote to the privy council that
Assuring your lordships, that, as far as I can see, the whole body
of the realm is inclined to France; for they do consider and say,
that France requireth nothing of them but friendship, and would
they should continue and maintain the honour and liberty of their
realm...Whereas...England, they say, seeketh nothing else but to bring

58 LP, V ol. 18, Part II, #302, p. 171.

106

them to subjection, and to have superiority and dominion over them;59
As Sadler left Edinburgh, he finally comprehended the reasons why Scotland was so
afraid of any kind of agreement with the English.
By November of 1543, the Francophiles were daily eclipsing the pro-English
party; Maxwell and Somerville had been committed to Edinburgh Castle on November 1,
and on November 7, Arran had taken both Dalkeith Castle, which belonged to the
Anglophile Earl of Morton, as well as Sir George Douglas’ house at Pinkie. As James
Gairdner writes in the preface of Letters and Papers, by this time “Henry’s friends were
but a small body of lords who had private interests and private feuds with others.”60
Perhaps this had been true all along. In any case, Sir Ralph Sadler’s mission in Scotland
was almost at an end. Arran sent him a message ordering him either to “repair to him
[Arran] or depart the realm,” to which the ambassador commented to Angus, “would fain
be at home; but, so long as the King would have him [Sadler] remain, he may with
Angus’ favour abide a charge more of the Govemour,”.61 Henry wanted Sadler to
accompany Angus and coordinate strategy for the assured lords, but they themselves
rarely met together and did not want Sadler overseeing their actions anyway. On
November 16, Sadler reported to Henry that the governor, who so lately supported
reformist preaching, had joined Beaton in persecuting Protestants as heretics, and a day
later a government commission under the authority of Mary Queen of Scots ordered
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Angus to remove Sadler from Tantallon, for the ambassador was “a resetter of
Englishmen in time of war.”62 The peace with England, after months of misjudged
diplomacy and calculated deceit, was for all intents and purposes now over and the
realigned Scottish government prepared to host a Parliament in Edinburgh in December.
On December 12, 1543, Ambassador Sadler was escorted by Sir George Douglas
and four hundred horsemen out of Scotland to Berwick, almost eight months after he had
arrived in Edinburgh to aid a strong pro-English party which was seeking to take control
o f Scotland. The political situation was much different in December than it had been in
March, for the Scottish Parliament had annuled the Treaties of Greenwich because of
Henry’s failure to ratify the treaties and the English king’s unlawful seizure of the
Scottish merchant vessels. Perhaps more importantly, Scotland formally renewed her
previous treaties with France, and the Auld Alliance, after a brief hiatus, became a reality
once more.63 A small force under the command of the Douglas brothers attempted to
prevent the parliament from meeting, but their demonstration was to no avail against the
superior resources of the cardinal and the governor and so they retreated. Neither Lennox
nor the assured lords attended the Parliament. The pro-English party would assemble a
larger force at Leith by the end of the year, but this flexing of muscle also led to nothing
for there was no firm foundation of money or support behind it. In England, Henry
requested that his ally Charles V consider Scotland an enemy, while back in Scotland,
Governor Arran called upon Pope Paul III and the Cardinal of Carpi for monetary
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assistance against an English king seeking to destroy both Scotland’s independence and
her religion. But as 1543 closed, a vengeful Henry wished for nothing less than the
complete destruction of his northern neighbor. His assured lords had failed him, and on
December 31 he had signed an Anglo-Imperial treaty for the joint invasion of France in
the summer of 1544. His main antagonist in Scotland, Cardinal Beaton, felt confident in
his popular support, as well as the promise from France of six thousand troops and
unlimited funds for the ensuing year.64 With the Pope and Francis I urging Beaton into
taking the offensive against England, it was obvious to Henry that the Scots would have
to be neutralized before the continental war could begin. The period of “gentle wooing”
was over.

64 SSP, p.338.

Chapter 7
Hertford’s invasion of Scotland

To-day Hertford has again visited Edinburgh, which had...rampared
the chief port with stone and earth; but the assault was quickly handled,
the gate set open with artillery, and the town won again, with slaughter
of 400 or 500 Scots, and loss o f but 7 of our men. The King’s
commission is now well executed, for the town and abbey of
Holyrodehouse is in manner wholly burnt and desolate...Standing upon
the hill without, to view the burning, the writers could hear the women
and poor miserable creatures o f the town cry out upon the Cardinal in
these words ‘Wa worth the, Cardinall!’.1

The beginning of the new year in Scotland was no less chaotic than 1543 had
been, but was soon to become much more violent than the new conservative government
had anticipated. Governor Arran remained in alliance with the Francophile Cardinal
Beaton and queen Dowager, Mary of Guise, who were in turn pitted against what was left
of the pro-English party, newly energized by the entrance of Lennox into their ranks but
still poor, indecisive, unpopular, and, in many cases, prone to double-dealing and reaping
rewards from both sides. Skirmishes continued between the Scots and the English along
the borders, and between the government forces and assured lords throughout the country.
Since leaving Scotland, Sir Ralph Sadler now worked with Bishop Tunstall and Lord
Lieutenant Suffolk in Damton attempting to coordinate the movements o f “Henry’s
friends”, who had control of Glasgow but not Edinburgh and most importantly not
Stirling, where young Mary Queen of Scots lay under heavy protection. Sadler and
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Suffolk both endeavored to stir the assured lords into action against the governor and
cardinal, and repeatedly complained of their apathy to Henry. But Angus, Sir George
Douglas, and the others had inadequate funds to make war against the ably supported and
financed cardinal, and while Suffolk would periodically give them small subsidies, it was
just enough to whet their appetites and provide for their closest followers. Yet, the proEnglish party still sought to influence the new conservative government and gathered
their forces for a display of power outside Edinburgh in early January.
Suffolk had written to George Douglas on December 30 with a set of Henry's
instructions on how the assured lords should proceed against Arran and Beaton. The plan
was for the pro-English party to assemble at Glasgow on January 3, then march on
Edinburgh, apprehend the governor, appoint their own council, then secure the young
queen and all Scottish strongholds in her name.2 As usual, this English scheme was far
too ambitious and fanciful, but Henry’s friends did succeed in assembling a respectable
force and occupied Leith on or about January 8. For five days, Angus, Lennox, and
Douglas positioned their men “in battle array” between Leith and Edinburgh, not daring
to enter the capital for they realized they were outnumbered approximately ten to one.
Writing to Suffolk, Sir George complained that the pro-English party was weakened by
lack of money, the defection of many of their followers, and the failure o f the northern
lords to join them.3 In addition, the assured lords had no artillery (having left Lennox’s
munitions at Dumbarton, presumably because of the weather), and when Arran had his
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men positioned cannon from Edinburgh Castle toward the Anglophiles, the confrontation
abruptly ended. Unable to take the capital, Henry’s friends capitulated to the
Francophiles. An agreement was made at Greenside on January 13 stating “that Angus,
Lennox, Cassillis, and Glencaim, for themselves and their complices, shall be true to the
Queen, and shall assist the Governor in defence of the realm and of Holy Kirk.”4
However, the pro-English lords simply wanted to escape arrest and, as in most Scottish
political affairs over this period, their submission was soon to be proven insincere.
Upon learning of his assured lords’ agreement with the Francophile government,
the English privy council wrote that “the King marvels at the disloyal and untrue dealing
o f Angus and Sir George and the rest that have received such inestimable benefits at his
hands;”.5 It appeared that Henry could no longer trust his men in Scotland - apart from
Lennox, whom he still favored - to accomplish anything that would benefit England. The
Douglas brothers had obviously been dealing with both sides, and this became even more
apparent in early 1544. Sir George consistently extracted money from Suffolk, with
promises of pro-English victories that never came about and were later explained away as
the fault of either someone else or natural circumstances. For months, Sir George was
reported to have been in conference with members of the conservative party according to
testimonies made by Scottish spies to Henry’s border officers, lords Wharton, Parr, and
Eure. Suffolk, whom Joseph Bain contends “seems to have possessed some common
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sense,”6 grew increasingly suspicious of the Douglas’ motives until finally writing to the
privy council that “Angus and Douglas have not sent for their month’s wages, which we
think their consciences will not suffer them to do...has stayed the payment of wages of
Angus and Douglas...”.7 Sir George was so caught up in his diplomatic game that he
informed Suffolk that he might be forced by Arran and Beaton to write misinformation to
the English and that they should look for a small outline of a heart on dispatches that
were to be trusted.8 An able politician, Douglas had dealt with both parties ever since
returning to Scotland, and had always used the excuse that if he wrote or acted against
English interests, it was not because he had switched sides, but because he had to keep up
the appearance of being a patriotic Scot. While not as clever or deceptive, Angus
nonetheless followed his brother’s lead in most instances, so that both of them talked
convincingly of working for England while in reality doing very little to bring Henry’s
plans to fruition. Yet, as stated earlier in this paper, the brothers’ ineffectiveness had just
as much to do with Henry’s attitude and inflated demands as it did the brothers'
unwillingness to cooperate.
But the fact that Henry constantly complained about the trustworthiness of his
assured lords while still urging them throughout 1543 and early 1544 to effect results
shows that the king did not want to risk a costly invasion and cared little about affairs in
Scotland as long as the Scots were not actively raiding the English borders. These

6 HP. Vol.2, preface, p.xix.
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positions directly reflect Henry's greater interest in the impending continental war against
France; he wanted to conserve money and resources while not having to worry about his
“shabby” northern neighbor. Yet as Henry prepared to invade France in the summer of
1544, he realized, no doubt much to his chagrin, that he would have to spend the money,
use the resources, and turn his attention to Scotland that spring. With the pro-English
party not only in shambles but dishonest as well, Henry had no choice but to take Scottish
matters into his own hands. As early as January 25, Suffolk and Sadler had prepared the
first set o f figures and timetables for the invasion of Scotland in May.9
It is significant that, although the Douglas brothers played both sides in Scottish
politics and had signed a truce with the Francophiles at Greenside that would end
hostilities in Scotland, they sided once again with Henry and Lennox and began to work
against the government in the north and west. Yet, as the winter of 1544 wore on,
Governor Arran and Cardinal Beaton increased their pressure on the Anglophiles and
religious reformers, readying forces to apprehend any pro-English supporters. In keeping
with his own deceptive diplomacy, Beaton even wrote letters o f peace to Henry, saying
that the kingdom was now “in perfect obedience to the Queen and Governor,” 10 and
requesting new treaty negotiations to be organized. But Henry continued his
correspondence with Suffolk concerning costs, supplies, and strategy for an early spring
invasion. The king was eager to knock the Scots out of the military scenario, and asked

9 LP, Vol. 19, Part 1, #59, pp.26-27.
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Suffolk if a March invasion would be possible so he could better concentrate on France.11
The lord lieutenant replied that a Scottish campaign in March would be virtually
impossible, and had from the start suggested a May invasion, when the English could
bum the newly sowed com and grain before the Scots could gather a large army or
receive aid from France. In Suffolk’s view, if the destruction was widespread and
effective, “the scarcity in Scotland would make it impossible to bring an army to invade
England.”12 Henry eventually accepted Suffolk’s timetable, but was anxious to harass the
Scots with border raids in order to keep them occupied until the invasion could
commence. Then in March, Lennox opened the way for a less costly solution to Henry’s
dilemma.
For two months, Lennox and Angus had been requesting a new arrangement with
Henry, being fearful of the Francophile threat and knowing of the plan being made to
invade Scotland sometime later in the year. Reckoning that Lennox and the assured lords
might still be useful if the defeated people turned against Arran and Beaton, Henry
dispatched a fresh set of articles and instructions to his friends in Scotland on March 28.
As was now the common case, the English king asked for much from his men, and
promised that if the word of God was preached in the kingdom, certain strongholds were
delivered to England, young Queen Mary was secured, and Henry was named protector
during her infancy, his army would set up a puppet government with Lennox as its head
and the assured lords as prominent counselors. Even though many of the assured lords
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had already given up their castles to the government and were ill-prepared to stage an
offensive against Beaton and Arran, Lennox agreed to these terms.
By the end of March 1544, Lennox and the assured lords, with the support o f Lord
Ruthven, were up in arms again, and for the first time since January assembled a
respectable force in the west o f Scotland. Using the French supplies Lennox had
acquired in October, the pro-English party took Paisley and reestablished themselves in
Glasgow. But by this time the Francophile government had assembled its own force, and
marched west behind Governor Arran. While Henry had informed his friends in Scotland
that an English army would aid them, this was probably meant to urge them into battle,
for Suffolk made no move northward and the pro-English Scots faced a seige o f Glasgow
by a much superior force. Although Lennox was forced to surrender, he escaped to the
safe confines o f Dumbarton Castle. The assured lords were not so lucky, and were
arrested by the governor. Yet, information gleaned from English spies suggested that
Angus, Maxwell, and Casillis had already spoken with Arran before the seige, and their
subsequent arrests were made by their own consent.13 Sir George Douglas was also
arrested soon after, but his son, the Master of Morton, contended that his father remained
true to the English cause. This final defeat was the end of the organized pro-English
party in Scotland, with Glencaim on the run, Lennox escaping to England, and
Somerville having already gone over to the governor. By early April, Henry knew what
had transpired in Scotland, and decided that placing a friendly government in place would
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never work. He had placed his trust in the assured lords one final time to no avail, and
was more than a little displeased with their ineffectiveness and hints of treachery. Thus,
plans went forward for a full-scale and highly destructive invasion, much like the one
Henry had proposed in a similar rage back in September and one much more violent than
the one Suffolk had envisioned in January.
On January 29, Henry had informed Suffolk that he meant to remove him from
the Scottish campaign in order to accompany the English army to France and help prepare
what the king viewed as the more important invasion of 1544. In Suffolk’s place, Henry
planned to send Edward Seymour, the Earl of Hertford, a new and quite capable royal
favorite who would later rise to great prominence as regent to Edward VI and lord
protector of England. To the Scots, he would also become known as a great villian of
Scottish history because of his exploits in 1544 and again at Pinkie in 1547. But as of
March 4, when Hertford reached Darlington and discussed strategy with Suffolk, his
official title was lieutenant-general, and he was obviously regarded as less valuable than
Suffolk to the king.
In February Suffolk had sent Henry figures for expenses with the interesting
comment that “since the King intends to spend money for revenge on his enemies, this
way seems best.”14 But not even the stout military leader Suffolk was prepared for the
plans Henry had formulated for the May invasion, and in the same dispatch advised that if
Edinburgh and St. Andrews were razed, “the King will be no nearer his purpose, and his
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friends (if he have any) will be in worse case thereby, for it will be taken to prove that the
King intends only the destruction of the young Queen and the realm.”15 Instead, the lord
lieutenant suggested fortifying certain positions in Scotland so as to better protect proEnglish Scots in their fight against the government. Yet, Suffolk mistakenly believed
that Henry wished to continue working with Scottish Anglophiles to bring Scotland over
to England’s side, which was no longer the case as of early 1544. Henry had ceased to
care about his northern friends and whether or not the Scots would peacefully acquiesce
to English demands. Through Hertford, he was going to take direct action to make
certain that the Scots would submit, for this time he would give them no choice.
On April 10, soon after hearing reports that the pro-English party had surrendered
Glasgow to Arran and the Francophiles, Henry dispatched instructions to Hertford for the
May invasion. His aims were plainly set forth in the introduction:
considering the King’s purpose to invade France this summer in
person, the principal cause o f his sending the army into Scotland
was to devastate the country, so that neither they nor any sent
thither out o f France or Denmark might invade this realm.16
The king ignored Suffolk’s plans to fortify key positions within Scotland with English
troops, and opted instead for a quick, month-long path of destruction extending from the
Firth of Forth south into the most productive Scottish lowlands. The invasion would
utilize a combination of sea and land forces, with Edinburgh and St. Andrews as the
primary targets, together with the lowland com and wheat fields. Specifically, Hertford

15 LP, Vol.19, Part 1, #136, p.72.
16 LP, Vol.19, Part 1, #314, p.199.

118

was to “bum Edinburgh town, and so deface it as to leave a memory for ever of the
vengeance of God upon their falsehood and disloyalty,” 17 but the English commander was
not to stop there. Showing the traits o f a man who possessed a terrifyingly cruel temper
and who repeatedly had been frustrated by circumstances, Henry ordered that Hertford
put man, woman, and childe to fyre and swoorde without
exception where any resistence shalbe made agaynst you,
and this done...spoyle and tume upset downe the Cardinalles
town of St. Andrews, as thupper stone may be the nether, and
not one stick stande by an other, sparing no creature alyve
within the same...18
Professor J.D. Mackie once referred to these orders as “the most brutal instructions ever
issued by an English council.”19
But on April 12, Hertford boldly responded to the King’s orders by stating that the
fortifications that Suffolk suggested should be undertaken, and more importantly, that the
mass destruction and vengeance taken on civilians should be curtailed as an ineffective
strategy. He wrote that,
it is supposed that a great number in Scotland would aid the
King’s army if they saw he intended to have a foot within the
realm, whereas fire and sword would put all to utter dispair...
would grieve to see the King’s treasure employed only in
devastating two or three towns and a little country which would
soon recover.20
Hertford wanted to create a network of garrisons in Scotland in order to control the Scots
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more efficiently without having to invade the country. The lieutenant-general’s intention
was to enforce order and protect Anglophiles within what he viewed as an English
province, much like Ireland. Hertford clearly saw what he believed should be the
practical, long-term goals for the English army royal in Scotland, and never deviated
from this course after Henry’s death.21 However, Henry cared little about long-term,
costly initiatives in Scotland when he was about to lead what he hoped would be a
glorious invasion of France in only three months' time. Henry did not want Leith and
other points garrisoned by English troops who could be fighting on the continent; instead
he sought a quick and simple solution that would rid him of the Scottish threat in 1544.
Thus, the privy council tersely replied to Hertford that the scheme for fortification “be
laid apart,” and that he should “proceed to the devastation of the country.”22 As for
Edinburgh itself, the king and council would not relent to the northern commander’s
reasoning, and ordered that he sack the Scottish capital “without taking either the castle
or town to mercy, though they would yield; for ye know the falsehood of them all,”.23
Obviously, Henry did not want Hertford fooled or stalled by Scottish deception as his
ambassador had been in 1543. Not wishing to lose his privileged position as lieutenantgeneral in the north, Hertford finally agreed to abide by Henry’s cruel instructions for the
massive invasion.
The build-up of troops, armaments, ships, and supplies for the Scottish invasion
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centered on Newcastle, where Hertford and his staff had established their headquarters.
The staff consisted of Cuthbert Tunstall, bishop of Durham; Lord Lisle, the Lord High
Admiral o f England; and Sir Ralph Sadler, the former ambassador in Edinburgh and now
treasurer of the army. The English Parliament provided Henry his justification for the
invasion by passing the “Act For the Subsidie of the Temporaltie”, which stated in part
that “the Kinges Majeste our moste naturall and dreade Soveraigne Lorde hathe good
juste tytle and interest to the Crowne and Realme of Scotlande.”24 Thus, Henry could
more easily argue, as he did, that the invasion was meant to punish the treachery of his
subjects, making the event more palitable to his ally in the French war, Charles V. As of
April 18, there were reportedly gathered at Newcastle about two hundred English ships
and ten thousand troops, though not without a degree of difficulty in securing the needed
supplies and victuals for the journey. One week later, Henry sent Hertford a
proclamation to be posted on the church doors of every village the English army sacked.
The document blamed the governor and the cardinal for the English persecution of
Scotland and promised that all who submitted to England after the punishment had ceased
would be shown mercy and kindness by their true sovereign, Henry VIII.25
However, these proceedings did not go unnoticed by the Scots and the French.
Francis I had received word of the invasion and recommended to Arran that he make
concessions so as to stall the English.26 The French king, also receiving pleas from Mary
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of Guise, supposedly planned to assemble a naval force o f ten thousand men at
Normandy to set sail in late March, but foul winds, mutinous troops, and the pressures of
the continental war prevented this. Contrary to popular belief, Arran was nonetheless
preparing his own defenses as early as late April when he sent a series of dispatches
throughout the country “charging all manner o f men baith to burgh and land to be ready
upon twenty-four hours warning baith to pass upon the Englischmen.”27 Just days later,
another dispatch was sent to all the towns on the south coast of the Firth of Forth ordering
inhabitants to make trenches to resist the English. Then on May 1, the day that Hertford
finally sailed north from Tynemouth, the governor sent summons through Fife “charging
all manner of men between sixty and sixteen to meet my lord Governor upon the Burgh
Muir of Edinburgh the fifth day of May, to pas upon the Inglische men.”28 Unfortunately
for the Scots, their preparations were too little too late, for the English fleet arrived in the
Firth on May 3 and safely disembarked at Inchkeith the next day with no organized
resistance from the Scots.
In his History o f the Reformation in Scotland. John Knox contended that Cardinal
Beaton remained nonplussed in the days before the invasion and even discounted Arran’s
preparations for defense as unnecessary.29 Yet, as historian Sir J. Balfour Paul once
stated, Knox “always lays on his colours with a heavy brush.”30 It had been rumored that
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the Scots optimistically believed the English fleet to be Icelandic fishing vessels, and
accounts from Leith seem to verify that the Scots were taken somewhat by surprise,31 but
this does not mean that they were totally unprepared or that the cardinal did not act
quickly to repulse the English. On May 6, Hertford and Lisle encountered what they
estimated to be six thousand Scots deployed between Leith and Edinburgh, led by the
governor, cardinal, and the earls Murray and Seton. However, the Scots were not as
battle-ready as their English counterparts and when Hertford pressed forward after several
exchanges of artillery fire, the Scottish lines broke and the poorly managed soldiers
fled.32 It was reported that Arran and Beaton retreated to Linlithgow, leaving Edinburgh
virtually defenseless before the English advance. Unable to defend the city, the provost
o f Edinburgh, Sir Adam Otterbum, requested a meeting with Hertford to discuss terms.
Ironically, in 1542 and early 1543, Otterburn had strongly advocated a pro-English
stance, but he and the rest of the Edinburgh merchant community had since reconsidered
this.
Upon being granted a meeting with the lieutenant-general, the provost told
Hertford that the keys to the city would be delivered to him on condition that the
inhabitants might escape and the city be saved from fire. Hertford replied that unless
Edinburgh was yielded without condition, he would put the citizens to the sword and burn
the town. Most likely he had planned to torch it in any case. Placed in such a hard
circumstance, Otterbum reportedly responded that “it were better...to stand to their
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defence than to yield to that condition.”33 Thanks to Otterbum's brave convictions, the
inhabitants o f Edinburgh rallied under his leadership. A militia was quickly formed,
centered on the castle rock and its powerful artillery. Outside the city, Hertford and Lisle
brought up their own guns, and that same day the assault on Edinburgh began.
The English troops rushed through the outer gates and into the city, driving
Otterbum’s militia back with their archers and arquebusiers. The remainder o f the day
consisted of bloody hand-to-hand combat in the narrow streets. The Scots inflicted
considerable casualties on the Englishmen, but Hertford’s trained and disciplined troops
had the advantage of sheer numbers, and claimed to have slaughtered four to five hundred
Scots on that first day of hostilities. Yet Edinburgh Castle under the command of Captain
Hamilton of Stanehouse kept up a steady artillery fire on the English troops attempting to
make their way up High Street, forcing Hertford to deem the stronghold impregnable. By
the end of the day, the battle for the city was over. The castle was not taken, but the
English proceeded to pillage and torch the city around it.34
All night long the rising flames from the blazing town lit up the
darkness. The next day and the next and the day after that there
came bands o f English from the camp at Leith, ‘and began where
they left off,’ burning and plundering till the sack o f the city was
complete. It is needless to say that Holyrood did not escape.35

The destruction would continue for the next four days, with less and less
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resistance from the Scots, who were fleeing the city by the hundreds with all the
possessions they could carry. On May 8, the four-thousand man rear guard, which had
ridden north from the borders under the command of the earl of Shrewsbury and Sir
Ralph Evers, joined with Hertford’s main force and proceeded to ransack and loot the
city. Their ruthlessness was such that when the castle would not fall, they ravaged
everything within a seven-mile radius, leaving “neither pile, village, nor house standing
unbumt.”36 Yet, as Sir J. Balfour Paul points out, neither Hertford, the English
Chronicler, William Patten, nor any Scottish historian ever referred to a massacre of
women and children, leaving one with the impression that the four to five hundred armed
citizens mentioned in the official account were the bulk of Scots killed in Edinburgh.37
Nevertheless, one can be sure that many more Scots were wounded in the fighting, not to
mention the destruction caused by the English forces throughout the southern section of
the Firth of Forth. As Hertford himself wrote, “will so devastate this realm and annoy the
King’s enemies as to make the punishment of their falsehood an example to the world;”.38
Viewing the scene on the morning of May 7 from Calton Hill, the English commander
could see the mass exodus of citizens in a somber procession westward as Edinburgh
burned behind them.
On May 11, Sir George Douglas visited Hertford at his headquarters in Leith,
rejoicing that the English army had arrived, lest “his brother and he should have lost their
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heads,”.39 It appeared that Governor Arran had released the Douglas brothers from
Blackness Castle just before escaping to Linlithgow in an attempt to assuage the English
commander. Sir George stated that the governor and cardinal were “perplexed” by the
invasion, but were “recomforted” by the knowledge that five French ships had landed at
St. Andrews bringing news of aid coming shortly from Francis I. He shrewdly added that
he, his brother, and a number of other assured lords were ready to serve the king again,
for he alleged that
Fair means would win the hearts of the people, and that by
fortifying this town and garrisoning Edinburgh and Stirling,
so that such as declared for the King might be relieved, the
whole realm would soon fall to the King’s devotion, whereas
this fire and sword put them in despair.40
Douglas no doubt spoke the truth, but also reckoned that a permanent English presence in
Scotland would afford his family better protection and more opportunities for power and
reward than would the conservative government if the English abruptly departed the
country. However, when asked to deliver Tantallon Castle to Henry immediately, Sir
George nervously answered that Angus would have to be consulted on that matter at a
later time. Hertford had listened patiently to Douglas, and assured him o f English aid,
but remarked to Henry on the Scot’s “crafty juggling and falsehood.”41 On May 14,
Hertford prepared to leave Edinburgh and march back to England with his army,
“spoiling the country according to the King’s instructions.”42 But first, Hertford’s troops
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sacked and burned Leith, a town whose citizens, as Sadler once remarked, had always
been eager Calvinists.43
The English filled their ships with over ten thousand pounds sterling worth of
booty, and Lisle sailed away with skeleton crews as Hertford led a path o f destruction
across the Scottish lowlands. Fields of newly planted crops were torched and many old
houses and castles were completely destroyed. In all, some thirty-three towns, villages,
and castles were devastated by the English forces.44 The inhabitants of Dunbar, thinking
themselves safe when the enemy broke camp, let down their guard and went to bed,
whereupon an English detachment succeeded in setting fire to the town, and “men,
women, and children were suffocated and burnt.”45 A large force led by Lord Seton
challenged the English at Pease Pass, but inexplicably failed to engage them, as if
paralyzed by fear, and let them continue unmolested south toward Renton. On May 16,
sixteen days after entering Scotland, Hertford’s army crossed the borders into Berwick
and rejoined Lisle’s fleet. That same day, Hertford received a dispatch from the privy
council ordering that three thousand nine hundred o f his troops be immediately sent to
Calais for the war against France 46 So as not to allow the Scots to regroup, Evers
remained in command of a light calvary force which conducted various raids into
Scotland for the next few months, burning the towns of Kelso and Coldingham. No
longer hesitant to destroy sites in Scotland, Hertford himself suggested that a further raid
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on Jedburgh was needed, so on June 10 Wharton and Eure sacked the city and torched the
surrounding countryside.
Although Hertford had decided that it would be too risky to attack St. Andrews,
Henry was still well-satisfied with the results of his Scottish invasion: Edinburgh was
virtually destroyed, countless people were left homeless, a great deal of arable land had
been decimated, the Francophile government was in a state of disrepair, and the entire
country was very much afraid o f the English and their king. Henry's objective had been
met: the Scots had been effectively knocked out o f military action for 1544. In the context
o f Anglo-Scottish affairs, Henry did not have time to consolidate his position, for the
French invasion was only weeks away. Curiously enough, the original reports on the
continent stated that the Scots had won a great victory and had caused “incredible
rejoicing” in Rome before the truth was discovered.47
Why had Arran and Beaton not attempted to increase Scotland’s defenses before
late April? It seemed that after the stalling tactics of 1543, the governor and cardinal
complacently believed that Henry would not commit to an invasion if the government
favored a renegotiated treaty with England. Certainly Beaton was of the opinion that the
French would send troops at the first sign of an English military build-up, as Francis I had
promised the Cardinal in 1543. Since messages between the two “auld” allies were being
intercepted by the English, Beaton could well have caused Arran to remain confident in
French protection until at the last minute, Arran could wait no longer and summoned
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troops. Since a large force had earlier beseiged Glasgow, the Scots were obviously
capable of mounting a defense, but appear to have been poorly organized and managed by
the conservative lords. In addition, the Scots were not as well armed as the English, nor
did they have the training and discipline o f Hertford’s troops. Throughout the period
covered in this essay, Beaton had seemed prepared for almost every situation,
diplomatically and politically, but as John Knox was quick to point out, on this particular
occasion the cardinal was outmanoeuvered by the English army, as had been the case in
1542. Although preparations were made, the English still took the Scots by surprise in
1544; the results of Hertford’s invasion adversely influenced Anglo-Scottish relations for
decades to come.
Surprisingly, the immediate results o f Henry’s Scottish invasion were exactly
what the king had anticipated in March: the Scots were knocked out of the French war
and fear of England had caused many to question the authority of the Francophile
government under Arran and Beaton.48 The ferocity of Henry’s vengeance temporarily
strengthened the Scottish Anglophiles and weakened the cohesiveness of the Francophile
party. The need to lay blame for the mass destruction enabled the opportunistic Mary of
Guise to lash out against Arran’s leadership, and in the process attempt to gain the
regency for herself. The queen dowager had never trusted the governor, and Beaton’s
diplomacy between them had not satisfied her desire to gain greater control over her
daughter and her late husband’s kingdom. On June 10, various Scottish nobles of both
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political factions, including Angus, Sir George Douglas, Casillis, and Sir Adam
Otterbum, signed a bond at Stirling to maintain the queen dowager in “the office of
government”,49 and effectively suspend Arran as governor. Through the summer months
Mary was able to create an administration recognized by many Scots as the true
government, but she lacked the political and financial support needed officially to strip
Arran of the regency or obtain possession of the seals. Her main obstacle was that she
failed to convince Francis I to give her precedence over Cardinal Beaton and the existing
government. In any case, Arran and Beaton enjoyed greater political and ecclesiastical
patronage than the queen dowager, which may account for the stance of many Scottish
lords during this period. The editor o f The Scottish Correspondence o f Mary o f Lorraine,
Annie Cameron, stresses that “bribery was a potent force at this juncture”.50 That old
assured lord the earl of Glencaim abruptly left the pro-English ranks to support the queen
Dowager and was fighting Lennox in the west by July, no doubt with a pension more
sizable than the one he had received from Henry. In the “pretended” government of the
queen dowager, none other than Angus had been appointed lieutenant of the borders.51
To put an end to the confusion, both sides called for rival parliaments to be held in the
autumn of 1544 in order to gain official sanction for their respective governments;
Arran’s would meet in Edinburgh, the dowager’s at Stirling. But Mary of Guise was
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“outdone in...promptitude and energy” by Arran when his parliament met first on
November 6 and deemed her piecemeal administration unconstitutional.52
Afterwards, Cardinal Beaton worked as a mediator in an attempt to avert a civil
war and keep the Francophile party together. It seems surprising that he would have
allowed the division to continue throughout the summer, but it must be remembered that
the dowager had no quarrel with the cardinal - indeed, they were rumored to be on
intimate terms - and only worked against Arran. Beaton might have seen the split as a
way to bring both antagonists under his wing and make the conservative government his
own, for his support o f Arran during this period forced the governor to rely more heavily
on his lord chancellor. Beaton ultimately succeeded in doing just that, for Scottish
indignation toward the government over Hertford's invasion subdued, and the cardinal
united the Scots using as a foundation their common fear and hatred of England and
Henry VIII. As J.J. Scarisbrick wrote, “exactly as Hertford had foretold, in the long run
ten days of violence only made the [England’s] Scottish problem more bitter and more
tenacious”.53 The sacking of Edinburgh had not brought the Scots to heel, it had only
heightened Scottish enmity toward England and made the country more resistant to any
form of rapprochement.
Immediately after the invasion, on May 17 at Carlisle, a treaty was signed
between the English and the only two Scots whom Henry dared to trust, Lennox and

52 Ibid.. p.64.
53 Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. p.445.

131

Glencaim.54 By June, Glencaim had bolted to the queen dowager’s party, but Lennox
remained on the king’s side, determined to win the regency from whomever eventually
obtained it. He traveled to London in June to conspire with Henry on how to make
himself more of a threat to the Scottish government. The answer was a marriage to
Margaret Douglas, daughter of Henry’s sister Margaret Tudor, the mother o f James V.
Lennox would therefore become Henry’s nephew, while also strengthening his claim to
the Scottish throne. He and Margaret were married on June 29, and soon afterwards the
overly ambitious earl was back in Scotland with English money, raising the western lords
and highland clansmen against the Francophiles.
Henry himself met with varying degrees o f success in his French campaign, but
the invasion was certainly not as glorious as the English court had made it out to be.
Following a debasement o f the currency in 1542, Henry pushed through Parliament an
“enhancement” of coinage in 1544 in order to pay for the German mercenaries who filled
out his army.55 The projected costs o f the invasion were nowhere near the actual
expenses, and Henry found that his riches gained from the dissolution of the monasteries
would not be sufficient. Therefore, the king drained England o f its resources to fight the
French, and as a result, the English economy suffered throughout the remainder of the
1540's. Yet Henry accomplished some goals in his French expedition, including the
taking o f Boulogne, where he personally oversaw the seige and later the English

54 LP, Vol. 19, Part 1, #522, p.324.
55 LE, Vol. 19, Part 1, preface, pp.xxxiv-xxxv.
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defenses.56 But the English were not able to gain Montreuil, which was brilliantly
defended by the French. Finally, the emperor asked Henry to begin his march on Paris
for the combined Anglo-Imperial assault, but Henry refused, making various excuses
about the condition of his forces. At the moment of truth, the English king felt his army
insufficient to take on the French main force; his mercenaries had deserted him, his
commanders lacked resolve, and his troops were in disarray. In any case, Charles V
knew that Henry had probably never intended to risk an attack on Paris.57 Thus, the
emperor signed the Treaty of Crespy with Francis I in October without consulting his
English ally, later making his own excuses to Henry as to why the couriers did not inform
him in advance o f the event. Henry, left friendless before fifty thousand advancing
French troops led by the dauphin himself, was enraged. He returned to London, and by
1545 held Boulogne as his only reward for a very costly invasion. As J.J. Scarisbrick
stated, “the English campaign of 1544 was a muddle even by the generous standards of
the times.”58 O f greater concern to Henry was the fact that as Francis and Charles were
now allies, and Scotland had healed her wounds, England faced the prospect of a
threefold invasion by the summer of 1545.

56 jLP, Vol.19, Part 1, #1003, p.600.
57 LE, Vol.19, Part l,#126,p.66
58 Scarisbrick, Henry VIII. p.450.

Chapter 8
The Consequences of the ’’Rough Wooing” and murder of the Cardinal
...the Cardinall satt doune in a chyre, and cryed, 'I am a preast:
ye will not slay me...but James Melvin...said 'Repent thee...of
the schedding of the blood of that notable instrument of God,
Maister George Wisharte...And so he stroke him twyse or thrise
throwght with a stog sweard...1
-John Knox

By November of 1544 Cardinal Beaton had effectively gained personal control of
Scottish politics and would remain in this position until his death eighteen months later.
His power rested in his ability to keep the governor and queen dowager “in double
harness” by giving them each something that would satisfy their respective ambitions.2
Mary of Guise was allowed more influence on the Council of Regency, while Arran was
approached concerning a marriage for his son with the infant Queen of Scots. The
governor had considered the match in early 1543 as a means to consolidate his position as
regent, that is until Henry’s demands for an Anglo-Scottish marriage prevented it. But
now Beaton proposed that young Mary be betrothed to Arran’s young son, assuring
Scotland of a Scottish, and not an English or French, king.3 In fact, Arran was so
successful in obtaining signatories for the match, that by October 1545 he was said to
have the support o f “the maist part of bayth temporal! and spirituall astait.”4 Not

1 The Works of John Knox, vol.l, p .177.
2 Donaldson, James V-VII. p.71.
3 Hannay, “The Earl of Arran and Queen Mary” Scottish Historical Review, vol. 18.
1921, p .1-3.
4 The Scottish Correspondence. #CVIII, p. 147.
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surprisingly, Mary of Guise disapproved of the scheme and preferred a French match, yet
it seemed that Beaton was hesitant to subject Scotland to French domination. Ignoring
pleas from the queen dowager to deliver young Mary to France while the English threat
remained, Beaton was determined to keep the Queen of Scots safe inside Stirling Castle
so as not to lose his prime bargaining chip. Little in the way of French support had
materialized in 1544, and as his biographer, Margaret Sanderson, states, Beaton “was
probably no more inclined to put Scotland, in the person of the Queen, into the hands of
the Most Christian King o f France...than into those of the apostate King of England.”5 In
fact, in 1545 the French envoy, de Lorges Montgomery, accused the cardinal of selfinterest in his Franco-Scottish diplomacy.6 Annie Cameron surmised that Beaton’s
commercial agreement with Flanders and appeals to Rome “may be construed as efforts
to keep open other sources of support, lest Scotland should become entirely thirled to
France.”7 It seems that the Cardinal, although a quite zealous churchman and
Francophile, was nevertheless politically practical on the matter of keeping Scotland
independant of French control.
As for Henry, his French campaign had been a virtual disaster, and as 1545
opened his commanders Arundel, Norfolk, and Suffolk were struggling to hold Boulogne
and Calais from the seiges of the dauphin. Anglo-French peace negotiations had stalled;
when told that the English defenses were weakening, Henry remarked, “Give up

5 Sanderson, Cardinal Of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1986), p.200.
6 Ibid., p.200.
7 The Scottish Correspondence, p. 123.
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Boulogne, forsooth!”.8 In Scotland, a convention in December had absolved all the
former assured lords of treason. Sir Ralph Evers and the other English border officers
were making an average of a dozen raids a month into the marches to keep the reunited
Scotsmen off guard.9 The high costs of supplying the English soldiers in the north during
winter actually forced the privy council to appoint a commission to collect an unpopular
and unconstitutional benevolence from the king’s subjects.10 Probably as a result of these
hefty expenses, English agents in the north (including Sadler at Darlington) were
instructed to remain in contact with many o f the newly pardoned Scottish lords and urge
them once again to work actively for the English cause. The Lutheran Casillis was
pledged to the queen dowager, but again sided with the English, and Lennox was
dispatched to Carlisle in an attempt to bring the Douglas brothers back into the fold. Yet
by 1545, Henry was much less trusting of Angus and Sir George, and put a price on their
heads for capture if they refused to cooperate with Lennox.11 If nothing else, Henry
reckoned that the Douglas brothers might be able to give information about French plans
to land troops in Scotland. Sir George Douglas indeed informed Sir Ralph Evers in
February that the French Captain de Lorges Montgomery was arriving in March with six
thousand French soldiers for an invasion o f England.12 Sir George also stated that
rumors in Scotland were that “if master here, the King [Henry] would make their

8 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, preface, p.xl.
9 Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. p.452.
10 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #16-18, pp. 10-11.
11 LP, Vol.19, Part II, #719, pp.433-434 / Vol.20, Part 1, #4, pp. 1-2.
12 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #202, pp.88-89.
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gentlemen no better than shepherds,” and that certain Scots “say that the King will make
a plain conquest, and kill man, woman, and child. Gentle handling and good words will
help the King’s affairs.”13 It seems Douglas spoke the truth here, honestly relating the
feelings and fears of his countrymen while also hoping that Henry would again show him
favor. Yet neither Evers nor Henry took these words very seriously, and in late February
Evers led a large force into Teviotdale to destroy some border towns that could be used to
garrison Scottish or French invaders. What happened next has been long debated by
historians, but was without a doubt an event of much significance for the Scots.
On or about February 27, 1545, Evers’ troops devastated the town o f Melrose and
ruined the Douglas family tombs located nearby. On guard against just such an attack,
Governor Arran and the earl of Angus led a force of equal size from Jedburgh to engage
the English. They overtook them at Ancrum Moor, where the Scots had the advantage of
the high ground. Reportedly furious over the desecration of the Douglas tombs, Angus
himself led the Scottish assault which resulted in a humilating English defeat. Evers was
slain along with many of his officers.14 Even though the encounter was actually slight,
the Scots were nonetheless overjoyed, and from first-hand accounts Sadler reported to
Henry that,
the Governor...took him [Angus] about the neck and kissed him
20 times, saying he repented having ever mistrusted him, who
had that day done so much for Scotland. Whereunto Anguisshe
answered that God knew his loyalty to his native country.15

13 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #265, p.l 18.
14 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #285, p.130.
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Thus, Hamilton and Douglas were on the surface reconciled, and all Scotland rejoiced at
the news of victory, the first decisive success for Scottish arms against England in
generations. Yet, Angus did not turn patriotic so abruptly, for he later explained to
Casillis that Evers had forced him to fight or else take great shame, and still pledged
devotion to the king o f England.16 In fact, as Gordon Donaldson stated, as of late 1544,
“Angus was granted a Scottish pension of one thousand pounds - possibly a more cogent
argument than the spoliation of Melrose in causing him to lead the Scots at Ancrum.” 17
By the Spring o f 1545, Henry and his privy council faced a greater threat from
their enemies then they ever had in 1539,and barricaded England on all sides against a
two-front invasion by the French. The defeat at Ancrum had created considerable
apprehension for the safety of the borders, and Casillis was directed to query the Scottish
Council concerning an Anglo-Scottish treaty. Yet, he reported that the military victory
and imminent arrival of de Lorges had strengthened the government’s resolve, and talk in
Scotland was o f war, not peace.18 A summons for men to join an expedition to England
had already been sent across the kingdom, and Casillis barely escaped arrest in Edinburgh
as an English agent. At the end of May, the French fleet finally arrived in the Clyde, with
over two thousand men, five hundred horse, and sixty thousand crowns to aid the Scots in
invading England.19 A convention was hastily called at Stirling to welcome de Lorges
and reconfirm Scotland’s formal support of the Auld Alliance. Jacques de Montgomery,

16 Ibjd., p.233.
17 Donaldson, James V-VII. p.72.
18 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #547, p.259.
19 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #457, p.203.
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Seigneur de Lorges, was of Scottish extraction himself and a captain in the king of
France’s Scots Guard, yet his background did not ensure smooth interaction with the
Scottish leaders and from the start there was friction between the French and the Scots.
Curiously enough, Francis I attached safeguards to de Lorges instructions,
warning him to be suspicious of the Scots and not trust anyone without due consideration.
At the convention at Stirling on June 26, fifty-four Scots signed a document in favor of
persuing war with England, and a “bipartisan” commission that included Angus, Huntley,
Argyle, Bothwell, Rothes, Glencaim, Arran, Beaton, and the queen Dowager were to plan
the conduct of the war.20 Yet, from the beginning de Lorges acted like a commander
rather than an auxilary captain, and it was soon clear to the Scottish lords that France
regarded operations in Scotland “simply as part of a wider military commitment.”21 As
Sir George Douglas had stated in February, the Scots believed that Francis was sending
them six thousand troops instead of the two thousand that actually arrived; the result was
to put more pressure on the Scots to assemble an army. A kingdom-wide muster arranged
for Roslin on July 28 was poorly attended, and French soldiers stationed in Edinburgh
soon became very unpopular. As in 1542, the Scots refused to risk invasion for the sake
o f another party. But there were other reasons for the change of heart and subsequent
lack of commitment to the invasion found in Scotland that summer.
The first concerns Sir George Douglas and a secret meeting that occurred on July
4 with Hertford’s servant, Thomas Forster. Asked about the expedition to England,

20 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #1049, p.504.
21 Sanderson, Cardinal of Scotland, p.201.
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Douglas stated that he “would do his best to stop them," and also remarked, although it
may or may not have been the truth, that “the Cardinal was thought the only occasion of
the war and was smally beloved.”22 But in addition to the calculated patronizing of Sir
George, Forster also secretly met with Casillis and Angus and they too pledged to remain
true to Henry and prevent the invasion. Angus did in fact lead the Scottish opposition to
the campaign in the war council, and Huntley was named the new lieutenant of the
borders. Thus, this group of seemingly pro-English lords may have had something to do
with the low turnout at Roslin, yet just weeks before Angus was seen leading Scottish
forces against Lennox and his English-sponsored clansmen in the west. Probably the
main reason the Scots were indifferent towards war with England was because they had
had enough destruction and desired peace. According to the Imperial Ambassador
Chapuys, “the Scots were thought to be short of food,” and the French soldiers were
“already deserting because of famine,” no doubt because the lowland fields had been
decimated over the previous twelve months.23 The Scottish lords, who never appeared to
share the warring zeal o f Henry’s men or the anti-English hatred of the Scottish bishops,
had their own problems to deal with in their own territories without having to risk another
Solway Moss. Argyle, for instance, had to remain on his lands in the west for fear of an
invasion from a rebel coalition of clans led by a “Lord Donald of the Isles”, who was
charged with “burning harrying and slaying in the service o f the King of England.”24 But

22 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #1106, pp.544-545.
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that they were ill-prepared and hesitant to attack is not to say that the Scots were idle in
their defenses, for a special force was raised through an extraordinary tax to defend the
borders in the Merse and Teviotdale.25 Nevertheless, by the summer of 1545 the mood in
Scotland had changed and the fiery thoughts of war had been dampened by the scarcity of
food, the presence of the French troops, the caution of the Scottish nobility, and the
realization that it would be foolish to provoke the English king. The prevailing attitude
now favored defense over an offensive, and no doubt many Scots feared that if Henry was
pushed too far, he would again take vengeance on Scotland as he had done the previous
year.
Henry was, in fact, planning to raise a large force along the borders, one that
could both defend England from a Franco-Scottish invasion and be used to form an
English expedition to Scotland that August. In May, 1545 Hertford reprised his role as
lieutenant o f the north and the privy council calculated expenses for the “putting ready of
the army of 30,000 men which the King has determined to levy for resistance o f the
enemy.”26 The northern recruits were additionally reinforced by the arrival of Spanish
and German mercenaries. But strangely enough, by the summer the English no longer
anticipated a devastating attack from the north. By June Hertford knew that de Lorges
brought with him a small company, and that “the Scots cannot at this season keep men
together for lack of victuals.” Consequently, he requested that his own invasion of

25 Donaldson, James V-VII. p.72.
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Scotland commence as soon as possible.27 Yet, the shortage of food was not the only
reason the English considered themselves safe from a Scottish invasion in July, for as
Chapuys noted, “the Scots have been so punished and are so disunited that they are
unlikely to invade [England] in force”.28 Thus, the prevailing opinion was that the
Scottish government was not nearly as unified as Beaton had made it seem in his
optimistic letters to France and Rome.
Lord Methven wrote the queen dowager before the June Convention at Stirling
that “your graice is prinsipall mediatrix to lawbour concord betuix all lordis and greit
men...and to solist tham to mak unyte and concord wythin all thar bounds,”.29 So it
appears that an invasion of England was not as desirable to the nobles as Francophiles
such as Beaton and Mary of Guise would have liked. Beaton wrote to Pope Paul III on
July 6 that “the quarrels of the nobility are appeased, and heretical opinions almost
extinguished,”30 yet Annie Cameron states that the correspondence of the queen dowager
clearly shows that “the country was honeycombed with heresy, distrust, and private
feuds,” and Scottish unity was only a nominal reality.31 In any case, probably the most
significant indication of the state o f Scottish unity was the invasion of England in early
August, which supports Cameron’s contention that the internal dissention continued
throughout 1545.

27 LP, Vol.20, Part 1, #906, p.448.
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Referring to the Franco-Scottish invasion of England, Knox wrote that the troops
“returned with more shame to the realm than scathe to their enemies.”32 The expedition
proved a failure and humiliated Beaton and the Scottish government. No more than a
few thousand Scots gathered on July 28 at Roslin (although the Scots reported as many as
fifteen thousand) where they joined the two thousand French soldiers and marched
toward the borders. They were nominally led by Governor Arran, but were in fact under
the fateful command o f Angus and the previously pro-English Glencaim. The Scots
encamped near Wark castle and proceeded to make daily incursions into England,
burning a few fields and towns, but never venturing more than a few miles from the
borders. De Lorges urged Arran and Angus to penetrate farther into England, but for
want of heavy artillery and more troops, the Scots refused. On August 14, Hertford
reported that the Scots and their French allies had retreated having done little damage.33
About the same time a French armada of over two hundred ships was harassing the
southern English coastline, having been sighted by the King’s flagship, Great Harry, on
July 19.34 By August 9, Lord Lisle had put out from Portsmouth to battle the French, but
apart from a few skirmishes, nothing decisive occurred and the French retreated. As J.J.
Scarisbrick stated, “by early September...the threat of invasionseemed miraculously to
have lifted,”35 and Henry was free once again to take vengeance on the Scots.
Hertford deliberately postponed his counter-invasion of Scotland until early

32 Sanderson, Cardinal o f Scotland, p.203.
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September, when “the year being very forward, the Scots’ com will be ripe and shorn.”36
The large English expedition, including many foreign mercenaries, reached Kelso by
September 9, and over the following two weeks devastated, killed, pillaged, and burned
all it could throughout the Scottish lowlands. The expedition hit Catholic buildings and
places of worship especially hard. Hertford’s second invasion was nearly as destructive
as his first:
Fortresses, Abbeys, Frere-houses, Market Townes, Villages,
Towres & Places brent, raced, and cast downe by commandment
of Therll of Hertforde...Between the 8th of Sept and the 23d of
the same...Sum Total...287.37
Although Hertford avoided larger towns such as Edinburgh and Stirling, and killed many
fewer Scots than in 1544, his destruction of the crops worsened the already critical food
shortage in Scotland, which had the effect of creating more critics of Beaton’s
government. In fact, the “Rough Wooing” of 1544-45 served to bring many Scots in the
west country and along the borders over to the English side. Tired of the disruption of
life caused by both armies, the men of the Merse, Teviotdale, and parts of the Lothians
sought to “assure” themselves to the English in great numbers. As a result, the English
faced little resistance and the “assured” Scots for the most part were spared the
destruction that befell their neighbors. Actually, the government’s problem of border
Scots assuring to England had been of great importance ever since the beginning of
Arran's reformist policies in early 1543.

36 L£, Vol.20, Part II, #130, p.61.
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As M.H. Merriman states, there was a “sustained and remarkably systematic
English effort during the Rough Wooing to create a body of collaborators - Scots who
worked for an English victory in this particular war”.38 However, unlike the assured
lords, the majority of assured Scots were commoners along the borders who, for fear or
religious reasons, sided with the English against their countrymen. The Scottish
government took action against the collaborators in early 1545, and by June had lists
compiled of persons suspected of assurance to England.39 The attention paid to the
assured Scots was not only a response to their collaboration, but also to their military
importance, for Merriman contends that
In early 1545...Arran moved in force against the assured in
Teviotdale and the Merse, and on 27 February, owing to the
revolt of Scots serving in the English force, the battle of
Ancrum Moor was won. This was followed up by a general
pardon...But in September the English merely had to attack
once again in great strength and all reassured with alacrity.40
An act of Parliament on October 2, 1545 declared all Scots’ assurances with the English
discharged under the threat of loss of land and goods to the government, and by 1548 a
confirmed assured Scot was to be immediately hung, drawn, and quartered as a traitor.41
But the fact that the Scottish government moved with such severity against the assured
Scots reveals that these collaborators were dangerous to the continued independence of
Scotland. This was true in both a political and a religious sense, for of all the assured
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Scots, it was the religious reformers who gave the English “their most consistent and
devoted supporters.”42 This religious aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations, combined with
ruthless English politics, brought about the murder o f Cardinal Beaton in 1546.
English plans for the elimination of Beaton had in fact originated long before the
act was committed at the cardinal’s own castle at St. Andrews in late May 1546. As early
as March 1543, Sir Ralph Sadler subtlely remarked to the earl of Glencaim that “it were
pity but he [Beaton] should receive such reward as his merits did require.”43 Nothing
more came of the idea until April of 1544, when a Scotsman named “Wysshert” arrived
in Newcastle with a letter for Hertford and Sadler concerning an arrangement to be made
with Henry. Supposedly, the former Treasurer of Scotland (the Laird of Grange, James
Kirkaldy), the master of Rothes (Norman Leslie), and John Charteris were prepared to
“apprehend or slay the Cardinal...if they knew what support the King would give them
afterwards.”44 The would-be assassins’ motives seemed to be both political and religious,
for they wanted one thousand English troops of Hertford’s invasion force to aid them in
destroying various abbeys and bishops’ houses, while also capturing the chief opponents
of amity with England. The privy council responded to Hertford that“if the lords and
gentlemen he named be compelled to flee into this realm, they shallbe relieved as shall
appertain;” and approved a grant of one thousand pounds for the conspirators.45 In late
May of that year, Henry himself dispatched two messengers from Rothes and two of his
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own agents to Scotland and ordered Hertford secretly to allow them to cross the borders.46
The letter, addressed from the privy council to Hertford, fails to explain the reasons
behind their mission, but if an assassination attempt was made in 1544, it was
undocumented and did not cost the lives of the main conspirators. In any case, it was not
until 1545 when the scheme surfaced again, and this time it was driven not by reformist
fervor, but by political motivation.
By 1545, Henry was less vague in his exhortations to eliminate Beaton, but still
wanted to distance himself as far as possible from the actual plot. On May 30, the privy
council informed Hertford that the king had seen letters from Casillis to Sadler that
contained “an offer to kill the cardinal.” The calculated response from London stated
that,
As to the first point [the murder of Beaton], the King, reputing
the fact not meet to be set forward by him, and yet not misliking
the offer, thinks that Sadler should write to Cassillis that it does
not seem meet to be communicated to the King, but that if he [Sadler]
were in Cassillis’s place he would do what he could for its
execution, thinking thereby to do the King acceptable service
and to benefit Scotland.47
Thus, Henry approved of the plan passed on by Casillis to eliminate Beaton, but
delegated the matter to Sir Ralph Sadler, not wanting directly to involve himself in a
murder plot. Then in July a set of ciphered messages were sent to the Council of the
North (Hertford, Sadler, Tunstall) from the laird of Brimstone, “touching the killing of
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the Cardinal.”48 The matter was referred to Sadler, who responded to Brimstone that it
would be an ’’acceptable service to God to take him out o f the way who does so much to
obscure God’s glory and confound the common weal,’’and added that a reward would be
“paid immediately upon the act executed.”49 Sadler added that Sir George Douglas, “who
appears to be of the same opinion touching the Cardinal,” also be informed of what he
has written. While the previous messages from the privy council concerning the murder
of Beaton had been vague and questionable, Sadler plainly urged the conspirators to go
forth and eliminate “the worker o f all mischief...the Cardinal,” and assured them that the
King would “liberally reward” them for their actions.50 This letter was most likely the
assurance the conspirators needed to go forward with the plot, and the frequency with
which Sadler mentioned the reward reveals that profit was probably as much a
consideration in the scheme as politics or religion. Yet, in this case the religious fervor
came from Sadler himself, who was a strict Protestant and justified the murder as an
event which would be looked upon favorably by God.
By the Spring of 1545, Beaton was firmly in control of the Scottish government
and the religious toleration of 1543 was only a memory. But, whereas the heretical
activity o f 1543 had been dealt with severely by prosecutions in the winter o f 1543-44,
Beaton’s preoccupation with war and political dissention had prevented him from dealing
as effectively with the reformists in 1545.51 Thus, renegade preachers were beginning to
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gain a sympathetic following in places such as Dundee and the Meams where they could
preach publicly to a general audience. The most prolific of these preachers was George
Wishart, a Scotsman who held strong Protesant leanings and was an excellent
communicator with the masses. The Cardinal himself ordered Wishart to cease preaching
in mid-1545, but Wishart defied the order and by the autumn of 1545 had returned to
Dundee to comfort those who had contracted the plague. Wishart’s fame spread rapidly,
and a zealous former schoolteacher and tutor to the Douglas family named John Knox
became his bodyguard, wielding a large broad sword at Wishart’s side during public
sermons.52 But in addition to being a popular and respected evengelist, Wishart also may
have been involved in the long-term plot to murder Beaton.
Although it is virtually impossible to prove, Wishart might have been an original
member o f the group conspiring to kill the cardinal. Wishart could have been the Scot
“Wysshert” who delivered the first datable conspiracy message to Hertford and Sadler in
1544. He was definitely in contact with Casillis, Glencaim, and other reformist lords
throughout the period, and was frequently sponsored and protected by local gentlemen
who were members o f the Leslie or Kirkcaldy families. Sir George Douglas, who also
knew of the plot, attended several of Wishart’s sermons, and Wishart himself was known
to have visited England on various occasions, possibly as one of Leslie’s agents to Henry
in 1544. But whatever his connection to the plot to murder Beaton, it was as a heretic
that Wishart was arrested in January 1546 and handed over to the cardinal by the earl of
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Both well.53
By 1546, de Lorges Montgomery and his French troops had left Scotland in
disgust, the money to finance a war with England was running low, the Scottish bishops
were losing ground to reformist ideas, and the cardinal was facing political opposition
from the notoriously fickle Scottish lords. Margaret Sanderson noted that it was "against
this background of domestic and international frustration and failure and hint of layecclesiastical friction that the trial of George Wishart has to be seen.”54 Beaton was
aware of the opposition he faced from the lay nobility and wanted to restore a sense of
order and ecclesiastical authority over the country. On March 1, the cardinal personally
presided over Wishart’s trial at St. Andrews Cathedral before a large convocation of
clergy. The sympathy in the cathedral for Wishart was shown when armed guards cleared
the building of spectators before the sentence of guilt was announced.55 Wishart was
immediately taken the short distance to the cardinal’s castle and burned alive. Whether
or not Wishart was an English agent, this gruesome spectacle finally sparked the Scottish
conspirators into action. In the two months that followed the execution, Wishart became
a martyr to the Protestant cause, and Beaton set off on a progress to Perth with the
governor, intent on repressing heretics.
On May 28, soon after the cardinal had returned to his castle, Norman Leslie and
the laird of Grange’s son, William Kirkcaldy, met with James Melville and a host of other

53 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol.l, #37.
54 Sanderson, Cardinal of Scotland, p.211.
55 Ibid.. p.218.

150

reform-minded individuals in St. Andrews. Early the next morning, Leslie and the rest
stormed the castle and murdered the cardinal in retaliation for the death of Wishart.56
Yet, Gordon Donaldson surmises that the murder was not entirely based on revenge or
religious fervor, for personal motives may have led the conspirators to kill Beaton before
he took repressive action against them.57 Money was obviously a factor in the killing, but
the action itself may have increased anti-Catholic sentiment throughout the country, for
over the next few months various churches were desecrated or looted. Yet the assassins
did not seem to have a broad base of support, and there were no risings against members
of the Scottish clergy. In fact, Knox contends that some of the murderers were in
Protestant eyes “men without God,” and represented radical elements which even
conservative reformers would have found distasteful.58 At any rate, the man who had
controlled Scotland was dead, and there was no one equally skilled to take his place. As
the cardinal himself muttered as he died, “fy, fy: all is gone”.59
Beaton’s murderers barricaded themselves inside the castle and for the next
twelve months St. Andrews became a refuge for prosecuted Protestants. John Knox
himself joined the group in April of 1547, and first began to preach from the pulpits o f St.
Andrews. The murderers looked to England for aid in fleeing Scotland, but the English
privy council refused to become involved in what would surely become an international
incident. Arran also hesitated to take action against the conspirators, mainly because his

56 The Works o f John Knox, vol.l, pp.173-177.
57 Donaldson, James V-VII. pp.74-75.
58 Ibid.. p.75.
59 The Works of John Knox, vol.l, p. 177.
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son had been under Beaton’s protection and was now a hostage. Finally, in July 1547
French ships under the command of Peter Strozzi bombarded St. Andrews castle and took
the survivors prisoner. Knox was enslaved in French galleys for the next two years
before he returned to Scotland in 1549.
Although Beaton did not unify Scotland politically or religiously, he at least had
the diplomatic ability to keep the various personalities, feuds, and factions in check.
Upon Beaton’s death, Scottish politics again revealed the internal dissention that had
marked it in 1543. As Gordon Donaldson stated, “the coalition which Beaton’s
astuteness had built up had disintigrated.”60 A parliament was hastily convened in
Edinburgh on June 11, 1546 with the intention of keeping Scottish politics united under
Governor Arran and the queen dowager. On that day parliament issued three important,
telling statements. The first formally overturned the band concerning the marriage of
Queen Mary to Prince Edward o f England, reiterating that even with the cardinal gone,
the Scots refused to ally with King Henry.61 The second was a proclamation prohibiting
communication with Beaton's murderers in St. Andrews castle, which suggests that the
conspirators were receiving aid from the outside.62 Similarly, the third was a
proclamation forbidding additional “outrage” toward ecclesiastical buildings and
demanded restoration of the places seized or desecrated.63 In late July, the governor and
queen dowager worked together to charge Norman Leslie with treason; a month later

60 Donaldson, James V-VII. p.76.
61 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland. Vol.l, #52.
62 Ibid.. #49.
63 Ibid.. #55.
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they ordered St. Andrews Castle beseiged.64 Yet, Arran and Mary of Guise were allied
out of mutual necessity and by the summer of 1546 “the Governor and Dowager again
began to strain in their several directions.”65
On July 31,1546, the Scottish Parliament accepted the comprehension of
Scotland in the Anglo-French Treaty of Campe, but the Scots were left at war with
England and with no word of French aid should Henry decide to continue his Rough
Wooing that autumn. The former provost of Edinburgh, Sir Adam Otterbum, was hastily
sent to London. The ambassador’s instructions indicated the underlying differences and
vague intentions of the Scottish government, for Otterbum was one o f the dowager’s
men, but was supposed to work closely with David Paniter, Arran’s secretary. On
September 26, Otterbum was summoned “to cum to Sanctandrois: and the effect was to
pas in Yngland, and the secreter and I to be in commissioun and gif we agre nocht, he to
pas in France to know the Kyng of Francis mynd.”66 Not surprisingly, the Scottish
emissaries could come to no agreement with the English, but they at least helped
convince Henry to withhold aid to St. Andrews (the prospect of English interference was
widely rumored in Scotland and greatly feared by the Scottish government).67 In any
case, by late January 1547 everything changed when Henry VIII abmptly died at the age
of fifty-five.
The Rough Wooing was over, but the fires of Anglo-Scottish hostility were not

64 Ibid., #64, #73.
65 The Scottish Correspondence, p .163.
66 Ibid., #CXXIII, pp. 170-171.
67 Ibid., #CXXII, p. 170.
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estinguished by the deaths of Cardinal Beaton and Henry VIII. Edward Seymour, the earl
of Hertford, gained the titles duke of Somerset and Lord Protector of England, and carried
with him a much more systematic plan for the control of Scotland than Henry had ever
considered. Ottterbum received no better results with Somerset than he had with Henry,
and his own government’s conflicting agendas made his task nearly impossible. He
wrote accusingly to Arran that “I repent sair that ther is sa grete respect to particular
proffeit and na respect to the common wele.”68 His words rang true, for the new Admiral
of Scotland, Bothwell, was warded at Blackness that July for “trafficking with England.”
Before leaving England, Otterbum wrote Arran in alarm that “I saw afoir my eis verray
gret preparation of weir," and added that Somerset admitted he had failed to discover
“better wayis to be had than the effusion of blude and distructioun,” in dealing with the
Scots.69 The ambassador declared to Arran that the Scottish government was “sufficientle
advertist” of the imminent English invasion, and hence should hastily do everything
possible to prepare their defenses.70 By March 17, the Scottish privy council noted the
"disturbed state of the country."71
On “Black Saturday”, September 10, 1547, the Scots were handed their second
crushing defeat of the decade at the Battle of Pinkie. Among the primary causes of the
debacle were the lack of trust between the Scottish lords - particularly between Arran and
Angus - poor military leadership, and a non-confident and ill-prepared Scottish army.

68 Ibid-, #CXXXIX, p. 190.
69 Ibid,. #CXLI, p. 192.
70 Ibid., #CXLI. P. 194.
71 Register of the Privv Council of Scotland, vol.l, #110.
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Somerset finally had the chance to implement his policy of garrisoning Scotland with
English troops in order to secure Scottish acceptance of Edward VI as their overlord and
protect the assured Scots. As M.L. Bush stated, “Somerset’s obsession dictated affairs:
the garrison policy was maintained,” even when it became unworkable with the arrival of
large numbers of French soldiers in June, 1548.72 England’s policy of controlling
Scotland by military force led the French king, Henry II, to send ten thousand troops to
the Firth of Forth in order to repulse the English and garrison the kingdom for France.
Scotland thus became the prize in a military tug-of-war between England and France for
the remainder of the 1540's. Foreign intervention meant the loss of Scottish political
independence, signified by the removal of Queen Mary to France in late July, 1548.

72 Bush, The Government Policy o f Protector Somerset, pp. 19 & 25.

Conclusion
‘Why think you that this treaty will be performed?’ ‘Why not?’
said Sadler. ‘I assure you,’ replied Otterbum, ‘it is not possible,
for our people do not like it. ’ Sadler said he could not understand
this, ‘these two realmes, being knytte and conjoyned in one, the
subjects o f the same, which have always been infested with the
warres, myght live in welth and perpetual peas.’ ‘Well,’ said
Otterbum, ‘if you had the lass and we the lad, we could be well
content with it, but I cannot believe that your nation would agree
to have a Scot be king of England. And, likewise, I assure you
that our nation, being a stout nation, will never agree to have an
Englishman to be king of Scotland; our common people and the
stones in the street would rise and rebel against it.’1
Somerset's overthrow in October 1549 ended England's policy of controlling
Scotland by force, and since Mary Queen of Scots had been removed to Paris, Scotland in
the 1550's almost became a province of France. Without the young Queen in his
possession, Governor Arran could not prevent the increase of French influence in
Scottish politics that resulted in Mary o f Guise assuming the regency in 1554. Yet, just
when Anglo-Scottish relations had reached a standstill, the spread of reformist ideas in
Scotland pushed the Scots away from their "auld" ally and towards England. By 1560,
Scottish Protestants under Knox had overturned the powerful Scottish clergy, and France
lost her power base in Scotland. Knox and his followers, with English assistance, had
effected not only a religious reformation, but a political one as well. The resulting Treaty
o f Edinburgh ended the four-century old Auld Alliance and marked the beginning of a
new alliance with England. Still, there remained much distrust and misunderstanding
between the two kingdoms, which only a long period of peace and open negotiations

1 Paul, “Edinburgh in 1544", p. 130.
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could change. The 1540's had revealed that future relations would have to be made on
even terms or positive results would be few in number. "If Scotland was to take up house
with England it must be as a sister, not as a bondswoman. Henry never understood that."2
Although Henry's "gentle" and "rough" wooing was never meant to effect a union
between the two realms, the intense politics and complex diplomatic situation did lead to
a few new ideas concerning a mutually beneficial alliance.
The burgher and assured Scot James Henrisoun, for instance, was one of the first
writers to use the term "Great Britain" to promote Anglo-Scottish amity. Henrisoun felt,
like many other merchants, that an alliance with England would benefit Scottish trade.
He also noted that the two kingdoms shared ties of language and blood, as well as a
commitment to the reformed faith.3 Likewise, in 1542 a highland "redshank" named John
Elder presented Henry with a tract which villified Beaton and the Roman Church,
denounced the French alliance, and argued for union between the two realms for religious
purposes.4 Whether the attitudes o f these two very different Scotsmen were shared by
very many of their countrymen in 1543 remains unknown. Henry in particular wished to
exploit the idea o f religious reform which caused so many Scots to support the proEnglish party . Were it not for the reformist influence from across the border and Queen

2 J.D. Mackie "Henry VIII and Scotland", Transactions of the Roval Historical Society.
4th Series, 29.1947, p. 114.
3 Merriman, "James Henrisoun and 'Great Britain': British union and the Scottish
Commonweal" in R.Mason, ed., Scotland and England 1286-1815 (Edinburgh,
1987), pp.85-112.
4 Elder, "A Proposal for Uniting Scotland with England..." in The Bannatvne Miscellany.
ed. W. Scott, D. Laing, and T. Thomson, (New York, 1973), vol.l.
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Elizabeth I’s intervention in 1560, Knox and the other Scottish reformers would have
been less likely to defeat the bishops, and in turn, French control. Thus, Anglo-Scottish
amity in the future was to go hand-in-hand with reformist sentiment, a fact that Henry had
recognized and worked to exploit through Sadler's embassies and the assured lords.
Nonetheless, Scotland was felt by most Englishmen to be, "a poor shabby sort of
place whose ill-clad inhabitants turned a dishonest penny by robbing one another,
harrying the borders, and making dishonourable raids upon England in the interest of
France."5 It seems that the failure of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement in the 1540's
partially rested on the fact that English policy was too patronizing toward the Scots. If
Henry and Sadler truly regarded the Scottish leaders as nothing more than uncivilized
buffoons, they grossly underestimated the political skills and resolve of their northern
neighbors. Sadler in particular seemed to view the Scots only in religious terms, trusting
those who appeared to be reformists and suspicious of all the rest. This attitude adversely
affected his mission for he was too quick to believe Arran's promises and prone to
disregard Beaton and the conservative earls. Because he felt the Scots would naturally
want to align with England and the reformed faith following the death o f James, Sadler
was blind to the fact that the Scots felt independence to be more important than friendship
with England and misjudged the attitude o f a nobility that would support an English
alliance but not English political control. Sadler was simply not practical enough to use
the personal divisions between the Scottish nobles to his advantage. But the failure of

5 M ackie, "Henry VIII and Scotland", pp. 112-113.

158

the "gentle" wooing was not his alone, for even if he had recognized how much the Scots
desired political freedom, it is doubtful he could have persuaded Henry to alter his
demands. Sir Walter Scott once wrote of Sadler that "he had to contend with the
prejudices which centuries of war had engraved in the bosom of the Scottish nation," and
"the impatient, haughty, and furious temper of King Henry, added to the obstacles which
the ambassador had to encounter."6 In the end, Sadler was simply an unfortunate prisoner
of his king's poorly-designed foreign policy.
Governor Arran, on the other hand, was a prisoner to both the factionalism of his
own countrymen and the political and military advances of the two powers who wished to
exert their control over Scotland. Over the course of eight months in 1543, the governor
swung from advocating pro-English relations and religious reform to allying with a hated
enemy and placing the kingdom under papal protection. Since Arran had in fact
capitulated to Rome three months before turning his back on Henry and Sadler, it appears
as though he was working in France's favor long before he defected to Beaton. Yet that
was not the case. Arran had worked closely with the assured lords in early 1543 to
initiate religious reform and block the French and papal influence that he and many other
Scottish nobles believed had contributed to the debacle at Solway Moss. For a time,
Arran challenged the ingrained Scottish enmity toward England even as Henry made his
condescending demands. However, the governor felt it more important to maintain his
position as regent, which meant doing what he could to retain the support of the nobility

6 SSP. p.xi.
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and bishops after the reformist backlash of Solway Moss had been forgotten. Margaret
Sanderson perhaps put the enigma of Arran best when she wrote, "Aware that he was
being used, he spent his time evading commitment to policies that might in any way
threaten his interests."7 Arran's primary interest was protecting young Mary from any
outside threats, thus preserving both the independence of Scotland and his governorship.
When he realized that Henry's inflated demands and the assured lords were turning the
country against him, he without remorse switched to the faction which would better allow
him to remain governor of Scotland. Even after his capitulation to the Pope in May,
1543, Arran continued playing off all sides in the hope of gaining as much as he could
without being forced into any one particular course of action. His actions are more
comprehensible if it is realized that he had little political experience and was not
committed to follow one political path or another. Arran certainly stalled the English for
time in 1543, but that was the most politically practical thing for him to do, and his
reputation as a weak and indecisive man actually helped him to achieve that purpose.
History has given Arran a questionable if not outright soiled reputation as a foolish and
unfit leader at a time when the Scots most needed a strong presence in Holyrood. Yet one
has to consider that in 1543, Arran kept England from obtaining the young Queen and
thus gaining political control of Scotland, while at the same time preventing a devastating
English invasion. He could have easily accepted Henry's proposal of a kingship, or
invited an English army into Scotland to defeat Beaton, and that he did neither shows he

7 Sanderson, Cardinal o f Scotland, p. 160.
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was competent enough to lead Scotland but not wise enough to hold his own power.
After Sadler, Arran, the king and the cardinal, perhaps the most intriguing figures
in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy o f the 1540's were the Scots nobility; both assured lords
and conservative earls. A traditionally factionalized group in normal circumstances, both
the Anglophile and Francophile lords were quick to place self-interest over loyalty to
kings and religion. They refused to act as pawns for others if they were not substantially
rewarded with profit or position. As Stephen Wood shows in his study of the Auld
Alliance, the problem "which had always dogged Franco-Scottish relations, was that the
Scots nobles...had fairly consistently resented the fact that the alliance always seemed to
work for France's advantage and rarely that of Scotland."8 The Scottish nobility
attempted to maintain the kingdom's political freedom against both the Francophile
clergy and Henrician demands for it was in their best interests to do so. Casillis,
Glencaim, Huntley, Argyle, and the rest, no matter which side they espoused, shared ageold suspicions of England and the Scottish bishops, and would rather themselves have
controlled Scotland. The Scottish nobles were very proud men, and under the blanket of
political practicality there can be found an underlying amount of national sentiment in
many of their actions, the most significant of which being their united refusal to deliver
young Mary to England. No doubt the willingness of the Scots nobles to take sides in the
1540's was based on calculations o f profit, but they were always much more inclined to
fight for political control amongst themselves and often turned on objects of French or

8 Wood, The Auld Alliance (Edinburgh, 1989), p. 10.
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English authority in Edinburgh.
As always, Henry VIII was liberal with his advice and instructions to Sadler and
the assured lords in 1543, but simply never grasped the complexity of the situation north
of the border. If Scotland had been foremost on his mind, the king doubtless would have
laid out a more sound and sucessful long-term policy. Yet, Eustace Chapuys noted that
the privy council had informed him "how Henry thought of nothing else, night and day,
but the invasion of France."9 At any rate, a lengthy political strategy (other than assuring
common Scots to England) would have been contrary to the way in which the old
monarch had come to rule by the second half o f his reign, when "foreign policy became a
matter o f day-to-day tactics rather than o f long-term planning."10
Possibly the most pertinent question is what Henry hoped to gain from his
Scottish policy. Why did the Scots not submit to his demands? Clearly, Henry was not
at all interested in union with Scotland, or even an alliance, for all he required was the
immediate assurance that the Scots would remain on their side of the border during his
invasion of France. The support of reformist Scots, the marriage treaty, the assured lords,
Hertford's two invasions, and the propagandists claims o f English sovereignty were
short-term tactics designed to make the Scots submit. In reality, the Scots interpreted
Henry's "gentle" tactics as humiliating threats of English domination, while his "rough"
strategy only united the Scots through fear and anger into greater resistance to his wishes.

9 Scarisbrick, Henry VIII. p.445, footnote #4.
10 Potter, "Foreign Policy" in D. MacCulloch, ed., The Reign of Henrv VIII (New York,
1995), p.133.
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Ironically, while the "Rough Wooing" helped make Henry's chief antagonist, Cardinal
Beaton, the sole ruler of Scotland, his murder with Henry's approval in 1546 eventually
opened the door to an increased French presence in Edinburgh after the king's death. At
any rate, Anglo-Scottish relations from 1543-1546 were in the end determined by the
diplomacy and personal agendas of the handful of individuals identified in this essay.
The individual ruthlessness of everyone from Henry to Mary of Guise to achieve his or
her respective personal and political goals cannot be overemphasized. Religion and
popular national sentiment played a large part, but the often unpredictable actions o f the
main political figures in England, Scotland, and France decided the final course o f events.
It was ultimately their complex personalities which made the diplomatic circumstances so
complicated in the period before, during, and after the "Rough Wooing".
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